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PROCEEDINGS - EXPROPRIATION
REGIONAL CONFERENCE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
COLLEGE OF LAW APRIL 15, 1972

The morning session convened at 9:00 o'clock A.M. in the
auditorium of the Law Center of the University of Denver, Mr.
John A. Moore of the firm of Holland & Hart, Denver, presiding.
Dean Robert B. Yegge of the University of Denver College
of Law and Terry Norbury, President of the University of Denver International Law Society welcomed the participants and
guests to the conference.
The Chairman then introduced the speakers, Professor William Loehr, of the University of Denver Graduate School of
International Studies, Professor Richard Lillich of the University
of Virginia Law School, Professor Burns H. Weston of the
University of Iowa College of Law, Fredrick Kirgis of the
University of Colorado School of Law, and Keith Williams,
Attorney at Law. Chairman Moore invited Professor Loehr

to begin.
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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNITED STATES
CORPORATE POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA
PROFESSOR WILLIAM LOEHR*

As many of you know, my only experience in Law is trying
to get out of parking tickets. I am an economist; I look at the
problem of expropriation from an economist's point of view. I
might be playing the devil's advocate - I think the question and
answer period will show that probably to be the case. I am not
against private investment by people from the United States or
anywhere else in the world. I believe that there are good and
bad things that come from such endeavors. In fact I have on
occasion been impressed with the type of investments Americans
have made abroad. When you walk out to the edge of the Chuquicamata open pit copper mines and you look down, you say "My
God, only an American could dig a hole this big." That has to
have an impact on the surroundings. It does.
When we are talking about expropriation by the developing
countries, we are talking about countries that are really at times
in rather desperate straits trying to provide their citizens with
what we would call adequate levels of well-being. If we look at
the historical record, we can see that they are having more and
more difficulty doing this as time goes on. Estimates made by
Simon Kuznets show that the Gross National Product (GNP)
per capita in the developed countries, that is here and in Western
Europe, were over ten times the GNP in the underdeveloped
countries in 1955, and that this disparity increased to a multiple of
twelve times the GNP per capita in the underdeveloped countries by the late 1960's. So you see that our incomes are very
much higher than those found in underdeveloped countries, and
in fact the difference between these levels of living is becoming
greater and greater.
Another thing that might put this problem into a little
different perspective: Can you imagine that if it were possible
to liquidate all the assets of General Motors, the largest single
U.S. corporation, and then take the money generated and go to
South America and begin to buy capital assets with the proceeds
of the sale you could buy outright all the capital equipment that
now exists in Chile, Bolivia and Peruthe whole shooting
match- the whole routine. When we are talking about a large
U.S. corporation, we are talking about something which is indeed
very large in comparison to the economies of countries which
are considering or practising expropriation.
*

Professor of Economics, University of Denver School of International
Studies.
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Under these circumstances- the widening gap between the
developing countries and the developed countries, their seeming
inability to catch up to or even approach our living standards,
and in view of the size of the corporations with which those
developing countries have to deal on occasion- political decision-makers are put in a rather desperate position. The decisions
they make for their populations are necessarily decisions of
equal importance and impact as we make in the United States.
They are literally making desperate decisions. They are not
talking about raising the incomes of people already wealthy
and making them wealthier. They are talking about raising
people from an almost sub-subsistence level to a mere subsistence level. They must make very critical decisions with regard to these issues. Sometimes a life and death issue also
pertains directly to the decisions maker's existence. His personal existence, as a politician at least, hinges upon the decisions he makes with regard to these corporations. So with this
in mind, the paper that I have generated and which you probably all have, and have at least looked at the cover of, I have
entitled The Uneasy Case for Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries. I agree that private investment from abroad can
help these countries. There are things to be gained under some
circumstances. On the other hand, there are potential detriments inherent in these types of investments, detriments which
on occasion cause developing countries to react in a way which
is called "expropriation."
In the period from about 1962 to 1969, new investment in
Latin America, by United States interests (excluding Venezuela,
which is a separate case because of the inordinately large investments of the petroleum industry there) averaged about $580
million a year. Of this $580 million a large portion, approximately
$280 million per year, did not come from funds that flowed from
the United States to Latin America, but was generated internally; it was simply reinvested earnings. As a result, the real investment flow from the United States to Latin America was
only about $300 million per year for this period. Now, there
is a flow in the other direction, of course, on the earnings on
those investments. This is the incentive for investors entering
these ventures-to cause a flow to themselves - a perfectly
rational thing to do. The earnings flow from Latin America
to the United States on the investments already in place is $1.3
four times the flow in
billion per year on the average -over
the other direction.
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One of the arguments favoring this type of investment I
find to be offered mainly by economists that have been educated
in the developed countries. Most of them teach in universities
in the developed countries and most of them offer their advice
from that position. One of the main things that these proponents of foreign private investment in developing countries
offer is the balance of payments effect. We have money flowing in from investments that are being made; I have just shown
that thought to be not entirely true about foreign investment
because the balance of payment effect can be very adverse as
in the case of Latin America. While we have, in the very short
run, money flowing in to form new investments to the extent
of $300 million per year on the average, we have $1.3 billion
flowing in the other direction and so the effect of that alone is
very adverse to the balance of payments.
Secondly, some proponents of the balance of payments
argument say that these corporations owned by interests in
the United States will produce things for a local market in
Latin America which would have otherwise been importedthings it would have had to buy from the United States. This
assumes that had those corporations not gone there, the people
consuming these items would have consumed them in any event.
I think the evidence is that they would not have consumed all
of these items; that they would in fact not have consumed them
at all. They would have shifted their purchases from things
produced by U.S. corporations and purchased things produced
locally. There is some of this substitution, there is some of this
favorable impact in that some of these things that are sold by
U.S. corporations and produced locally by U.S. corporations
would have indeed been imported and purchased by locals under any other circumstances, but it is not necesarily a universally applicable example.
An argument in addition to the balance of payments argument is that as the capital investment in the underdeveloped
countries increased, their productive capacity would increase.
The assumption is that these countries are poor because their
local businessmen do not have the ability to raise capital, and
further, that their governments on occasion either do not have
the ability to raise capital or do not have the ability to run
productive enterprises even if they could raise the capital.
Foreign capital is viewed as a substitute for these inabilities.
Another need that U.S. investors might fulfill is markets
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expansion. Very often if a Latin American country could produce something, it might not be able to sell it on an international market because those markets are gravitating more and
more toward the United States in absolute volume than through
any other country, and in order to sell in international markets,
Latin Americans often have to have access to markets that are
controlled by U.S. interests, and U.S. investment interests assumed this access.
It is often said the presence of U.S. investors in Latin
America would increase the productivity of Latin American
workers or Latin American industry. They would lend their
advanced levels of technology, or they would hire and train
local people to work in their enterprise. They would leave
behind residual knowledge or residual technology and skills
to be applied generally throughout the economy. This argument hinges on the willingness of U.S. corporations to hire
and train local people.
In order to increase the general productivity of the economy in which the investment is located, the technology used
by the corporation or the investor has to be generally applicable throughout the rest of the economy. We run into troubles
because we have what the economist calls "technological dualism." We have on the one hand an extremely modern productive enterprise, such as petroleum in Venezuela, and yet the
technology used in those fields is very inaplicable to the rest
of the economy which might be mainly peasant agriculture,
handicrafts and very light industry. There is little transfer of
the technology used by the U.S. investors to the rest of the
economy in which they operate. We often see that the large
corporations at times try to protect whatever technological
knowledge they possess, and leak it out in doses just large
enough to get the task at hand accomplished. They wish to
very rational deciguard their secrets as much as possible -a
sion from their point of view.
We often have what we economists refer to as external
economies taking place. An external economy is simply a
linkage between one industry and another, where one industry
has an impact on the other. The existence of one industry might
increase, for example, the profitability of some other industry.
A U.S. investment might come in and produce something for
sale locally which requires a distribution system. If that corporation comes in, sets up its firm, and produces something, it
increases the incentive for someone locally to become a dis-
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tributor. It makes it possible for him to do so, and therefore
supposedly stimulates entrepreneurial activity in the form of a
distribution system. The existence of the investment of a foreigner might create a demand for some input. For example,
on the northern Chilean coast we had Marco Chileno, a Seattle
corporation that produced fishing boats. It has since moved
out; conditions turned a little adverse. The existence of Marco
Chileno created a demand for flat steel, wood, metal hardware, labor and so forth. It creates a demand for things
which someone must produce and transport and sell for the
foreign interests. It creates a possibility of some other business
development, some other business becoming profitable and
therefore creating incentive. This would be favorable as well.
In view of all these potential benefits, I will agree that
under some circumstances the benefits will predominate, that
under some circumstances a foreign investor could show up
in a developing country, set up a firm which would be profitable
to himself, and in fact have all of the favorable things happen
in the local surroundings.
Opposition, however, comes on several different issues.
Opponents say that the above benefits are overstated; that, in
fact, perhaps the technology of the firms concerned is not
transferable to the rest of the economy. The rest of the economy
just does not benefit from the existence of the technology in
the country. The firm is like a country unto itself and its
technology does not go beyond its borders. It is just not applicable anywhere else as you would find, for example, in
the petroleum industry. There is not much in the petroleum
industry, at least petroleum extraction, which is generally
applicable throughout the rest of the economy. This is a very
specialized type of technology, very capital-intensive.
They also indicate at times that companies have been
unwilling to hire as much local labor as they could. They were
sometimes reluctant to hire local labor because of restrictive
labor legislation, the threat of strikes, or just not knowing
about the local labor market. For instance, if the foreign investor does not know whether local labor has the requisite
skills, he does not know if they could develop these skills and
he is therefore reluctant to use much local labor.
The productive techniques that we use in the United States
are relatively capital-intensive and use a lot of capital and
advanced technology. When you transfer this to the underdeveloped countries it looks odd to use a lot of labor (because
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it is cheap) in production which is generally capital-intensive.
You find that the foreign enterprises use very little labor for
some reason. For instance, Venezuelan petroleum industry which
produces sometimes as much as 30 to 35 per cent of the Venezuelan GNP, employed only about 2 per cent of the Venezuelan
labor force. True, those laborers had incomes far in excess of
any other laborers in the Venezuelan economy. The same thing
was true of workers employed by American owned Anaconda
Copper Company in northern Chile. Their incomes were approximately five times the general income of workers of equivalent skills in the rest of the economy.
Another major argument against the foreign firms is their
impact upon local competition. Latin Americans say that local
businessmen simply cannot compete with the superior technology, the superior administrative skills and the superior financial capabilities of the large multinational corporations. As
a result, upon admitting these large multinational corporations,
there is very little probability that a local extrepreneurship will
develop. That local businessmen will get their feet in the door
and somehow develop for themselves equivalent administrative,
financial and technological skills is practically impossible. They
say that if they do not admit foreign investment they can
stimulate some class of local businessmen.
The underdeveloped countries also indict the monopoly
power that many of the multinationals possess. Oftentimes just
in local markets alone they constitute a monopoly. There is
nowhere else to sell except through a large multinational corporation. Oil might be one example -I hate to keep using that
one but oil is the illustration of most of the complaints that
Latin Americans have. There is really very little chance of
selling oil in large quantities unless it is sold through one of
the large multinational corporations. As a result the only way
that a country can take advantage of oil reserves is to invite
in large oil concerns.
Latin Americans are particularly concerned about the absorption of local enterprises by multinational corporations or
by interests from abroad. This is not extraordinary. Most countries resent this type of activity; Canada, Australia and Western
Europe are beginning to complain about it. In Latin America,
however, it is somewhat easier for a large corporation to take
over local enterprise because of the incidence of recession in
economies much more unstable than our own economy. During
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a recession, local businessmen will approach bankruptcy and
will sell out at bargain prices to anyone who can pay. Very
often that someone is from abroad who can rely on independent
financial markets for diversification of the risks involved. Multinational corporations can draw their finances from a country
which is not in recession, such as the United States, and buy
somewhere where business is in recession.
Also, multinational corporations and large U.S. corporations often have access to the local banking system. Often they
are the best credit risks. They have the best collateral. They
have fine credit reputations and they can borrow from local
banks in order to buy local enterprises. In some instances it
takes no investment flow from the United States to Latin
America for multinational corporations to gain control of local
enterprises. They simply borrow from the local banking system and use Latin American resources to buy Latin American
enterprises and put them under U.S. control. This in particular
is resented.
With regard to all of these issues there is a general frustration in Latin America. They see the dynamic sectors of their
economy in the hands of foreigners. Decisions made outside
their country affect their entire economy. This is particularly
frustrating in countries that have now developed the capability
to run these companies themselves. Perhaps originally when
many of these large corporations gained a foothold in these
countries, the local entrepreneurs could not have run an oil
enterprise, a copper extraction enterprise, steel mills, a complex banking system or whatever it happens to be. But over
the years these countries have in many instances developed the
capability to run these enterprises themselves. They find themselves in a situation where they are able to run the show and
yet it is in someone else's hands. Someone else is benefitting
from nationally owned resources; copper, minerals of different
types and so forth. The question is how they can get a piece
of the action: how they can get into these enterprises. They
have the capabilities and yet they find it difficult to enter
these fields of enterprise.
So we indeed have an uneasy case for foreign investment
in developing countries. It is not proven as a generality that
the existence of foreign investors either helps or hinders development. In some cases it will help, in some cases it will be
very detrimental. The outcome will depend upon the society
in which the investment is made, the capabilities of the local
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people and the technology that is needed to run the enterprise.
Each situation requires a separate evaluation. There is no
clear-cut case at all. U.S. policy, however -official U.S. policy
concerning private investment-is based on the assumption
that foreign private investment is good and that more private
foreign investment is better than less in developing countries.
Most official policies are to stimulate the flow of private investment from the United States to developing countries, Latin
America being typical.
Some of the main policies that are being used are the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, with
1961 and 1964 amendments, and the Investment Guarantee Program begun originally in 1949 to help in the development of
Western Europe after World War II and recently applied to
developing countries. Those policies, which assume that foreign private investment is the greatest good, can only raise
international tensions. They can only cause international conflict. Since the case for private investment is uneasy and can
go in either direction - good or bad - any policy that is either
all good or all bad will necessarily be wrong in some cases.
These policies of the United States are often seen from the
Latin American point of view as an attempt to bully Latin
America into an ideology that is favorable to the United States,
as an attempt to force the Latin Americans to be like us. The
Hickenlooper Amendment in particular is considered rather
disgusting by most Latin Americans. It has been criticized very
strongly by our own State Department and by businessmen's
groups such as the Council for Latin America because it
heightens tensions. Though it might protect the foreign investor
during his entry into a developing country, once the investment
is in place he finds himself in a real conflict situation. He is
faced with potential expropriation despite the legislation in
the United States; he is faced with some kind of confiscatory
taxation; he is faced with a series of controls placed upon him
which make the operation of his business very difficult.
The Hickenlooper Amendment was last used as a threat
in the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company
(IPC) in 1968. The situation there was one where President
Fernando Terry Belaunde of Peru had tried without success
to negotiate a settlement with the IPC for several years. When
it eventually was reached, it was publicized in Peru and he
was immediately overthrown because it was completely unacceptable to the Peruvian people. Shortly thereafter the new
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administration expropriated IPC and refused any compensation
whatsoever. The Hickenlooper Amendment was used as a threat
- the United States would cut off aid to Peru if in fact IPC was
not compensated for its losses. President Velasco simply said to
keep the aid money, that Peru did not want it. IPC was expropriated and lost all of its properties with no compensation
whatsoever.
Other properties were expropriated when Peru saw that,
indeed, it was an empty threat. Other countries followedBolivia, Columbia, Ecquador, Chile-all of these countries
expropriated properties shortly after the Hickenlooper Amendment was seen as an empty threat.
U.S. businessmen have indeed been hurt in Peru and other
places in Latin America and have been hesitant to set up new
operations in that part of the world. However, businessmen from
other parts of the world are now competing for contracts in
these and other countries that have expropriated United States
holdings. It appears that the reaction on the part of Latin
Americans was not so much against private enterprise as
against private enterprise from the United States. They are
presently seeking bids from international corporations based in
non-United States countries to come in and set up an enterprise.
So I think that had the Hickenlooper Amendment been
used in this or similar circumstances, it would have been shown
to be a complete farce. There is no way to enforce it. The
amount of nationalism involved does not permit them to bow
to the United States. Upon rejecting the U.S. aid, President
Velasco was raised to what I would have to call hero status.
He was a hero because he stood up to the United States, called
a bluff, and in fact found out that it was a bluff. So I think
that policies like the Hickenlooper Amendment are doomed to
failure. You cannot force the issue with something such as this.
The Investment Guarantee Program is a program whereby
new investments by U.S. businessmen are protected against
loss due to expropriation, due to insurrection and a couple of
other minor things. Basically, I think this type of program
might have possibilities on the international level if, in fact,
an investment guarantee could be internationalized. This would
require both the developed countries who are the investors and
the host countries to participate in some way.
However, the way it has been run by the United States
is simply to have the Agency for International Development
(AID) guarantee the investments of U.S. businessmen. In order
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to participate in the program, the host country has to sign an
agreement with the U.S. government allowing the investors
coming into their country to be covered by such insurance
because it means that the U.S. government could subrogate the
interests of the expropriated companies in the case of claims.
There is ample evidence to believe that these countries
were forced into signing these agreements. There are statements in all kinds of official U.S. documents, subcommittee
hearings and so forth where officials of the program said that
pressures were placed upon the signatories of these agreements.
They were threatened with cut off of aid, threatened with
limitations on their trade in the United States. Again I see
this as a method of political force to bludgeon Latin American
countries into submission to our particular ideology.
My own suggestion is that any policy that assumes that
foreign investment is good or bad is doomed to failure. If host
countries in, for example, Latin America assume that all
foreign private investment categorically is bad, I would say
that that policy would be very bad for their interests and
their own development. That is not my decision-it is theirs
-let them make it. Similarly, any policy of the United States
that assumes categorically that foreign private investment is
good or bad and that the United States will act to either stimulate or retard it could also lead to failure of our policies in
the development of corporations in developing countries. I myself would advocate that the U.S. government participation in
investment decisions should be absolutely zero- that it play no
part at all in investing, that it neither guarantee, nor include
little things like the Hickenlooper Amendment into foreign assistance legislation, and that foreign multinational investors simply make their investment decisions based upon the situation
as they see it in the countries concerned.
I think that there are benefits to be gained from foreign
private investment and the Latin American countries will see
that there are benefits. Most of them do see that. Witness the
country of Peru, which expropriated the whole of local U.S.
enterprise and yet has invited businessmen from other countries
to make investments. They know that if they get an international reputation as being likely to expropriate they will not
get any foreign investment. Industries will not be willing to
enter countries which blindly expropriate foreign holdings.
I would say that should there be no U.S. governmental intervention in these types of decisions the investment climate
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would improve. Investors would see which countries engage in
expropriation. They would see where they were wanted. They
would see which countries would offer them concessions. They
would see which countries want private foreign investments in
their midst. I do not think there would be a rash of expropriations expressing opposition. If the United States had stayed out
of it there would not be this problem. There would not have
been this landslide of expropriationary measures in Latin
America simply because most of the countries recognize that
there were benefits to be gained and that they would be losing
those benefits should they get a reputation for adopting expropriationary measures.
I could go on with my policy of non-intervention by any
government in favor of a policy that would allow the investment
decisions to be made purely on the merits of the investment
itself and on the merits of the government contracted with.
I will leave it at this and perhaps some of these issues will
come out in subsequent discussions. Thank you.
THE RECENT CHILEAN EXPERIENCE AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS
PROFESSOR RICHARD LILLICH*

I would like initially to say a few things with respect to
what Professor Loehr has said. I just would like to mention
one or two things in the broad context of protection of foreign
investments, because I think we have to make some distinction
between his broad overview, which is not really concerned
with law qua law, and mine, which basically focuses on some
of the legal problems.
The whole problem of foreign investment is a very difficult and confusing problem, and Professor Loehr rightly recognizes in his paper the needed challenge to received wisdom
about foreign investments, particularly by American companies
in sensitive areas such as Latin America, I of course do not
challenge this point. While I accept our government's policy,
as codified in the first section of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended, that foreign investment is generally a
good thing, there can be no hard and fast rule. One must also
consider what happens if that foreign investment is taken. What
consequences, particularly under international law, result from
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
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that decision? I could go on and elaborate with respect to Professor Loehr's paper and his references to the Hickenlooper
Amendment, which I think is an exceptionally irresponsible
piece of legislation- but a piece of legislation which has had
no practical impact at all. It has only been invoked oncewith respect to Ceylon. Ceylon did compensate the American
oil companies for the property that was taken, but not because
of the imposition of the Hickenlooper Amendment. They had
a domestic coup.
Peru is a similar example. Velasco became a popular hero
because he used not-so-latent anti-Americanism to arouse the
people. It had nothing to do with the imposition of the Hickenlooper Amendment as no funds had been coming to Peru for
about five years anyway. As Dick Goodwin pointed out in an
article in the New Yorker, which Mr. Loehr mentions in one of
his footnotes, you do not have to have domestic legislation to
cut off aid. No country is willing to give aid, whether it be
France, Great Britain or what have you, to another country
which has just expropriated their properties. We had not given
much aid to Peru from 1963 on. That was a pretty stupid thing
to do because a very good man, Fernando Terry Belaunde, was
President. Peru had a very good opportunity during that time
to go ahead and salvage some kind of democratic regime. As a
matter of fact we cut off the aid- there was no imposition
of the Hickenlooper Amendment - because the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations thought that by turning off the spigot,
in effect, Peru would decide not to expropriate IPC. Of course,
Peru expropriated the IPC anyway.
Now if I can proceed from this very brief introduction, an
introduction which I hope has indicated my sympathy and
appreciation for what is a rather complex mixture of problems
which foreign investments generate, I would like to get into
the specific problem of what happens when property is taken.
What is the international law applicable in the case of
expropriation? The Western powers reached the conclusion, I
suppose way back in 1938, that the old international law rule
that a country could not take the property of aliens was no
longer valid. No one today 'challenges the right of Chile or
Peru, or Albemarle County for that matter, to take property
as long as there is some compensation paid. Now the question
is basically what amount of compensation should be paid, and
whether distinctions in this regard should be made between
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old and ..iot so honorable investments, such as IPC, and new
investments, such as many in Chile. Therefore, it is really, to
my way of thinking, not a question of arguing, as many international lawyers have, between prompt, adequate and effective compensation (whatever that may mean), and partial
or no compensation. The idea is to find some equitable standard
of compensation that will allow a foreign country to decide
for its own reasons that it wants to nationalize its natural resources and to do so and pay a reasonable amount of compensation. That is what the Founding Fathers had in mind in the
Fifth Amendment of our Constitution. I think Professor Weston,
who wrote the definitive article that has been miscited several
times by the Supreme Court, may want to comment on that,
as his article goes in some depth into the whole standard of
what compensation is fair. He suggests obliquely, and I would
suggest a little more strongly, that this whole question would
have been avoided, in effect, if we had not focused on some of
the adjectives like prompt, adequate, effective and what have
you but had just used our own constitutional standard of just
compensation. Actually the correspondence in 1938 does indicate that just and equitable compensation would have been an
acceptable standard insofar as the United States was concerned.
If I may digress for a moment, when the Hickenlooper
Amendment was first enacted it had a provision that the compensation to be paid by the foreign country had to be just
and equitable compensation. I wrote a little piece that indicated
that this was a fine standard because it supposed a certain
degree of flexibility. Senator Hickenlooper's legislative assistant
happened to have the article called to his attention by a certain
prominent company which shall remain nameless, and as a
result in 1963 they amended the Hickenlooper Amendment so
far as the whole concept was concerned to strike out "just and
equitable." The feeling was that we cannot have anything like
that even if it is our own constitutional standard and we should
substitute prompt, adequate and effective compensation in convertible foreign exchange as required by international law.
What we were doing was imposing a higher standard on foreign
countries taking property than on our own country's taking
of property within the U.S.
As I have said, I do not think there is any dispute about
a country's right to take property, and I suggest that the real
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the standard of fair and just and equitable compensation to be
paid. I think that by taking this approach we avoid what I
call "the fallacy of the meticulous jurist." It comes from a
statement by Professor Ronning who says that most international lawyers, like indeed most economists, construct knitpicking rules which they fashion and polish until they glitter
in the sun, and while doing so they of course ignore the realities
of the situation.
What we are concerned with is whether compensation
should be paid in a case like this and whether the compensation paid meets the international law standards, whatever
they may be. I have a little quotation from Mr. Rogers of
Arnold & Porter in Washington, D. C., who becomes President
of the American Society of International Law next week, in
which he indicates that if we go with the Chileans on one
side saying "we'll pay what we want," or with the U.S. government saying "we've got to have full compensation," we will
only obscure thought, comfort the parties with notions of
ideological certainty and moral perfection, and inspire them
to dig their trenches deeper. The actual issues in real life are
too complex, the cases to be decided and the precedents of
decision too disparate and unique for easy, simple principles.
I think it is useful to give some background to the Chilean
experience. The Chilean legislation is a sophisticated case study
of how one country has nationalized the foreign investments
in its country. It is quite interesting to compare the situation
in Chile with the situation in Cuba. There is a big contrast
between the Cuban situation and the Chilean situation. Cuba
made no effort in its statutes even to make a prima facie case
for any reasonable amount of compensation at all. It was
obviously a political act since the compensation that was to
be paid was to be paid out of increased sugar subsidies that
the U.S. was supposed to pay Cuba for sugar. The bonds that
were to be issued in payment and which were not be become
due for thirty years at zero interest never were printed. The
compensation standard in the Cuban legislation was completely
illusory. Of course, they got into all kinds of difficulties -the
Sabbatino case, the First National City Bank case-and many
others. At the time many of us said that what the Cubans
really ought to have done was to have hired some Wall Street
international lawyers. If they had wanted to take property
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without compensation, they should have tried to do it by some
neat drafting.
The Chileans have taken that advice to heart. The New
York Times characterizes this whole constitutional and legislative program as a movement by "a radical with a flair for
legal niceties." Those legal niceties, of course, began with the
amendment of the Constitution last summer. Now of course
there is nothing wrong with adding a constitutional amend-.
ment, but as you know, international law does not allow a
country to commit an international wrong and then justify it
by the fact that the international wrong is permitted under
dom-estic legislation.
A point which has not yet been made, except by myself
indirectly, is that there is a big difference between old investments like IPC, and relatively new investments that have just
gone into a country, such as Gulf Oil which went into Bolivia
in 1955 and was nationalized in 1968. The Bolivians very carefully waited until the oil installations and the refinery equipment, the distribution system, all these things were in working
order-these things that are so important and that require
such an immense capital outlay-were in place. They allowed
Gulf Oil in effect to get out their investment in returned earnings. Just when Gulf Oil had broken even after thirteen years
they took over its operations.
Obviously one may talk about the sympathy one has for
Bolivia or Peru, but there is a vast difference in the amount
of sympathy one has for Peru, going back to the origin of the
IPC problem in an 1820 piece of legislation, and the current
problem in Chile. In Peru it is rather an old dispute with a
company that has made many, many times over its investment.
The situation in Chile is that the company took a bath under
President Frei in 1968, at which time they in effect were
Chileanized. As we know, all American investments in Mexico
were Mexicanized over the last thirty years or so, with the
Mexicans now having a majority interest. And this is what
happened in Chile in 1968, and at the time that was thought
by some people to be a horrendous thing. Companies thought
they were losing a lot of money. But in any event at that time
the decision was made by the companies to go along. The
Chilean government thought that this was the way for Chile
to gradually get control of their own natural resources and
yet have a very effective partnership with these companies.
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Therefore, we do not have in these situations companies
that have been exploiting for generations and generations withsituation supout any reassessment of that exploitation -the
posedly in Peru. We come into this situation with the taking
of American copper companies in 1971, when the value of the
companies had been fixed almost unilaterally by Chile just
three years before. In the new pattern of legislation that we
have in Chile, the old constitution has been entirely wiped out.
The legislative history the speeches of the Senators who introduced this bill last July and last August, clearly indicate
that they realized that under their prior constitutional provisions they could not take this property and pay the minimal
compensation they wanted to pay. They wanted to pay as little
compensation as possible and they therefore had to amend the
constitution. The compensation that they are to pay under the
amendment is book value as of the end of 1970, less all kinds
of deductions which I shall go into only briefly.
Now, first of all, book value as a standard of valuation in
international law may in many instances be adequate compensation that all parties can agree upon, but certainly one cannot
say in all instances that it is equitable as a matter of law.
For instance, the book value of General Motors in 1962 was
fixed at six billion dollars. The market value was seventeen
billion dollars. In other words, the book value represented only
about one-third of the worth of General Motors. This is true
of many other companies as well. Good accounting practice
not only in the U.S. but in all countries indicates that book
value is not exclusively thought to be the best form of determining "going concern," or market value, or whatever standard that would result in a more equitable determination of
compensation. Indeed, accountancy practice in the U.S. and
most other countries that have a free-market economy is based
on all kinds of other alternatives- all kinds of equations which
result in something that is approximately what a free market
price would be. There is very little international precedent for
this because until recently there has been very little taking
of foreign property- by recent, of course, I mean the last
twenty-five years.
Whatever international precedents we have indicate that
book value is not going to be deemed the fair and adequate
value that international law requires. In the words of the Lena
Goldfield's Arbitration, which is cited most frequently because
it involves a situation which is very similar, the test is the
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fair purchase price as a going concern in a free market. So I
think it is fair to say, as Assistant Secretary of State Meyer
has said, that this is really a dubious standard of international
validity that has been adopted by Chile. Nevertheless, the
interesting thing is that the companies, or at least the counsel
for the companies, are prepared to accept book value. The
book value was, of course, established by the Chileans in 1968
because they had to have a value to determine what Chile
should pay for the 51% of the stock of the companies which
it was about to buy. That book value was a jointly arrived at
book value and as applied to the 49% that the company still
owned results in about $365 million. Various other tests, like
going concern, like some reconstructed potential market value,
place it substantially higher than that. In any event, $365 million for Kennecott, which has published the data on it; Anaconda has been a little more secretive in its figures and
statistics.
Now assuming that even though book value prima facie
is inadequate, the companies would have been happy, or at
least Kennecott in this instance would have been happy, to
accept $365 million, even though it may not be adequate under
international law. That is not the end of the story, of course,
because then starts a series of deductions. They put aside funds
to pay for retirement of workers, to build houses for workers,
to continue that construction program and keep up the maintenance. These items were deducted from book value. The
basis for these deductions was that the companies' rights to
the mining property were not valid rights under Chilean law
despite the fact that three years before the Chileans had said
they were. They deducted these figures from the $365 million
and came down to $319 million.
Now I am not saying, although I would be prepared to
argue if pressed, that these deductK is are impermissible under
international law. But you will note that in readjusting book
value, which itself is not necessarily an adequate indication of
the worth of the company, it all goes one way. It is a one-sided
situation. There is no potential for the companies to increase
book value for a variety of reasons. For example, the growth
in the operations since Kennecott entered into a participation
arrangement with Chile in 1965 and the earnings of the company and the fact that they were ploughing back these earnings to develop these gigantic mines that were referred to
before-none of these things are allowed to be taken into
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account. In other words, anything you want to do to depress
the price by knocking off things from book value is permissible,
but you cannot touch book value if you increase it. This onesided application of this one-sided accountancy principle is
obviously inequitable, not only to my way of thinking but to
the way of most international lawyers.
Secondly, Chile deducted thereafter $198 million for reevaluation and $21 million for deficient installations. No one
knows what the latter means. The $198 million for reevaluation
was made in the company's books between 1964 and 1968 as
required by Chile. The theory now urged by Chile is that the
company inflated the book values and as a result Chile should
deflate it by taking the $198 million. In any event, taking that
sum away leaves $100 million. Once again it seems to be that
these are strictly one way deductions-they are not deductions which follow good accounting principles and they certainly have no precedent in international law.
Chile then deducted excess profits. No one has ever referred to deducting excess profits in international law. There
was an excess profits law in the U.S. during the Second World
War and the Korean War, and we should have had one during the Vietnam War and now during Phase II. In any event,
it is not an unfamiliar device even in the Western world, but
it is never applied retroactively. Chile applied this retroactively to 1965. The companies have to pay compensation based
upon excess profits when, of course, Chile was making a
healthy tax on these profits for the last three or four years.
The company is actually being double charged. The excess
profits amount to $410 million, which figure exceeds Kennecott's entire earnings during the last 17 years.
This determination was not made by a tribunal at all, but
by President Allende, and his decision can be appealed only
to a special ad hoc copper tribunal that is controlled by his
political appointees. The excellent Chilean judiciary is completely cut out of this procedure. There is no appeal to the
Supreme Court of Chile. Despite the fact that an appeal is
pending before the special copper tribunal, there is no way to
attack this excess profit figure. It is completely without any
precedent in international law. Taking away $410 million from
$100 million, you come out with the company owing Chile nearly
a third of a billion dollers.
I think it is fair to say that this entire machinery has
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been designed very carefully to make people think that some
kind of judicial process is going on. Of course, this is not the
administration of justice in any real way; it is a denial of
justice under international legal concepts. It is almost impossible to reach the conclusion that this is a good faith attempt
to work out any equitable compensation standard, even taking
into account all the claims that Chile might have.
Nor are we going to learn anything more of value, I am
afraid to say, from the Chilean nationalizations than from the
Cuban nationalizations. I think these have been handled in a
very strategic way in Chile, by providing the semblance of a
legal proceeding, despite the fact that it is not a proceeding
under the regular constitution and the regular law. Despite
the fact that it is not a proceeding under the regular judiciary system of Chile, which is the most highly respected
judicial system of any country in Latin America; despite the
fact that the key decision on excess profits has been made
unilaterally by the President and is based upon no evidence;
despite the fact that the excess profits are greater than the
entire earnings of the company over the last 17 years; in spite
of all these obvious indications of denial of justice under international law, the fact that the process has been going on
to some extent diffuses a lot of adverse comment. The U.S.
cannot point to it, as the U.S. was able to point at the Cuban
situation, and say that there is no procedure to obtain compensation at all. Chile has not been that direct, and it has
not taken the approach the Soviets took in 1917 and the Mexicans took in 1938 which was that no compensation at all was
required. They have indicated that they are willing to pay
compensation. Having acknowledged this obligation, they completely cut the guts out of the compensation.
It is rather sad what has occurred. The result is that I
do not think we are going to get what I and others had hoped
would occur when the Chileans decided to take the copper
companies. We then thought that we would have the first
example of a communist country taking property, but giving
at least an adequate amount of compensation for the taking
of that property. The result of this would have been that investments which the country purports to be interested in,
access to the international copper market, international trading arrangements, what have you, would not have been simultaneously cut off. The foreign countries that had their property
taken would not feel compelled to take retaliatory action be-
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cause of the pressure of business interests or because of the
tremendous losses they have suffered as a result of the Chilean
action. Unfortunately, I am afraid to say that that is happening
now. Certainly my information through the Treasury Department indicates that the rather hard line position which the
U.S. is being forced into is going to result in the same kind
of polarization we had with respect to Cuba. This is very unsatisfactory, but I suggest that in this instance, at least, the
blame resides with the Chilean government much more than
it does with the American companies.

COMMENT
BuRNs H. WESTON:

I would like to react to a number of
things that were said both by Professor Loehr and by Professor Lillich. It may come out in somewhat jumbled confusion,
but I believe my comments are in order in light of what everybody else has done this morning. I want to point to a few
things which perhaps will give a slightly different gloss to
what else has been said.
When one gets into discussions about expropriations, nationalizations and related problems, as I have repeatedly done
over the last few years, I find that there always are a few
new ideas to ponder- usually the result of what people better
qualified than I have had to say. This is what has happened
to me again this morning. A few new things have struck me,
and while I have no right to say that I have crystallized my
thinking on the two points I would like to address, I think
they are worth mentioning.
I just want to say now that I agree completely with the
general thrust of Professor Loehr's statements this morning,
since, as he points out, it is dead wrong to talk about foreign
investments being all good or all bad; sometimes foreign investments are good, sometimes they are bad. Where I disagree
with Professor Loehr-that is too strong a word-where I
question Professor Loehr's remarks- is in his emphasis. I have
the impression that he is inclined to leave the matter of foreign
capital flows entirely up to free market mechanisms, although
he said things which tend to belie that inclination, to wit, that
he saw the value of having an internationalized investment
guarantee program.
My main concern with leaving foreign capital flows to
free market mechanisms is that, if one can judge from history,
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we may end up with a pattern of wealth allocation or distribution not any better or more equitable than the one we have
already. My reaction to Professor Loehr's emphasis, in other
words, is that it does not take sufficiently into account the
power realities that are involved in the foreign investment
process. Let's face it, we are not talking about mere corner
store operations; we are not talking about minor entrepreneurs.
We are talking about giant corporations that have annual
budgets that oftentimes far exceed the annual budgets of many
countries. To leave the foreign investment process entirely or
nearly exclusively to free market mechanisms, without any
kind of international regulation or direction, strikes me as
short-sighted.
I think there is a very strong need, today perhaps more
than ever before, for work to be done at the highest levels
of internationalism to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements and mechanisms. Examples would be an internationalized
investment guarantee program and greater use of, and elaboration on, the precedent established by the Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes attached to the World Bank.
In short, it is naive to assume that small underdeveloped countries are going to have the political and economic muscle to
call the tune to companies like ITT. There has to be some
kind of control.
One of the controls
the rule of compensation
It is in connection with
some conclusions I have

we are learning about here today is
and its sidekick the rule of valuation.
this rule that I find myself reaching
not been wholly sure about before.

In the first place, it is important to know what we mean
by rules of international law. They are outcomes of decisions
about specific past conflicts. As far as the future is concerned,
however, they are general "guesstimates". That is true as much
in domestic law as in international law. The international legal
order, however, is more a horizontal than a vertical legal system, especially in the area of foreign investment control and
the regulation of nationalization, expropriation and the like,
and this means that we are bound to have more "guesstimate"
outcomes internationally than we will have "guesstimate" outcomes domestically: In any event, the latitude for "guesstimates" will be greater in the transnational sphere where most
effective decisions are made on a foreign office to foreign office basis, and in the absence of an international West Digest
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system we cannot face the rules with the same confidence we
do in the domestic sphere.
Now in aproaching the "guesstimate" we call the rule of
just compensation for the taking of foreign property, we encounter two difficulties which derive from its inherent ambiguity.
First, what is a "taking"? Even in this country we know
that the State can zone people out of existence without paying
compensation. Is such an action any different from a nationalization measure or some other equivalent to what we call
an exercise of the power of eminent domain? In short, the socalled rule of just compensation cannot be tied too closely
to the form through which the wealth deprivation is effectuated.
Second, what is "just compensation"? It is a presumption
and no more, and this is why Professor Weigel and I, in our
joint valuation article, have suggested that there may be occasions in which it is inappropriate to pay any compensation at
all even under an eminent domain type proceeding. This would
be the situation, referring back to Professor Loehr's remarks,
where the investment is not of benefit to the host country
and therefore to be discouraged. In short, even where the
rule has been said to operate, we ought not always to say
that "thou shalt pay just compensation". What I am saying
is, simply, that there should be a presumption of compensation for the taking of foreign-owned property (however one
defines "taking"), but that there is a burden to demonstrate
that the investment was beneficial to the host country involved. In the absence of such a demonstration, we ought really
to think seriously about whether compensation should be given
at all.
So, while we need international controls, they must be
controls that work to everyone's benefit. Otherwise, international law would have little reason to be called international
law.

COMMENT
PROFESSOR FREDERIC

L.

KIRGIS* -

I

would like to start with simply

a few comments on Professor Loehr's presentation and skip
over to a comment on Professor Lillich, and perhaps lead into
a thought or two of my own that I would simply like to put
forward for your consideration.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado.

148

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

Professor Loehr may overemphasize somewhat the adverse
effects of some U.S. government participation in the foreign
private investment scheme of things. I would agree with all
speakers so far with respect to the Hickenlooper Amendment
in that it is counter-productive. But I would like to focus a
little bit on the investment guarantee portion of Professor
Loehr's comment.
He implied, I think, that the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation which administers the U.S. investment insurance
and guarantee program may be pushing private investment
from the U.S. onto unwilling recipients in a way which really
does not contribute to the foreign economies and which is not
welcome in those countries. I think it should be noted that
OPIC does require approval by foreign governments of every
investment that it insures, so there is some assurance that the
foreign governments want the investment. And I think OPIC
does try carefully to be circumspect in this area now. I do
agree, too, that perhaps the multilateral insurance investment
scheme perhaps has some advantage over the unilateral United
States scheme. Several other countries have private investment
insurance schemes somewhat on the pattern of the United
States and I think there is some possibiliy that we may all be
able to get together on this and have an international scheme.
I understand, though, that some of the developing countries
are dragging their feet on this, and I think that reflects some
of the concerns that Professor Loehr rightly emphasized.
Also I would like to associate myself with Professor Weston's comments about the so-called market solution. But I do
think that some of what I gather to be Professor Loehr's conclusions assume a certain amount of political and economic
stability in developing countries which recent experience suggests just is not always there. You can have a market solution
-and again, I realize that Professor Loehr is not talking about
a market solution in a classical Adam Smith sense-but I
do not think you can have anything very close to that unless
you have some kind of stability. Stability allows investors to
make decisions and have some confidence as to the outcome
of those decisions and also allows foreign governments to make
decisions with some confidence that they are going to be
around for a while to carry out the policies that those decisions
reflect.
This leads me into Professor Lillich's remarks. He em-
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phasized the fact that the real dispute about compensation in
expropriation situations is to fashion a just and equitable standard for compensation. And I have some problem with that.
When talking about equitable solutions, one talks about what
is equitable to the participants involved. When participants
have widely varying cultural and geographic backgrounds, when
their values in other words are not the same in respect to the
matter at issue, one has a lot of trouble in finding any common
grounds for what is equitable and what is not. As we know,
equity is a nebulous concept. It has to do with values and
values are important and meaningful when they are shared by
the participants. The question is how to arrive at enough of
a sharing of values, when we are talking about the giant corporations representing giant economies such as that of the
United States, Europe and Japan, and the developing countries
who come to the situation with quite different sets of values.
I wonder if some kind of bargaining process could be set
in motion under which the United States and perhaps other
capital exporting countries can bargain with some of the capital
importing countries. Perhaps it is better to talk about this
process strictly in a bilateral sense at least at first- the United
States with individual capital importing countries -whereby
we could arrive at some agreement as to the standard of
valuation that needs to be applied. The United States might,
for example, agree that it would not espouse claims of its
nationals. We are talking now of course about corporations,
primarily. If the nationals have not substantially performed
according to a code of fair practices that is agreed upon between
the United States and the developing country involved, the
bargaining process could be invoked. This kind of thing could
not work unless you also had some kind of arbitration provision in it so that there would be a third party determination in
case of dispute as to whether the participants have lived up
to the standards. This would also be applicable in case of a
dispute as to the application of the compensation standard.
The reason I suggest this is that I think it is evident from
all that has been said today and from simply reading the newspapers that what is called the investment climate, particularly
in Latin America, is getting worse. And it seems to me that we
should say to the Latin American countries that we would like
to avoid those agreements which are of the old style (the old
style being one where the duties are all on the host country
and the rights are all with the investor); we would like to
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make agreements in which some of the rights are in the host
country. The host country may insist on this code of fair practices, but it also has some duties. The bargain includes some
duties and yet it is not a one way street anymore. I wonder
if perhaps this would not only do something toward improving
the compensation standard but perhaps in addition foreclose
the expropriations in some of the marginal cases. With a better investment climate the expropriation, when the expropriation would be economically unsound, may not occur. Thank
you.
CHAIRMAN MOORE

thanked the speakers and asked if there were

any questions which might be directed to the speakers or panel.
MR. HARLEY SHAVER*: I am wondering to some extent if the
countries that are under consideration may not be, with regard
to the investment climate, in the position that Mexico was
some forty years ago. I am going to disagree somewhat with
Professor Kirgis' remarks. I think in regard to the investment
insurance that has been criticized we have seen the pendulum
come full swing. I think the assumptions at the beginning of
this type of insurance resulted from benevolence on the part
of the U.S. and pressures from less developed countries to get
investments in areas that would otherwise be high risk ventures. So what is now the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is a successor to similar previous agencies that did
intend to guarantee investments in high risk capital ventures
because of the location in less developed countries. This was
thought to be a good thing at the time. Now we are seeing it
criticized because the type of investment may not be beneficial to the host country. But I think the historical perspective
on that is somewhat important.
Professor Kirgis suggested some type of arbitration agreement. I do not think that at this stage that is any answer.
In other words, when a foreign licensing agreement or an
agreement with a foreign government can be abridged by a
successor regime, perhaps on the basis of unequal bargaining
power, we have at one edge of the spectrum the Soviet experience- maybe the Cuban experiences similar to that- saying that at the time the agreements were made it was either
a non-legitimate power or if that does not work, at least the
bargaining positions were so unequal as to be unfair in historical perspective. I think we see under the veil of constitutional process a similar type of argument made by the Allende
* Attorney at law, Denver, Colorado.
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regime. If there is to be a minimum standard of due process
for compensation, I think there has to be, before that, a minimal due process standard for ascertaining how and when an
agreement is binding upon a successor regime. What arguments
are valid- what arguments are invalid?
I would like to make a comment on the relationship between the instability in different governments. There
was some concern expressed that where there was this free
enterprise type of thing, which I do not carry too far, really
this market solution, that there is not likely to be too much
investment, because of instability of the government concerned,
where contracts made with one government might be broken
by governments which come to power through one means or
another in a few years.
PROFESSOR Lo~im:

However, I think that there is some relationship between
instability and inappropriate foreign private investment in developing countries. You can see, for example in Cuba, one of
Castro's main appeals was that he in fact would expropriate.
He promised to expropriate foreign holdings. And this was part
of Castro's charisma. His promise to expropriate holdings which
were considered to be inappropriate by the Cuban population
actually caused the instability that brought him to power. In
the Peruvian case the main thing, I think, that overthrew the
Belaunde regime and brought in General Velasco was an agreement between the Belaunde administration and IPC which was
unacceptable to the Peruvians. It was easy at that point for
the Velasco followers to take over and the main justification
for taking over at that time was that Belaunde was bowing to
the international corporations. Again, existence of a concern
considered inappropriate by Peruvians could be related to the
instability.
In the Chilean case, the government is very stable and
yet we find that this is where the main expropriations have
now taken place. Chileans are very proud of their long-lived
democratic institutions. They have only had one unscheduled
change of government in the twentieth century -in the 1920's
when there was a strange series of events. So this is one of
the most stable countries in Latin America, and yet this is
where we see the expropriations taking place. We might allude
to Mexico. Mexico was very unstable thirty to forty years
ago and went through a series of expropriations. Now that
this phase is over you find that Mexico is one of the most
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stable countries in Latin America; one of those that in its past
has had very substantial expropriations with very little compensation. Mexico is now one of the favorite targets of private
investors from the United States. This is where they want to
put their money. I think that these expropriations, getting this
out of their systems, relieving these pressures, had a substantial influence on the future stability of Mexico-the stability
that we see now. Thank you.
PROFFESSOR LILLICH: I will just respond to Mr. Williams' question
about excess profits and then elaborate briefly on the problem of obtaining agreement on a just and equitable compensation
standard. First of all, one can provide no answer to what
excess profits meant in this context because the President of
Chile, in a one page decree, which really was a political document describing why he felt it necesary to take the copper
companies, ended with two lines saying the excess profits were
this figure of $400 million and that was the end of it. I talked
wi-th both the general counsel of Kennecott and also the mem'ers of the firm that represents Anaconda and they have no
idea of where this figure came from. I have also talked with
people from the Chilean Embassy in Washington, and they
have no idea about it either. Unfortunately, of course, it cannot be appealed because the Chilean constitution and legislation state that the special tribunal which I mentioned before
has no jurisdiction to review this matter.
The second comment I wish to make is in response to the
question of whether a just and equitable standard can be
fashioned. My plea is not whether we can codify a standardI supose that we have to live with what the U.N. decided in
its resolution about natural resources in 1962. But some adequate compensation consistent with international law should
be paid. My plea is for a process, for a procedure, that we
develop some forum. We have had reference to arbitration and
to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank, which none of the Latin American
countries will participate in because of rather exaggerated
fears of the arbitration process based upon what they think are
bad experiences in the nineteenth century. I do not think these
experiences are at all relevant to the contemporary context.
My plea is to have some process begun by which some standard
might emerge, perhaps on a case-by-case basis. The action by
Chile is completely destructive of any opportunity to develop
such a standard in the international sphere.
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What I really am concerned with is that we disabuse ourselves of the notion that the rhetoric of prompt, adequate and
effective or the rhetoric of partial compensation will solve the
problem.
I have previously suggested that the United States formulate some kind of code for foreign investment. I do not think
we should have this regulated directly by the government. Although this has not been done in statutory form, those who
are familiar with the practice of the Legal Advisor of the
Department of State know that the espousal of an international
claim when one's company is taken overseas is entirely within
the discretion of the Department of State. And, for instance,
while there are no rules that say that an American corporation cannot invest in Southwest Africa, the statement has already been made on the record by the Department of State
that if their companies' properties are eventually taken, the
United States will not espouse their claims. This is certainly
a sanction against American mining interests going into what
is now called Namibia. I think it might be useful to take that
approach, and not just do it on an administrative, executive, ad
hoc basis, but to push it into a more formalized code.
CHAIRMAN MOORE thanked the members of the panel and adjourned the session at 11:45 A.M.
PROFESSOR VED P. NANDA* chaired the afternoon session which
was convened at 2:30 P.M. again in the Law Center of the University of Denver. The CHAIRMAN introduced the speakers for
the afternoon, Syed Muhammed Hussain, Esq., Senior Advocate,
Bangladesh Supreme Court, Dacca; Harley Shaver, Esq.; Burns
Weston; J. Robert Fowler, Esq.; Richard Lillich; and Julius
Duru, President, Association of Student International Law Societies. The CHAIMAN then suggested that, keeping the topic of
the session, "Whither the Future of the Law of Expropriation"
firmly in mind, the most effective procedure might be simply
a roundtable discussion. The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Hussain to
begin.
SYED MUHAMMED HUSSAIN:** It is a great pleasure for me that
while living in this country as a political refugee I find the
question of expropriation of property being discussed. This
issue is based in certain broad concepts sweeping the world
at the present moment: the concept of the sanctity of private
* Professor of Law and Director cf the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law.
Supreme Court.

** Senior Advocate, Bangladesh
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property as opposed to property as a social contract. The region
from which I come, Bangladesh, about three decades ago
adopted a middle of the road stance, a social policy which we
call a mixed economy of a mixed society. The country's economy is to be developed by a very harmonious cooperation
between public and private capital on the one hand and foreign
capital on the other. This cooperation from the full sector is
considered essential for the growth of the national economy
by many of the emerging countries.
In the 50's, legislation was passed by the Parliament of
India taking over all intermediary land holding interests in
India. These were viewed as revolutionary acts by the people
at that time. But the unfortunate part of that legislation was
that it was not a collateral thing, it was the executive government and the judiciary at that time. The Indian Supreme Court
in the mid-50's struck down much of the social legislation
of the Indian Parliament which tried to sequester the intermediary property class. I remember when the Indian Prime
Minister, Nehru, in opening Parliament, characterized the Indian Supreme Court as a sanctuary of vested interests which
created a great row in judicial circles in India. The right to
property was adopted as a fundamental right in the Constitution of India in 1950. There have been a series of amendments
in the Indian Constitution; the latest amendment was passed
only three months ago which has completely obliterated the
right to property as a fundamental right.
The basic notion of jurisprudence as it is being developed
in the Indian subcontinent is that on the social level, property, to be a fundamental right, must be available to all citizens and persons universally. The right to property cannot be
such a fundamental right because property owners constitute
only ten per cent of the country's total population. Only the
right to personal freedoms, which can be made available to
all persons universally can be considered a fundamental right.
Thus in the context of the developing world the right to
property is viewed with mixed feelings. The basic economic
and social changes being undertaken approach a level which
will cause these countries to approximate the welfare society.
To reach that level, the state must initially assume an acquisitive character. That is, I think, a fundamental difference in
jurisprudence between what has emerged in the Anglo-Saxon
world and what is emerging in the developing world. We are
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not interested at the present moment with the sensitive nature
of the sanctity of property. What we are concerned with is the
overall social progress of the general population. That automatically must give the state the right to attack certain interests in the community. Property by itself must be considered secular, there is no sanctity to be attached to it. Most
of the emerging governments are assuming this character of
an acquisitional state. From this point of view I think the
entire question of expropriation of property is to be considered
by all parts of the world.
Now the question is whether there is to be a special rule
for giving adequate, prompt compensation of nationalized property owned by foreign interests. That is a sensitive question
and the feeling that is developing in most of the emerging
nations in the East is that it is highly dependent, not on a
fixed rule of law, but on a flexible political situation. Most
of these countries are asking for foreign investment -private
investment, public investment from different foreign countries
-- in order to develop their national economies. And certainly
it is not to be in the political interests of those who are inviting foreign capital to expropriate foreign property without
compensation. But that is also dependent upon certain circumstances, such as how these international foreign corporations function in the country's economy. We have the image
of the role of the United States Fruit Company in the rise
and fall of many governments in Latin America as well as
the role of the Standard Oil Company in the operation of
government in the Middle East. And certainly these are viewed
with a great amount of apprehension. While inviting the foreign
capital of the other countries for the development of the national economy, the foreign corporation must not be allowed
to interfere with the national sovereignty of the state. The
most sensitive fact of the emerging world in the present day
is encroachment on their national sovereignty.
In the Indian subcontinent today, I do not think there is
any basic difference in applying the law of expropriation to
national property or foreign property. The same principle applies: That the right to property is not a fundamental right of
the citizens or anyone else. The right to property of any foreign
owner is not considered to be an inalienable right. But it is
the political and moral obligation of the government to see
that they are protected because the foreign investor was invited for the improvement of the country's economy. From this
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point of view, whether the foreign property and national property can be expropriated by giving adequate, prompt compensation is again dependent upon various political considerations.
If the government is constitpted in a fundamentally constitution democratic way, then I do not think that there is any
fear of the foreign international property being expropriated
without compensation. But if a revolutionary situation develops
and the government is asumed by persons whose revolutionary
ideas cut the very root of this concept, then this international
rule of giving prompt and adequate compensation does not
apply.
Protecting the rights and interests of the foreign property
owner within the country is dependent upon various factors.
One of the best ways of seeing whether property will be protected is to see if democratic institutions are deeply rooted in
these countries. In the countries where a democratic process
of law is allowed to function there is the least danger of these
properties being arbitrarily expropriated. One of the best
examples can be given by looking at India where the banks
and insurance businesses have been recently nationalized. There
is a clause in the legislation that foreign banks and insurance
will not be nationalized. There is nothing in the Indian Constitution or the law passed by the Parliament to prevent the
nationalization of the foreign sector. But that was not done.
It was not done because of the democratic premise on which
the government was established. Take in contrast the countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia where the democratic rule of law does not prevail. They have expropriated
their own property and every other property. Whether the
expropriation of foreign property will be done or should be
done seems to be dependent upon what type of policy is established there.
In my country of Bangladesh, many properties have been
nationalized within the last few months, primarily properties
belonging to Pakistanis. This had to be done because the country was at a state of war with the Pakistanis. We cannot allow
these properties to stay in the hands of Pakistan, as it has not
recognized our rights. There again, in nationalizing banks, insurance and foreign trade, although there is no legal bar on
the sovereign will of the government of Bangladesh, a definite
proviso has been made that where the banks and insurance
and other businesses of foreign non-Pakistan interests are concerned, they will not be nationalized. That is because of the
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basic democratic process of law that has been adopted in the
country.
The international business community, whose help is being
sought by the countries in our region to develop their economies, have a moral responsibility to see that the democratic
process in these countries is allowed to develop. There are
occasions, unfortunately, when these international companies
have not always been faithful to the democratic ideals in which
they are rooted. The companies occasionally are the cause of
reaction which help the forces of dictatorship. Our interest is
to invite foreign capital to help the development of our country. It is in the interest of international capital to see that the
democratic process in these countries is deeply rooted so that
ultimately there is no repression of foreign economic interests.
I think that is the best way. of creating a reciprocal promotion
of business in the international world, particularly between the
developed and the undeveloped countries which are emerging
from economic backwardness. These countries want social and
economic progress, but at the same time are willing to stick
by the democratic constitutional process. Thank you.
MR. J. ROBERT FOWLER: * The revolutionary constitution of 1945,
a very brief document which I think Sukarno probably wrote
on the back of an envelope while on a train somewhere, says
very clearly that the natural resources of Indonesia belong to
the people. There has never been a method by which foreigners
could obtain an interest in the oil in place, and that is the
fundamental concept of the production sharing contract under
which so many foreign corporations are operating today.
I think that the production sharing contract truly creates
a partnership between the state corporation and the foreign
corporation. The latter is clearly made the junior partner. The
contract which is now almost a standard form, makes that very
clear in many ways. The state enterprise reserves complete
management control; in fact, it delegates that management control to the foreign contractor, but what it delegates it can in
terms of the contract undelegate and take back. The foreign
partners obtain all information that is derived from exploratory
activities. All tangible personal property which the foreign contractor buys, imports and puts in place in Indonesia immediately
becomes the property of the state corporation upon its being
put in place. The foreign contractor has no title at any time
to the undiscovered oil, it has no title to the drilling platforms
* Attorney at Law, Denver, Colorado.

158

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

which it has bought and paid for; its only rights are to recover
out of 40% of the production its cost of exploration and equipping and to receive in addition thereto 32 to 35% of the oil
for the term of the contract which is 30 years. Now these are
two valuable rights. The question is, will it become Chile in
Indonesia; because these rights could be expropriated.
I think that the present government is pretty satisfied with
the deal that they made and formulated in 1966 in the first
contract; they have of course since then attracted many other
companies. I think the present government judges that it has
made a good financing arrangement to develop its resources.
I think that all of the companies operating there are happy
in their relationship with this state enterprise. There is apparently a free exchange of information between the two groups
and I believe that there is a general feeling of optimism on
the part of the state enterprise and all the foreign contractors
that this arrangement will work well in the next 30 years. But
who knows for sure?
MR. MooRE: I have been wondering after this morning's talks,

assuming that the predicted result occurs in Chile, where do
the copper companies go? What remedies do they have and
what procedures are available under international law if they
find they have an unsatisfactory result in Chile. Are there
any? Is this a justiciable claim before the International Court
of Justice or other body? Has there been any development,
thinking more broadly, toward international agreement on proper elements of value? Have proposals been made as to evaluation standards that might be agreed upon by multiparty conventions? Where the states, in other words, would have defined more clearly in advance those elements of value to which
they agreed to be bound internationally when evaluation questions arise.
Another thought that I had on valuation standards and
the great complexity of them: Professor Lillich talked about
the arbitrary determination of excess profits. But I wonder if
the determination was possibly not arbitrary, whether an element of historical profits is not absolutely essential in valuation of expropriated property. We are not very familiar with
that concept domestically, at least in this country, because we
are so used to trying to figure out the ways in which you
value a going concern or fair market value, but the situation
is a little different internationally. A foreign investor going
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in will look at the years in which it will take him to get
paid out. Let us say that he looks at a pay-out of six years.
He has six million dollars and he figures that he will make
a million dollars each year so that after the sixth year he is
in a pure profit picture. Of course this is simplified because
he probably would have additional capital requirements in the
meantime, but he is out in six years and from that point on it
is all profit. If he runs for another twelve years, would you
value what he has that is expropriated at the end of that
twelve years in the same way that you would value it at the
end of the sixth year? Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.
MR. WESTON:

I am glad you asked those questions, John. I agree

that questions of social welfare have to be taken into account.
A number of years ago they were not; they were sacrificed
almost always to doctrines upholding the sanctity of private
property. Many companies, both of this country and others,
perform considerable social service functions. They can and
do bring considerable benefits to host economies, as Professor
Loehr suggested this morning.
The real question, therefore, is not whether we are going to
champion principles of social welfare or the principle of sanctity of property. The real question is, with the rich getting
richer and the poor getting poorer, how are we going to get
sufficient capital to help the process of economic growth in
the Third World on a large-scale basis? Largely for political
reasons, there simply is not enough capital to go around; yet
there is an absolute need for foreign capital, and that is just
something we might as well face. We cannot wish it away
under concepts of social welfare nor ought we to safeguard it
unduly under outworn concepts relating to the right to property. The real question, then, is how to encourage that kind
of investment in the underdeveloped world (and for that matter in the developed world) that will assure benefit to those
countries and therefore, over the long run, to the global economic process as a whole.
Countries like Chile, Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, and so forth
have been on a rampage in recent years, taking foreign assets
by direct and indirect means. They do so for different reasons,
and not all of them are sound. Part of the question of how to
encourage investment into areas where it is needed and can
be beneficial, therefore, is how to impress upon host country
elites the necessity of dealing in an equitable and fair manner
with the investments that are deliberately attracted there. We

160

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

have seen in the Chilean experience a kind of behavior that
raises fundamental questions of equity and fair dealing, a kind
of behavior that is likely to retard economic progress in that
country. Surely Chilean policy is not designed to win the love
of foreign investors of any sort, including the good ones. A
basic problem, therefore, is how to impress upon host countries
a recognition that they need foreign investment, that they
cannot go it alone. When preemptory action is taken, to me it
often represents an insufficient sensitivity to a host country's
own and very real need for capital and all the external economies that come with foreign investment.
Likewise, however, it is necessary to impress upon foreign
investors that they cannot pursue rapacious or otherwise politically insensitive policies and expect to be indefinitely welcomed. So what kind of investment do we want to channel
into these Third World areas? It is easier to say what kind
of investment should be discouraged than it is to say what
kinds of investment should be encouraged. For example, one
ought to discourage investment when it is aimed at clearly
politically sensitive sectors of the economy; and I have in
mind such investments as relate to banking, extractive industries, public utilities, and the like. This is not to say that foreign
investment should not go into these sectors at all, but rather
that they should not continue unmodified; in other words, they
should not be left entirely in the hands of foreign entrepreneurs.
We have to seek ways in which to multinationalize, if you
will, those kinds of investments. Joint venture arrangements,
licensing, franchising, opening up share ownership to indigenous
populations, profit-sharing schemes similar to the oil consortiums in the Middle East - these and other techniques would
be useful. Brand-use licensing would be particularly important
in the manufacturing sectors. There are, in short, a variety of
ways in which foreign ownership need not dominate, and if
we want to see a lessening in the number of expropriations in
the future we should strive to multinationalize investment as
much as possible. Also, I think too much emphasis has been
given to direct foreign investment in lieu of portfolio investment. Certainly there are other ways of pumping money into
countries where it is badly needed.
But how do we go about encouraging the kinds of investments we are concerned to get -into Third World developing
countries where multinationalization is impossible or impractical? As I said this morning, and it is a truism that bears
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repeating, we are living in a horizontal international legal order.
There are few centralized mechanisms now available, or at
least few immediately available or very effective, to regulate
foreign investment flows, although there are all kinds of alternatives we could pursue. We have talked of multinational
investment insurancb schemes and there has been some reference to a code of fair business practice. There are good ideas.
We can talk, too, about the creation of new and more developmentally sensitive arbitral procedures, and about Albert Hirschman's disinvestment proposals. Possibly we can consider international organizational licensing or incorporation of certain types
of business activities. The fact remains, however, that as of
now the supranational mechanisms that are available to us
are either few or ineffective. We have, therefore, to resort to
making sure that principles of compensation and valuation, or
other principles which are designed to regulate and control
the investment process around the globe, are designed to encourage the policies that are going to be in the best interest
of all concerned.
Allow me, then, briefly to mention what my colleague
Professor Weigel and I have fashioned in respect of this question of compensation and valuation. Basically, we have devised
a valuation-compensation standard which is based upon the
value of an enterprise to the host country when owned by the
foreign investor. Let me give you some quick background.
By and large, foreign investment is enterprise; it is ongoing operations. Therefore, notwithstanding the book value
approaches taken in the Chilean situation, values that are
based on some estimate of cost do not strike us as particularly
helpful in getting a really accurate picture of the worth of an
on-going enterprise. How can you say that Anaconda has a
market value? Who is gong to buy it? Obviously it is not very
rational to talk about a market value when there is no market
in which to sell whatever it is you are trying to evaluate. On
final analysis, therefore, one has to rely on valuation schemes
that would value foreign enterprises on the basis of their future earnings capacity or projection. Of course, you have to
ask whose projection to use? Is it the value of future earnings
as seen by the foreign investor or the value of future earnings
as seen by the host country which proposes to nationalize or
already has nationalized? Professor Weigel and I have concluded that either way is one-sided. Either way is likely to
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produce results which will be more beneficial to one side rather
than the other.
Accordingly, our concern has been to recommend a value,
based on future earnings expectations, that reflects the value
of an enterprise to the host country while owned by the foreign
investor. Is it worth more to the host country to have the particular enterprise in foreign hands or is it worth more to have
that enterprise under its own control? I cannot go into all the
details now, but the spinoffs or results of this scheme are
essentially to encourage that kind of investment which is beneficial to the host country and to discourage that investment
which is not beneficial to it; and, in the long run, this tends to
work to the benefit of the foreign investor as well. Of course,
the question remains: what is meant by "beneficial"? Well,
obviously, the criteria can be and are many, and if there is
any one area in which hard work needs to be done it is right
here. One has to account not simply for economic factors, but
as well, for social, political, ideological, ecological, and a whole
range of other factors for purposes of determining whether a
given investment is going to be of net detriment or benefit to
the host country. But the complexity of the solution is not,
we think, grounds for avoiding it.
Where do the copper companies go assuming they get no
fair dealing from the Chilean Government? I suppose one can
say that this is an issue that could be adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. But, frankly, after watching the
Court operate in the Southwest Africa Case and after watching
it operate in the Barcelona Traction Case, I'm inclined to doubt
the Court's utility. On the other hand, I would prefer an adjudication even by the ICJ than a march by the Marines on
Santiago. So I would say that this is a justiciable issue. International, even World Court, adjudication is a legitimate and
policy-desirable alternative. Of course, another alternative is
the old standby of diplomatic protection. But when you get
involved in the potentially politically-charged atmosphere of
the State-espousal-of-claims system, frankly my "guesstimates"
are not hopeful.
At any rate, to sum up, I am concerned that we stop labelling private foreign investment as ipso facto good or ipso
facto bad. We have to recognize that it is needed immediately
and that we have to do everything we can to channel it in a
beneficial way. And in the absence of highly specialized mech-
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anisms that permit us to regulate this investment, we have to
bend every effort at framing rules that are responsive to a
more equitable world economic order. I believe Professor Loehr
made reference to the fact that countries like Mexico and Indonesia, which have gone through economic bloodbaths in the
past, are now welcoming foreign investment. The point is that
foreign investment is not necessarily detrimental to the countries in which it is situated, and that it is pernicious in the
extreme to assume that nobody should stand up for the foreign
entrepreneur in these discussions. At the same time, however,
if we expect to achieve a kind of global economic process that
is going to benefit the world community as a whole, including
the Third World, foreign investors have simply to recognize
that they can not continue to hide behind the so-called sanctity
of the private property concept. Thank you.
MR. JULIUS

DuRu: * Before I get in the middle of the problem,

I would like to raise a few questions, which is a technique I
learned from Professor Nanda. One I would like to raise is
what actually is international law? Are you talking about international law as American law as applied in foreign countries? Are you talking about the law of nations as they operate
as a whole? If it is the latter then we have to agree that there
is not a single international law about expropriation because
most of the countries you are talking about are in Africa. I
do not remember any of those countries having developed a
system of compensation for foreign companies in their own
country. These have been simply beneficiaries of old treaties
which they inherited after Africa became independent. They
have begun to operate themselves quickly and without really
understanding and without really being parties to these initial
contracts. So when we talk about expropriation and international law, it would be better to discuss international law as
African law, and as American law, and as English law as they
function in the international arena. As it is today, international
law is not really binding on the Third World.
A second point I would like to raise is about most underdeveloped countries. They are very worried that as developing
countries they will never assume the status of a developed
nation. To become a developed nation, which is their aspiration, they have to control the rate of exploitation of their
natural resources. This throws a whole new light on the question of expropriation because these foreign corporations have
* President Association of Student International Law Societies.
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a time schedule whereby they must get back their capital investment. They go about trying to get as much profit as possible in as short a time as possible. Therefore, they have to
dig out the Nigerian natural resources at a fantastic rate. This
means that the young people in those countries may be left
bankrupt in the long run in terms of their natural resources.
If you allow the countries that have developed technology to
come in and quickly take out all the natural resources, it is
incumbent on the young nationals to impress upon the government the need to take steps to preserve the natural resources
for future generations. So then the question is whether there
could be a means whereby those companies in the business of
extraction could take off those natural resources at a controlled
rate so that there would be a measure of how much is left for
the country when it becomes developed. I very much doubt
that if they have all of their natural resources taken out that
they will ever be a developed country; they will forever be an
undeveloped nation.
Now the next question I would like to raise is that since
America has played a very vital role in classifying many countries as either developed or not developed by determining the
rate of investment, I wonder if the United States will not
champion the idea of creating a code of modern international
investment. A code of investment may be meaningful when one
takes as an example the EEC countries. If an American corporation goes into the EEC countries it will be very cautious
because it will respect the laws about hiring local labor; they
affect the company's welfare. But when the same corporation
goes into the Third World it feels it can just shoot in a lot of
dollars and maybe get in and out fast. This code will in effect
prevent expropriation because, as I envision this code, it would
set up standards of behavior. For example, it would tell companies not to operate in areas where there is slavery. In South
Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Guinea and all the places where
there is slavery we have today the largest African investment
by developed nations.
What are the corporations doing in those countries? Are
not they really perpetuating the devastation of human rights?
Is it surprising to find that the United States is truly hesitant
to ratify a treaty on human rights? I find it amazing that the
prominent international lawyers in this country do not advocate that the United States ratify these treaties that deal with
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the protecion of human rights. The time has come to leave
rhetoric alone and address ourselves to the real issues.
I would not be surprised to see a wave of expropriation of
United States companies in Africa within the next five to ten
years. In fact, I will predict it. It is going to happen because
the United States companies really have a lot of investment in
South Africa and the other countries there. This is viewed by
Africans as insensitivity to the problems of the black people.
And now Africans are recognizing the fact that expropriation
really hits home; the expropriation of a United States company is a way to dramatize what they want to say. They are
now begging these companies to change their means of operation in South Africa. I think it is extremely unfair for Gulf
Oil to take Nigeria's oil and reinvest the money from it in
South Africa. The African people are now awakening to such
facts.
Since we are dealing with expropriation here, I think that
we should start with these companies that bring these problems upon themselves, and create in them a sensitivity to the
black African's problems. Until we do so we can talk about
compensation, but it will be nothing but an academic exercise.
If we really want to solve the problem we have to start by
making these companies become sensitive to the domestic problems of the host countries and look upon those people as human
beings of equal rights and dignity. They have a right to their
natural resources, and a right to preserve them. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN

NAnDA:

I would like to ask Professor Lillich how

he thinks the operations of the Chilean Development Corporation and Banco de Chile would be affected by claims being
made at the present time. And looking into the future, is it
possible that retaliatory measures might be undertaken?
PROFESSOR LILLICH:

There are all kinds of strategies of a retalia-

tory nature, and negotiations are going on in Paris to extend
the time that Chile will have to pay its 3-5 billion dollars worth
of obligations that have nothing to do with the nationalization
of property. Lawsuits are pending in New York. The investors
obviously have utilized domestic remedies in the absence of
international remedies. Given the bleak picture of what the
eventual outcome will be, it is assumed that even if the United
States decided to take Chile into the International Court of
Justice, the Chileans would probably plead by reciprocity the
Connally Amendment and claim that it was a matter of do-
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mestic jurisdiction and thereby deprive the Court of jurisdiction. I think it is to some extent discouraging that one opens
up this kind of economic warfare, but on the other hand it
seems inevitable that anyone who is associated with a company
like Kennecott would approve of such action. We talk about
these companies as monoliths, but there are some persons who
own ten or twenty shares of Anaconda, like myself. They are
somewhat disappointed that their property has been taken because the market value has gone down from 66 to 19 in the
last three years. I suppose there is a large number of people
who feel they have been unjustly deprived and would welcome
any kind of strategy here of an economic nature, of a quasilegal nature, of a legal nature that would provide an opportunity to obtain partial compensation. But it would only be
partial.
The two points I really would like to come down a little
harder on are based upon statements that I heard both this
morning and from at least two members on the panel this
afternoon. First, that there is either no law in this area or that
the question of compensation is a political question. It seems
to me that this is a complete denegation of international law.
If we wish to build an international economy we have to have
some rules by which both the investing countries and the host
countries can plan their affairs, given all the facts that we
can quantify. All kinds of political developments may occur;
as Professor Weston pointed out, we cannot necessarily take all
these into account. To say that there is no such thing as international law, no such thing as guidelines or principles, or
to say that we should give up the effort to articulate some
standards is, I think, a denegation of our job as international
lawyers. We have seen that the Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case said it was not going to tackle tough questions.
We have seen the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case say that it was not going to tackle tough
questions. I think this approach is quite unsatisfactory.
The second thing: it seems to me that we are involved
here in a very vicious and circular type of argument. The suggestion has been made several times that these corporations,
despite modern, enlightened corporate stewardship, despite the
Texaco and Esso ads, despite the building of clinics and playgrounds, despite the tours of Bill Russell and Arthur Ashe
showing Africans how we play basketball and tennis-that
all this adds up to a mere facade. The corporations are the
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same kind of exploiters they were in the days of Rudyard
Kipling. It is suggested that what they are interested in is the
short-term buck, pound or yen-to get in and get out. As
a matter of fact, everyone knows that in Malayasia or in Hong
Kong you must get out your investment in four years or in
six years, or you are not going to invest. This type of business
judgment is quite unfortunate, but which comes first, the
chicken or the egg?
It is the irresponsible behavior of the countries, and particularly countries which welcome in new investments and
then nationalize them after a very short period of years, that
creates this atmosphere, that forces companies to make this
business judgment. If they can get no protection because we
as lawyers are not concerned with the rules of international
law, or devising procedures, which we really have not come
to grips with today, or enforcing the rules of international law
that we do devise, what can one expect? Therefore, these shortsighted countries are in many instances encouraging the very
kind of behavior on the part of the corporations, the short run
exploitation of natural resources that our colleague from Nigeria
pointed out, that none of us would accept and that none of
us certainly would recommend.
As I say, it is a vicious circle. When you have this irresponsible behavior by Chile, what is any lawyer or any man
on the board of directors going to advise his corporation to
do? To go in and invest a lot in hospitals, auxiliary roads and
malaria control and earn 5% and hope that after 75 years
there eventually will be some kind of return? Of course not;
that would be nonsense. The businessman realizes that the life
expectancy of a corporation in the average country may be
11 years or 18 years, and so he goes into make a short term
buck in many instances. While I think this approach is certainly one to be discouraged, the point is that it is a circular
type of thing. I do not know which comes first; I suppose
we have to work on both fronts. Certainly we should encourage
corporations to be good citizens, certainly we should encourage
them not to exploit; on the other side of the coin, we should
encourage countries not to nationalize precipitously, not to nationalize new investments, and not to nationalize when it is
not in their own interest. Of course, you cannot excise political considerations and all kinds of other things that may come
along. All we can do is the best we can, but it has to be done
by both sides and not only one.
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NA-DA: There seems to be some kind of consensus
emerging at this conference that if it were possible to effectuate it, wealth should be widely shared. Also, the concern
has been expressed here that notwithstanding all aid, trade
and financing efforts - bilateral, regional, and multilateral
such as those undertaken by UNCTAD - the disparity seems to
be widening between the developed and developing countries.
Various international reports show that this unfortunate development is taking place. We must pool our expertise and
resources to reverse this trend.
CHAiRMAN

It is obvious that equitable and effective norms, procedures
and instructions are needed to create world order in which all
values, including wealth, are equitably shared. The international
lawyer's role is important in fashioning the desired institutions, norms and procedures and setting standards. Perhaps we
should close this conference today on this note-that we need
rules and laws; the question is what kind of rules and laws and
how to make them work.
I would like to thank the members of the panel for a most
provocative discussion and thank the audience for their very
active participation.
CHAIRMAN NANDA

adjourned the session at 4:45 P.M.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM AND
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
HENRY LANDAU*

Recent years have seen changing attitudes toward the status
and role of existing and prospective foreign investments and
the rights and property of foreign investors. In the developing
nations, the change was brought about in response to unfulfilled rising expectations and nationalistic fervor, as well as
by desires for economic self-determination and achievement of
development goals with a minimum of outside help. The attitudes of the developed nations were shaped by extensive economic penetration by foreign interests and a concomittant fear
of outside control of major sectors of their economies.
DEVELOPING NATIONS

The economies of the developing nations are largely agricultural. Because they lacked technical and managerial skills
and capital resources, their governments clamored for, and the
international agencies urged the infusion of, private foreign
investments to transform agrarian societies into industrialized
nations, provide employment, increase national standards of
living, and earn foreign exchange needed for infrastructure development.'
Exploration and subsequent exploitation of natural resources required investment of substantial high-risk capital and
the application of sophisticated technology, with no expectation
of immediate return on the investment.2 The installation and
operation of large-scale public utilities called for technology,
operational skills and investors willing to accept a small yield
on their investment, none of which were available locally.
To attract the required capital, technology and skills the
developing countries were willing to enter into long-term concession agreements, operating agreements and investment agree* Member of the New York Bar; Adjunct Professor of Law, Baruch College
City University of New York; B.A. Columbia, J.D. Columbia; member

Commission on International Trade Practice, International Chamber of
Commerce.
1See generally The CapitalNeeds of the Less Developed Countries,Report
of Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 102/5 (1962); Financing of Economic Development - Promotion of Private Foreign Investment, U.N.
Doc. E/4293 (1967); International Chamber of Commerce, Public and
Private Invstment in Economic Development BR 179 (1955).
2 It took, "almost $150,000 to find and develop Boliva's oil and gas resources," and "it took ten years and $95,000,000 before Gulf could export
one drop cf oil from Bolivia," Lumpkin, Gulf Oil's Experience in Bolivia,
8 HOUSTON L. REV. 472 (1971).
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ments. Additionally, many offered incentives which were then
thought to be commensurate with the size of the investment,
the risk involved and the benefits the investment would bring
to the countries. The foreign investor responded, relying upon
the promises embodied in these agreements.
Fundamental socio-economical and political developments,
resulting from pressures of the dissatisfied, produced an outlook unfavorable to foreign investments. Vying for popular
support, the ruling groups in many developing countries identify
themselves with the needs and aspirations of the people. To
allay the frustrations of the populace and to divert its attention
from the ruling grodps' failure to solve the countries economic and political problems, they exploit the fear of foreign economic
domination, brand the foreign investor an economic imperalist
and blame him for nonachievement of development goals. By
appeals to national pride and by use of the fashionable slogans
of nationalism and economic independence, 3 they take measures
to abrogate or modify rights previously granted to the foreign
investor and take over his property.
In countries where natural resources are the primary source
of wealth, the extractive industries are the principle objects of
take-overs. Natural resources, especially minerals and petroleum,
are exhaustible. It is often charged that their extraction by
foreign investors is not in the best interest of the country.
These resources are generally the main source of export earnings. As a result there is pressure, in the face of rising nationalism, upon the governments in many developing countries to
secure greater control over these industries in hopes of obtaining a larger share of the foreign exchange earnings they produce.
The trend to expropriate extractive industries became evident a decade ago when Uruguay introduced the United Nations
Resolution 1803 calling on each member "to recognize the right
of each country to nationalize and freely exploit its natural
wealth as an essential factor of economic independence. '' 4 Recently, Algeria's President Houari Boumediene was quoted as
having said, "Until now the riches of the Third World have
served the interests of the rich nations. It is time for those
3 Brigadier General Guillermo Rodriguez Larahas said that, "There is no

4

political tendency in our revolution and no ideology. There is nationalism, there is the Fatherland at the beginning, the middle and the end,
and there is a desire to serve the Ecuadorian people." N.Y. Times, Mar.
9, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
7 GAOR 7 (1952), U.N. Doc. A/C2/L.165 (1952).
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nations to understand that economic colonialism-like political
colonialism before it-must vanish."
As a result of this trend, the foreign owned companies are
continually pressured to agree to a revision of their concession
agreements to provide the host country with an ever increasing
share of the companies' earnings and, in addition, demands are
made upon them for equity participation." To force the sale
of an equity interest, the governments sometimes impose unattainable production quotas, limit the amount of exports, or
7
subject the enterprise to harassing government regulations.
5 Sheehan, The Algerians Intend to Go It Alone, Raise Hell, Hold Out and
Grow, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1972, (Magazine) at 18.
6 In 1969 Chile and Zambia took over more than 70% of profits of the
copper extracting companies and leading oil producing countries ining Libya, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela received more
than five billion dollars in tax revenues. On September 4, 1970, the
government of Sierra Leone acquired a majority interest in diamond
mining operations in Sierra Leone. In 1972 the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, consisting of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Quatar and Aubu Dhabl demanded a 20% participation in the Persian
Gulf concessions as the only alternative to nationalization. In 1961 Mexico
passed a new mining law restricting foreign capital in mineral development thereby compelling Asarco Mexicana S.A. and Industrias Penoles
S.A., subsidiaries of American Smelting and Refining Company, to
sell 51% intrest to Mxican nationals. On May 18, 1972, the Mexican
government announced the "Mexicanization" of the country's sulphur
industry with the acquisition of Azufrera Panamerica, 34% owned by
Pan American Sulphur Company, of which the government will own
80% and private individuals 20%.
Under the Chileazation program, foreign-owned copper companies
were initially compelled to sell a portion of their 100% interest.
After the passage of a new mining law on February 7, 1961, which
provides for fading-out of majority foreign interests, Mexican interests
acquired a majority interest in Asarco Mexicana S.A., formerly a 100%
owned subsidiary of American Smelting and Refining Company, and of
Industries Penoles, a subsidiary of American Metal Climax. Algeria
converted its minority interest into a majority interest in a number of
oil and gas companies. Kenya acquired a 50% interest in a petroleum
refining company owned by a foreign consortium. The Bolivian Government announced the nationalization of the nitrate industry by its acquisition of the 49% equity interest of Eequimich from Anglo Lautara, 51% of
which was already owned by the Government. In 1971, a state-owned
Chilean steel company acquired Bethlehem-Chile Iron Mines Company,
an iron mining concern, wholly-owned by Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
Guyana took over Demerera Bauxite Company, a subsidiary of Aluminium Company of Canada. Haiti cancelled a refining concession agreement held by Haitian Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Valentine
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation. Peru expropriated the refinery
complex and oil fields of International Petroleum Company, Ltd. Algeria nationalized or intervened in a number of natural gas, oil and pipeline companies and refineries. Libya nationalized the petroleum import
and distribution facilities of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Gulf Oil
Company was compelled to relinquish its exploration concession.
Uganda nationalized a number of foreign-owned oil and mineral companies. Zaire (formerly Congo, Kinshasa) took over the concessions
and facilities of Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. Burma nationalized
Burmean Oil Corporation. Ceylon nationalized distribution facilities
and related equipment of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and California-Texas Oil Co.
7 Iraq's demand for a 20% participation was accompanied by an increase
in the production quota. The sale by Compania Azufrera Mexicana,
S.A., a subsidiary of Pan American Sulfur Incorporated of its 43%
interest to the Mexican government and of its 43% interest to private
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The threat of nationalization is often sufficient to induce the
sale of the enterprise at a price below that ordinarily obtainable.
The chairman of Pan American Sulphur Company, which
in May 1972, sold its interest in Azufrera Panamerica to the
Mexican Government said, "This was not an expropriation at
all. It was a voluntary arms length transaction."" However, Pan
American Sulphur Company was reportedly happy to sell out
because it was displeased with some government regulations.
The sale followed an anti-dumping investigation by the U.S.
Treasury Department, and Horacio Flores de la Pana, Mexico's
National Properties' Secretary, told a news conference, "The less
share we have of U.S. markets, the less reason there is to share
our sulphur earnings with U.S. investors."9
In several countries, there was outright expropriation and
in others the take-over followed the acquisition of equity participations of petroleum and mining companies. To keep these
basic natural resources completely under local control, the expropriating governments abrogated or annulled even recent
concessions and took over the enterprises' properties, machinery,
distribution and other facilities in the belief that they could- successfully operate these companies and thus obtain funds for
their development programs. 10 In a number of countries the
Mexican nationals, and the sale by Compania Explotadora del Istneo,
S.A., a subsidiary of Texas Gulf Sulfur of its 66% interest to Mexican
nationals followed the Mexican government imposition of quotas limiting their exports.
8 N.Y. Times, May 19, 1972, at 49, col. 1.
9 Id.
10 On November 15, 1963, by Decree 743-45, Argentina annulled petroleum
exploration and development contracts awarded to seven companies,
some of which continued operating, in Argentina. In 1969 Bolivia nationalized all assets of Bolivian Gulf Oil Company. In 1971 the government of
Juan Jose Torres Gonzalez abrogated International Metals Processing
Corporation's dredging concession, granted in 1965, and the twenty-year
lease of zinc, cadmium, lead, silver and gold granted in 1966 to Mina
Matilde Company, owned by U.S. Steel and Mineral & Chemical Corporation. In 1972 the disputes concerning the International Metal Processing
and Mina Matilde confiscations were resolved by the government of
Col. Hugo Banzer Suares, by the creation of mixed enterprises under
private management. In May 1970 the Bolivian Government announced
the nationalization of the nitrate industry by acquisition of 49% equity
interest of Soquimech, of which it then owned 51%. In 1971 a stateowned Chilean steel company acquired Bethlehem-Chile Iron Mines
Company, an iron mining concern, wholly-owned by Bethlehem Steel
Corporation. Guyana took over Demera Bauxite Company, a subsidiary
of Aluminum Company. Haiti cancelled a refining concession agreement
held by Haitian Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Valentine Petroleum and Chemical Corportation. Peru expropriated the refinery complex
and oil fields of International Petroleum Company, Ltd.. Algeria national
ized or intervened in a number of natural gas, oil and pipeline companies
and refineries. Libya nationalized the petroleum import and distribution
facilities of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Gulf Oil Company was
compelled to relinquish its exploration conces-sion. Uganda nationalized
a number of foreign-owned oil and mineral companies. Zaire (formerly
Congo, Kinshasa) took over the concessions and facilities of Union
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outlook regarding basic utilities and essential services resulted
in similar measures with respect to foreign owned communica12
tion and power industries," as well as banks and insurance
13
companies.
The nationalistic urge to eliminate or reduce foreign influence is not confined to basic industries. Even as U.N. Resolution 1803 reflects the desire to preserve control over natural
resources, U.N. Resolution 2158 (XXI) recognizes "the right of
all countries and particularly of the developing countries to
secure and increase their share in the administration of enterprises which are fully or partly operated by foreign capital and
to have a greater share in the advantages and profits derived
14
therefrom on an equitable basis." The policy enunciated in
Resolution 2158 was given a fuller expression in the message
of Mexico's President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz to the Mexican Congress on September 1, 1966.
Those who would like to open the door to foreign investments without limit or protection forget that through our economic development we strive to consolidate national independence as quickly as possible. With reference to direct foreign
investment, we propose that they be associated in minority partnership with local capital. Far from granting preferential treatment, we try to limit their field of activities by proposing exclusiveness of the Nation in basic indusry and require a majority
of Mexican capital in certain secondary industry closely linked
15
with basic industries.

The policies thus expressed were carried out by excluding
foreign interests from new and existing stipulated industries
and activities deemed vital to national economies, and by conManiere du Haut Katanga. Burma nationalized Burmean Oil Corporation.
Ceylon nationalized distribution facilities and related equipment of
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and California-Texas Oil Co.
11 Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico took over the properties of
American Foreign Power Company, and Chile acquired a 70% interest
in South American Power, a Boise Cascade subsidiary. Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador and Peru expropriated telephone and cable facilities owned by
subsidiaries of International Telephone & Telegraph Company. Somalia
took over the Italian-Somali Electric Co.
12 Chile, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Burma nationalized foreignowned banks. Peru restricted foreign ownership in domestic banks to
25%, and Decision 24 of the Andean Subregional Common Market
Commission limited foreign interest in domestic banks to 20%. Venezuela
restricted banking functions of banks having a foreign interest until
80% of the capital shall be owned by Venezuelans.
13 Libya, Uganda, Indonesia and Iraq tcok over foreign owned insurance
companies. Tanzanian Insurance (vesting of interest and -egulation) Act
of 1967 provides for compulsory sale to National Insuranc ; Company of
foreign owned shares of insurance companies operating in Tanzania.
Sudan ordered all foreign owned insurance companies to cease writing
new business.
14 G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Supp. 16 (1966).
15 Creel, Mexicanizations: A Case of Creeping Expropriation, 22 Sw. L.J.
281, 294 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Creel].
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trolling and regulating foreign investments in other, even small,
established and prospective enterprises.' 0
Foreign participation in new projects is controlled by insisting upon, or encouraging, substantial local participation, 7
restricting foreign wholly owned enterprises1 8 and by offering
incentives to enterprises owned jointly by foreign and local
interests. 19
The extent of foreign ownership and control of existing
enterprises is regulated by provisions of investment laws or
investment agreements, which confer upon the government the
right of participation in enterprises, 20 and by laws and decrees
which call for a fade-out of the foreign interest through the sale
of fixed percentages of equity within prescribed periods of
21
time.
16 Brazil excludes foreigners from ownership and operations of domestic
air lines, coastal shipping, newspapers and telecommunications. Mexico
reserves control of radio and television broadcasting, production, distribution and export of motion pictures, transportation, fish hatcheries
and fishing, publishing and publicity, production, distribution and sale
of aerated beverages, manufacture and distribution of rubber products,
and insecticides and basic chemical products. In Indonesia, foreigners
are excluded from telecommunications, production and transmission of
electricity, aviation, ownership of railroads, mass media and other industries considered vital. El Salvador reserves enterprises with capital
of $40,000 or less for persons born in El Salvador or other Central
American countries. The Ghanian Business (Promotion) Act of 1970
transferred foreign owned small and medium sized retail and wholesale
businesses to Ghanians.
17 Mexican Decree No. 4990 (D.O. 2nd July 1971) provides for Mexicanization of oil, steel, aluminum, cement, glass, fertilizer and cellulose industries. In India, a majority foreign ownership is not permitted except
where the enterprise will contribute needed technology, or require a
substantial amount of foreign exchange or produce substantial export
earnings. Ceylon and Thailand prefer joint enterprise. Philippines prefers joint ventures and limits foreign interest to 40% in certain areas and
in industries developing natural resources. In Nigeria at least 55% government equity is required in iron, basic steel, petrochemical and
fertilizer production industries. At least 35% private participation is
required in some small businesses even though local investment capital
is not available for such participation.
Is In several Latin American and African countries control is exercised
through initial screening and approval which among other things affects
remissicn of profits and repatriation of invested capital.
19 In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Malaysia investment incentives are available only to joint enterprises, with substantial local
participation.
20 In Congo (Brazzaville) the government reserves the right to take equity
participation. In Ghana large scale enterprises are required to offer
to the government participation in new issues.
21 Mexico requires a reduction of the majority foreign interest within
five years in important industries and ten to fifteen years in others.
Also, sales of stock to foreigners in Mexican companies which will result
in a foreign owned majority are discouraged. See Creel, supra note 15.
Ceylon requires a gradual transfer of majority interest to its nationals.
In the Philippines, pioneer industries must iist their stock on the exchange within ten years and sell 60% of the equity to Philippinos within
twenty years. Zambia's President Kaunde proposed that the state should
take a 51% interest in 25 companies engaged in the manufacturer and
sale of building materials, road transportation, brewing and wholesale
and retail trade. Peru requires all foreign owned concerns to enter into
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At times, political motives for the elimination of the foreign interest loom as large as the economic motives. In the
preamble to the Bolivian Supreme Decree G.O. 474 of the
17th of October 1969, the stated reason for the expropriation
of Gulf Oil is that "[T]he Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation has
grown into a new superstate economically and politically more
powerful than the Bolivian State." Libya nationalized the properties of the British Petroleum Company for "colluding" in
Iran's invasion of the Arab island in the Persian Gulf. The
United Arab Republic threatened to nationalize the properties
of West German companies should West Germany establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The effect of moves such
as these is that "foreign investments are the most exposed
targets of frustration, irrational policies and misguided na22
tionalism."
The efforts to rid the country of real or imagined foreign
domination may satisfy national pride and serve political interests, but only at the expense of the country's economic interest. Most of the developing countries have not reached a
stage of technical and managerial expertise which can provide
a sustained efficient operation of the expropriated industries.
Absent such expertise, there will be no earnings for self-sustained growth and for upgrading of the standard of life. For
example, Chile's labor and technical problems limited copper
production from the expropriated mines to 750,000 tons instead
of the planned one million tons. 23 Bolivia exports one-third of
24
the tin it exported prior to expropriation.
Perhaps in recognition of their own limitations, some developing countries have reversed the trend toward economic
nationalism. Guinea, which in 1961 took over Bauxites du Midi,
a subsidiary of Alcan, was unable to fulfill its contractual oblifade out agreements providing for the sale of its shares to reduce the
foreign ownership to 85% by July 1974, to 55% by July 1981 and to
49% by July 1986. In December 1970 the Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration published its Decision 24,

later superseded by Decision 37, proposing uniform rules to exclude

foreign investments in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and
to reduce foreign participation to a minority interest in the future, by
subjecting existing companies to divestment of equity and management through mandatory fadeout agreements in key industries and de-

priving other industries cf the Central American Common Market benefits if they do not avail themselves of the option to enter into fadeout
agreements. (See Schliesser, Restriction on Foreign Investment in the
Andean Common Market, 5 INT. LAW 586, (1971).
22 President Nixon's "State of the World Message," 116 Cong. Rec. 3821
(1970).

23 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1971.
24 Expropriation,Why They Do It,

FORBES, July

15, 1971, at 36.
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gation to mine and export bauxite, and by 1963 was compelled
to turn over the operation to a new enterprise in which the
government holds a minority interest. On May 1, 1971, President
Amin of Ghana reversed the policy of former President Obote
to require a 60% Ghanian ownership in commercial banks, mining, transportation and other important private companies by
reducing the government's participation therein to a 49% interest. Cambodia, which nationalized the petroleum industries
in 1967, at first granted a twelve year grace period to Standard
Oil Company (N.J.) and to California Texaco Company, and in
1970 repealed the Nationalization Act. In October 1967, Sierra
Leone revoked the "Non-Citizens Trade and Business Act of
1966" which excluded non-citizens from certain industries. In
1970 the assets of Sterling Drug Company were nationalized
and subsequently denationalized.
Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suares, referring to the
transfer of the previously confiscated tin dredging operation
of International Mining and Processing Company and of the
Matilde Zinc Mine, to mixed companies under private management, stated, "[T]here is no need now for major nationalization
and we want foreign capital to develop our resources on a fair
basis. We have enough problems making the already national' ' 25
ized mines work efficiently.
An in-flow of advancing technology as well as a large
amount of foreign capital is essential if the industrial development of the developing countries is to continue at a desirable
pace. The pursuit of policies grounded on economic and political nationalism will impede that flow.
The Executive Committee of the International Chamber of
Commerce was prophetic when it issued its statement that it
feared
the overall effect of Decision 24 (of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement) will be: to deter rather than to attract the
transfer of technology, to adversely affect the balance of pay-

ments and to result in a wasteful utilization of local capital resources. The ICC further fears that Decision 24, instead of contributing towards the attainment of its stated objectives, will imdevelopment, national
pede rather than promote progress toward
20
participation and regional integration.

The restrictive investment policies of the Andean group caused
56 companies to hold up 84 definitive or potential projects in
1971.27
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1972, at 7, col. 1.
37 ICC INFORMATION 9 (1971).
27 Learning to Live with Expropiation,BUSINESSS
25
26

WEEK, July 10,

1971, at 34.
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Overseas Private Investment Corporation insured only $8
million of new U.S. investments in Latin America during the
last quarter of fiscal 1971 against an average level of $100 mil28
lion for each quarter of the preceding four years. The gain in
national pride and the short term political advantages are a high
price to pay for the economic and social advantages which would
have resulted from the abandoned and lost projects.
DEvELOPED CouNTmIEs

Foreign investors no longer have an unrestricted access to
the economies of all developed countries. There is a growing
concern that some sectors of their economies will be dominated
2
by U.S. and other foreign interests. 11 Governments and business
communities are particularly disturbed by the role of the giant
international corporations and their impact on the local social
30
They are concerned that decisions
and economic conditions.
affecting production, employment and marketing are made outside the country and are influenced by the business and national
interests of the foreign parent company rather than those of the
31
local operating company.
Several developed countries have adopted, or are contemplating adopting, measures to control or to curb foreign investments. Japan weighs the competitive effect of new ventures
on existing Japanese industry and does not permit the entry of
a competitive enterprise. All agreements between Japanese and
foreign business concerns must be approved by the Ministry
of International Trade. There is insistence that management be
in the hands of Japanese, and there must be a Japanese majority equity interest if government approval is 32required for
remission of earnings and repatriation of capital.
The European Economic Community Commission prefers
enterprises within the Community, capitalized by nationals of
the Community's members and whose centers of decision will
be within the Community. In France, Law #66-1008 conferred
upon the government the power to regulate foreign invest28 OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT,

at 6 (1971).

29 See generally S. SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1968).
30

31

32

Valery Gisard d'Estaing, French Minister of Finance, has said, "Multinational companies are growing out of all proportion with national firms.
This is a problem with which the government must be concerned."
Louis Camu, president of the Bank of Brussels, has said, "Make the
power of decision coincide with operational activity." London Financial
Times Symposium, 1970.
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, Report No. 428-429, April 30,
1965; E. LANG, Doing Business in Japan - A New Look at Licensing and
Joint Ventures, BusINESS ABROAD (1970).
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ments. 33 Foreign investments are screened, and special permits
are required for large investments. Under Decree #67-78 all
acquisitions or increases of control must have the approval of the
34
Ministry of Finance.
The problem of foreign investments, particularly U.S. investments, are important issues in Canada and Australia. Canadians are perturbed by a high percentage of foreign ownership
and by their belief that some foreign owned industries are run
likes branches of the parent companies with little or no sensitivity to local conditions.
In 1971, the First National City Bank of New York, which
was the only foreign owned bank in Canada, sold, under pressure, its 75% interest in the Mercantile Bank. In 1972, in response to the Grey Commission Report, which dealt with the
influence of foreign investments, acquisitions of existing companies will be under the control of the Canadian government.
United States investments in Australia are attacked by
politicians and economic nationalists, and the government is
examining the role that the large foreign enterprises play in
the Australian economy. John Douglas Anthony, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry, said that the
government intends to police foreign investments and hinted
at a requirement for a higher percentage of Australians in ownership and management.
Economic nationalism exists in all parts of the world. Its
intensity, the manner in which it is expressed, the way in which
it operates and its impact on foreign investments varies from
country to country. However, it is generally related to the
country's political and economic maturity and stability. The
foreign investor must, therefore, conform to the national goals,
aims and economic policies of the host country. 35

33 Torem and Craig, Developments in the Control of Foreign Investment in
France, 70 MICH. L. R. 285, 286 (1971).
34 Id.
35

To promote "collaboration between partners which is so vital if the economic growth of the Third World is to be accelerated" the Commission
on International Investments and Economic Development of the International Chamber of Commerce is preparing a guide for international
private investment which will contain recommendations addressed to the

investors, as well as to the governments of host countries and of the
countries of the investors.

THE UNEASY CASE FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
WILLIAM Lomm*

The purpose of this paper is to develop a case for foreign
private investment in underdeveloped areas. The policy in developed countries toward such investment has exaggerated the
favorable aspects of private investment while all but ignoring
the detriments. This policy has caused undesirable positions
to be assumed by both the investing and the host countries. For
expositional purposes this paper will concentrate on investments
originating in the United States destined for Latin Amerca. First,
will be an examnation of the general magnitude of foreign investment. Second, the cases both for and against foreign investment, paying special attention to Latin American attitudes, will
be presented. Third, will be a close look at major U.S. policy,
especially as it has added to international tension. Finally,
some suggestions will be made for policies which would reduce
the potential for international conflict and maximize whatever
benefits might accrue to Latin America from foreign investments.
Latin America has long been a target of U.S. investors.
Prior to 1930, foreign capital entering the Latin republics was
largely unrestricted. In response to increasing world demands
for raw materials needed for industrial development, large
amounts of capital were invested in Latin America, mostly in
extractive industries. The great depression reversed this trend
temporarily, but renewed resource scarcity during World War
II stimulated the inflow of private capital and guided many
Latin American countries through what for some has been their
period of most vigorous growth. Since then these countries in
the aggregate have been able to finance over 90% of their
investment from their own resources.' Most external capital
continued to come from private sources until the late 1950's
when declining private capital was matched by that available
through international development agencies and bilateral aid.
In 1929 almost one-half ($3.5 billion) of all foreign direct
Professor of Economics, University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies.
Holly, External Finance, in LATiN
BOOK 521 (C. Veliz ed. 1968).
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private investment from the United States ($7.5 billion) was located in Latin America. Since then other areas of the world have
increased their relative attractiveness to U.S. investors. Throughout the 1960's for example, earnings on investments in other
developing areas averaged from 5% to almost 9% higher than
in Latin America, and even Europe offered over 2% more.
Thus, the book value of U.S. private investment has increased
by about 4.5% per year in Latin America but at a 9.0% rate for
all other regions combined.2 Today, only about 1/5 of U.S. private
direct investment is in Latin America.
The main outflow of private capital from the United States
to Latin America is in the form of direct private investment.
Generally, direct investment refers to the committment of resources by U.S. residents to foreign firms controlled by U.S. interests. The magnitude of these and other forms of investment
appear in Table 1. In 1962, net direct investment outflow from
the United States to Latin America was actually negative due to
TABLE 1
U.S. INVESTMETr IN LATIN AMERICA (MILLIONS $)
ReNet Dir.
invest.
Invest.
Outflow Earnings

(1)

(2)

Dir.
Net
Total
Tot.
Portfolio invest. Invest,
Dir.
O'flow
Invest.
Invest.
minus
peiro
in
Venez.
(3)

Tot.
Invest.
excluding
Dir.
Invest.
in
Venez.
petro
(9)

(6)

(7)

(8)

245

135

278

413

422

(5)

(4)

Tot.
ReDir.
invest.
Earn. Invest.
minus excluding
petro
in
Venez.
petro
Venez.

268

236

9

1963

69

173

242

17

259

110

183

293

310

1964
1965

143
176

216
306

359
482

194
26

553
508

168
274

217
308

385
582

579
608

1966
1967

190
184

302
181

492
365

50
84

542
449

291
258

303
180

594
438

644
522

1968
1969

677
345

358
376

1035
721

114

1149

470
354

364
390

834
744

948

1962

-32

Source: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS

(various issues)

repatriation of capital from extraordinarily large investments in
the petroleum industry in Venezuela. Since investment activity
in that single country is large enough to affect the picture for
Latin America as a whole, we present data in columns 6-9 with
the Venezuelan influence removed. Outflows of capital from the
United States are not the only source of direct investment. Each
year a large amount of the earnings on already existing direct
investments are retained and reinvested in Latin America, in2 INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

POLICY

Assoc.,

THE U.S. BALANCE

OF PAY-

MENTS 19 (1966); COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE EFFECT OF U.S.
AND OTHER FOREIGN INVESTMENT ON LATIN AMERICA 64, 66 (1970).
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stead of being repatriated for distribution among interest holders in the United States. The sum of these two sources of direct
investment appears in column 3. The purchase of Latin American securities by U.S. residents can be added to total direct
investment to obtain total yearly investment in column 5 (Col.
9, without the influence of direct investment in Venezuelan
petroleum).
One cannot assume that U.S. investors make a net contribution to Latin American enterprise as investments give rise to
earnings, some portion of which are repatriated to be distributed
among the original contributors of capital. Indeed, the incentive
to investors is some assurance that they will eventually receive
more than their original contribution, and a steadily increasing
book value of investments implies that in the long run a
steadily increasing flow of funds to the original source will be
observed. Table 2 shows that earnings remitted to the United
States on investments in Latin America far exceed the new investment flow in the opposite direction. The net annual average
outflow of funds from Latin America to the United States over
the period shown is about $1 billion. It is worth noting here
that should the investment inflow to Latin America stop entirely the outflow to the United States would continue (at a
decreasing rate) due to coninued earnings on already existing
investments. Latin America is, therefore, in a very difficult
position if she decides that foreign private investment is no
longer desired. Exclusion of new foreign investors will aggravate the net outflow of earnings on existing investments since
part of that outflow would no longer be matched by private
capital imports. On this basis alone one would expect to find
TABLE 2
LATIN AMERICAN REMISSIONS TO THE U.S. (MILLIONS $)
Net Outflow from
Latin America
to U.S.
(Col. 4-Col. 3)

Earnings on
Dir. Private
Investment

Earnings on
Other Private
Investment

1962

762

135

897

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

956
1016
1014
1111
1190

156
211
257
309
356

1112
1227
1271
1420
1546

86
337
202
240
268

1026
890
1069
1180
1278

1968

1248

405

1653

791

862

TOTAL

Total Inflow to
Latin America

-23

920

1969
a Net direct investment inflow plus Net Portfolio Investment (from
Table 1)

Source:

SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS
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policies restricting new foreign investment to be accompanied
by efforts to capture a larger share of earnings before they are
repatriated to the investing country (e.g., expropriation, increased taxation, exchange controls, etc.)
ARGUMENTS FAVORING FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Economists have long worked under the assumption that,
on balance, benefits would accrue to countries successful in
attracting large amounts of foreign private investment. These
benefits, it was reasoned, would stem from the resulting increased productive capacity and productivity of the recipient
countries as well as from various external economies and a
favorable effect on balance of payments. The reasoning behind
this point of view remains unproven. The generalities underlying this point of view are examined here and opened to
criticism in the next section.
Underdeveloped countries have, almost by definition, a low
capacity to generate equity investment.3 Borrowing funds for
equity investment is one possible source of capital, but it depends in large part upon pre-existing equity and, therefore, it
does little good to speak of local businessmen obtaining loans
in international capital markets. Investment by foreigners can
be considered as a substitute for investment by businessmen
who are unable to raise capital. One might argue that rates of
investment could be improved through public borrowing since
official government organizations may have greater access to
loans. This however would raise the problem of selecting productive uses for the publicly raised funds and increases the
probability that unproductive investments will be made. Private
investment by foreigners is preferable since there is no problem
of selecting productive investments and no drain on government
4
resources where irrational decisions are made.
Foreign investors, in addition to bringing their capital, are
usually connected with world-wide distribution systems for
their respective outputs. Access to these markets is desirable
where production is accompanied by economies of scale which
cannot be exploited within the limited markets of most Latin
American economies. Again, there is an advantage in private
foreign investment over domestic public investment in that the
latter is less likely to have ready access to wide international
markets.
3 Jaguaribe, A Brazilian View, in How LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE U.S.
INVESTOR 71 (R. Vernon ed. 1966).
4 G. MEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT Ch. 6 (1968).
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Foreign investors, in addition to their capital, contribute
to productivity growth in less developed countries by introducing
modern technology and administrative techniques. Should such
improvements be actively sought without the help of private
foreign investment, the recipient would be forced to pay for
use of patents, consulting fees, management contracts, etc. It is
obvious, of course, that these benefits will accrue to the recipient
country only where there are no major institutional barriers,
and where the technology in question is relevant to other sectors of the developing economy. Some of the major complaints
of Latin Americans are that foreign investors employ few local
people and only a small portion of them in technical jobs thereby limiting the transfer of new technology to other sectors. An
example is the Venezuelan petroleum industry which at times
has produced as much as 32% of the Venezuelan Gross Domestic
Product while employing only 2.6% of the active population. 5
There is reason to doubt that the technology employed in petroleum extractions can generally be applied to other sectors
of the Venezuelan economy.
Foreign investment exerts a multiplier effect stemming
first from the original injection of capital and secondly from
what Brazilian economist Helio Jaguaribe has called the "germinative" effect." This effect refers to the development of new
investment possibilities arising from the linkages between the
original invstment and other sectors of the economy. Domestic
demands for raw materials or other inputs may increase, making
investments in those fields profitable. If the product of the
foreign owned enterprise is to be marketed locally, opportunities
for development of a local distribution system will appear.
The foreign producer may also supply some input such as fertilizer or construction materials - which would normally have
to be imported at a higher price - and thereby increase the
profitability of production employing these inputs.
Increased investment from abroad will provide jobs locally
and serve to shift the distribution of income in favor of labor.
As local capital stock increases, the marginal productivity of
capital will fall and, assuming competitive markets, the return
to capital will also fall. Assuming a less than perfectly elastic
supply of labor this tendency will be accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the marginal productivity of labor and,
5 Prebisch, Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, Am. EcoN.

REV., May 1959, at 254.
6 Jaguaribe, supra note 3.
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therefore, wages. The importation of capital can then be an
integral part of the programs of many countries which are designed to alleviate the extreme inequality of income and wealth.
Foreign investors produce for local markets some of the
items which would otherwise be imported, thereby saving scarce
foreign exchange. Also, the original capital import provides
foreign exchange and exerts a favorable influence on the balance of payments. This argument seems extraordinarily weak
in thaL we have already observed that capital investment inflows in one year lead to capital outflow in future years. Secondly, it is not clear that items purchased locally from foreign
owned firms would have been imported had those firms not
existed. It is possible that these purchases simply represent an
increase in consumption due to the increased availability and
lower prices of the items concerned. The so called "international
demonstration effect" has often been accused of creating demands in developing countries for new items which are traditionally unavailable in those countries.7 The generalization
can not, therefore, be made that items produced for local consumption by foreign investors would have been imported had
the investment not been made. It may simply be that these
items would not have been in demand and, therefore, not consumed.
OPPOSITION TO PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Most arguments against foreign private investment in Latin
America claim that the value of the benefits from this activity
are exaggerated, are at best short-run, and are outweighed by
factors working to retard the recipient countries. This is especially true where the benefits are difficult to evaluate, such as those
accruing from availability of modern technology, patents, etc.
Claims are often made that these contributions do not warrant
the high profits extracted from investments in the area. It has
ever been argued that, in the long run, if private investment
is effective in providing the benefis that its proponents claim, e.g.,
missing inputs, modern technology, etc., its continued presence
in Latin America becomes increasingly unjustified.8
There seems to be little integration of the foreign investments into the recipient economies. Often technology is transferred directly from the investing country with little or no
7
8

Kottis, The International Demonstration Effect as a Factor Effecting
Economic Development, KYKLos, Vol. xxiv 1971, at 455-72.
Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why, in 76
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 4 (1969).
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attempt to adapt it so as to improve its impact upon local economic growth. Host country employees are usually not given
positions which allow them to develop the administrative skills
needed to manage a large business venture and technical information is often a guarded secret, only released in doses
sufficient to accomplish the task at hand. The importation of
foreign managers and rejection of local capital participation
confirm Latin American opinion that foreign investors do not
want to become part of the local society. 9
Some of the most often heard complaints about the presence
of foreign investors in Latin America have to do with their
unfavorable effect on local competition. These accusations are
usually based upon the effective monopoly power of foreign
firms or upon their superior technical and financial abilities.
In the short run, local businessmen are at a disadvantage and,
in the long run, if they succumb to or simply accept the competitive superiority of foreigners, they may fail to develop into an
active local entrepreneural group. There is a tendency in the
United States to brush aside this complaint with the comment
that such losses are well compensated for by the contribution of
foreign owned firms to the general welfare. 10
Special concessions offered by governments overly anxious
to attract modern technology and improve employment can provide foreign investors with a monopoly position. These concessions may take the form of tax holidays or exclusive right
to engage in certain activities, thereby eliminating potential
competition and raising the probability of profit for those lucky
enough to obtain such concessions. These concessions are not
the fault of private investors per se, but an indication that
Latin Americans themselves have been unsure of exactly what
they want from private investors.
In some cases the very nature of the firms which seek
investments abroad implies some degree of monopoly. In the
case of the petroleum industry there are important economies of
scale available in crude oil exploration and distribution. Suppliers of oil are hesitant to use price reductions to adjust production and scales since other suppliers can respond with offsetting reductions. To secure stable markets, producers try to
9

Wionczek, A Latin American View, in How LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE
U.S. INVESTOR 21 (R. Vernon ed. 1966).

lOhnson, U.S. Private Investment in Latin America: Some Questions

of National Policy, The Rand Corp. Memorandum RM-4092-ISA, July
1964.
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develop vertically integrated refining and marketing facilities."1
Potential oil producers in Latin America have little choice in
developing that resource for export since access to oil markets
is only available through the large international oil companies
and at a price determined by the few firms involved. In most
cases markets are blocked to new oil producing countries, unless the rights to oil extraction are granted to the large international oil firms.
Latin Americans particularly resent the displacement or
absorption of their domesic enterprise by foreigners. For instance, manufacturing firms are usually concerned with cap12
turing markets and, with this security, maximizing profits.
Such a process is illustrated by the absorption of "Adesite," a
Brazilian adhesive tape factory, by the Union Carbide Corporation. "Adesite" was a Sao Paulo firm which grew from a
simple workshop into a factory with monthly output exceeding 500 million Cruzelros. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company, also selling tape on the Brazilian market,
began cutting prices by up to 40%, causing the sales of "Adesite" to fall precipitously. Under these circumstances, Union
Carbide was able to buy out "Adesite" and enter into an agreement with Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing to divide the Brazilian market in half and to raise the price of their adhesive
tapes by about 50%.1 3 One may argue that there was not necessarily a conscious attempt by these North American firms to establish a more oligopolistic market favoring themselves, but the
fact remains that such takeovers do occur, and they do discourage local invesors as well as stimulate political resistance to
private foreign investors.
Investors from developed countries are assisted in taking
over local business by a high incidence of business recession
in Latin America countries. During these crises, local firms are
unfavorably affected by declining sales, unavailability of domestic credit, and, at times, devaluation of national currencies
which can aggravate externally held debt. Foreign firms can
weather these situations more easily because they have access
to wider markets and to external credit sources. Thus, under
such circumstances, local firms can be obtained easily by
11 Vernon, Foreign Enterprise and Developing Nations in the Raw Materials Industries,AM. ECON. REV., May 1970, at 122-23.
12 V.

URGuIDI,
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AMERICA

103

(1964).
3

Galeano, The De-Nationalization of Brazilian Industry, MONTHLY RE-

VIEw, DEC. 1969,

at 18-19.
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foreign owners at prices which are sometimes considered extraordinarily low, but, nevertheless, are acceptable to owners
on the verge of bankruptcy. This process has been observed
in such countries as Argentina during the 1962-63 recession and
14
Brazil during the Castelo Branco anti-inflationary drives.
There are strong foreign elements in the dynamic sectors
of Latin American economies and there seems to be a direct
5
correlation between such dynamism and foreign participation.
Among Latin Americans this is interpreted as an indication
that foreign firms, due to their technical and financial advantages, can and do move into those sectors promising greatest
profits thereby eliminating opportunity for domestic businessmen and transferring abroad many of the fruits of development.
This leads to a continually decreasing autonomy for the host
country since growth becomes increasingly dependent upon
foreigners, and more growth implies less autonomy. This concern over control of the productive processes of the host country is not limited to the countries of Latin America. Canada,
Europe and Australia are also hosts to large amounts of foreign
investment particularly from the United States, and all have
expressed concern over foreign ownership of important economic sectors.'6
Special concern exists in Latin America over the foreign
domination of exports of petroleum, mineral ores and metals.
Nearly all exports of these items are produced by relatively
few foreign owned firms. For example, two U.S. companies,
Kennecott and Anaconda, before their expropriation in 1971,
produced about 90% of Chile's output of copper. In Peru, three
American firms, the Southern Peru Copper Company, Cerro de
Pasco and Northern Peru Mining Company, accounted for 83%
17
of copper mined and 99% of smeltered copper. The reasons
for this domination are that the principal markets for these
items are in the developed countries and the search for supAMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD 159-60 (1969); Ferrer,
El Capital Extranjero en la Econornia Argentina, EL TRIMES'.E EcoNOMICO, Abril-Junio 1971, at 314.

14C. KINDLEBERGER,

For an Argentine example, see Ferrer, supra note 14, at 302.
16 Fear of foreign control expanding from important economic sectors
into domestic politics is very prevalent in Latin America and increases
their distaste for large foreign investors. Latins "know" that firms such
as ITT attempt to influence local politics through extra-legal means.
Allegedly, that firm attempted to prevent the inauguration of freely
elected Marxist Salvador Allende as President of Chile in 1970. N.Y.
15

17

Times, Mar. 24, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
Mikesell, The Contribution of Petroleum and Mining Resources to Economic Development, in FOREIGN IIvESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND
MINERAL INDUSTRY 9-10 (R. Mikesell ed. 1971).
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pliers of these resources has usually originated in developed
countries. Firms from the developed countries also control the
international markets for most of these materials making it
difficult for newcomers to enter the field. Secondly, the technology employed in petroleum and minerals extraction is difficult to acquire and often is not available without the cooperation of the international firms already possessing it. Latin
American countries attempting to extract such materials on
their own often encounter technological difficulties which can
be remedied only by making concessions to foreign investors. 18
Thirdly, the international companies have relatively enormous
amounts of capital at their disposal and are able to reduce
the risk involved in exploration through diversification of their
efforts. 19 In most Latin American countries, the road to development is seen to be through industrialization and so this
exploitation of mineral resources by foreigners is thought of
as a raid on industrial inputs which will be needed for future
economic growth. Latin Americans charge that concessions
used to attract investors into these fields have been excessive,
causing the cost of mineral extraction to appear too low to
those parties acquiring the rights to these resources. As a
result, reserves are depleted so rapidly and so completely as
to leave nothing as an input for domestic industry.
UNITED

STATES

POLICY

REGARDING

PRIVATE

INVESTMENT

IN LATIN AMERICA

Most North Americans feel that the advantages of private
investment are so evident that the case for it is seldom made
explicit. It is often pointed out that the United States own
rapid development in the 19th and early 20th century was
dependent upon foreign capital. Also, like most developing
countries now, the U.S. had to cope with the vagaries of
world demand for a few agricultural products such as cotton
and tobacco. It is implied that since the early experience of
the United States and the current situation in Latin America are
so similar, the developmental success of the U.S. can be duplicated simply by imitating U.S. economic policy. Private foreign
investment was good for U.S. development and, therefore, is
recommended for others.
181 d.; Edwards, The Frondizi Contracts and Petroleum Self-Sufficiency in
Argentina, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINING INDUSTRY Ch. 1 (R. Mikesell ed. 1971).
19 Mikesell, supra note 17; Loehr, The Supply of Risk Bearers in Under-

developed Countries: A Ccmment (unpublished article being revised for
publication at GSIS, University of Denver).
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Impressive economic advances made by Puerto Rico are
sometimes alluded to as an indication that Latin Americans
can accelerate economic development by employing similar
techniques which rely heavily upon investment by foreigners
particularly upon investment originating in the United
States.20 Latin Americans would argue that Puerto Rico has paid
the unacceptable price of complete loss of political independence.
They reject the Puerto Rican model for exactly the same reasons
that the United States urges them to reject the techniques which
have led to the economic gains of countries within the Soviet
21
orb.
U.S. policy makers point out that in addition to the advantages of private investment indicated above and the success
of the U.S. development model, private enterprise yields the
additional return of political stability and democracy. In their
opposition to private investment, Latin Americans fail to
"appreciate fully the connection between private enterprise and
political freedom. ' 22 This connection is found in, first, the support that private enterprise lends to the development of a broad
middle class of managers, property owners and small capitalists.
It is assumed that this middle class would then function in
much the same way as it does in the United States; through
relatively well informed expression of political opinion. Sec.
ondly, by diffusing economic power and decision making
throughout the economy, private enterprise would provide a
bulwark supporting individual freedom against the rise of
an arbitrary centralized power.
This argument has been particularly unpalatable to Latin
Americans. Instead of leading to the development of a solid
middle class, foreign investment is observed to create relative
economic giants. Foreign investors, they argue, stunt the development of local businessmen because of their superior competitive position and, therefore, they retard the development
of an articulate middle class. Latin Americans are fearful of a
loss of personal freedom to an arbitrary, centralized power.
Many countries are already strongly influenced by decisions
made externally, beyond the control of their national gov20

E. HANSON, PuERTO Rico: ALLY FOR PROGRESS (1962).
21 Hirschman, Abrazo vs. Coexistence: Comments on Yypsilon's Paper, in
22

ed. 1961).
ECONOMIC
J.C. Doe. No.

LATIN AMERICA IssUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 62 (Hirschman
JOINT ECONOMIC COMIviTI'EE, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIPS, PRIVATE INVESTMENT

33-147, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964).
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ernments. Experience has also shown that where foreign capital has been relatively unimpeded, the benefits to the host
country are distributed in favor of a few local businessmen who
come to wield inordinate economic power. Rather than diffuse
private economic power, unimpeded foreign private investment
may enhance its concentration. While this phenomenon can be
observed in varying degrees in different countries, nowhere is
it more obvious than in one of Latin America's poorest countries,
Nicaragua. Not only has private economic power been concentrated in the hands of very few members of the Somoza family
and their friends, but those same hands hold the political reins
as well. United States cooperation in allowing the Somoza
dynasty to develop and continue in power, perpetuates the impression in other Latin American countries that this is the
type of political stability and democracy the United States
advocates.
United States policy regarding private investment in Latin
America seems to be based upon an ignorance of the possible
detrimental effects of such investment. The unquestioning support offered to private investors is reflected by the main policies
in this area: the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and the U.S. Investment Guarantee Program. An
examination of these policies leads us to discover that they
build rigidities into our mixture of policy instruments which
often lead us to results which are neither in the interests of
the United States nor of Latin America.
HicKENLooPER AMENDMENT

The Hickenlooper Amendment, originally attached to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and later in a modified form
to the same Act of 1964, seeks to improve upon the investment
climate in less developed countries by using foreign aid as a
threat. The Amendment requires the President to terminate
foreign aid and sugar quotas to countries which expropriate
(or levy taxes which are expropriationary on) the property of
U.S. citizens and, fail within six months to take steps toward
equitable compensation in convertible foreign exchange. Support for this policy developed during the aftermath of the
Cuban expropriation of U.S. properties valued at over $1 billion,23 and during negotiations concerning the expropriated
23

It is of interest that U.S. investors in Cuba felt so secure that none had
obtained investment guarantees which were available from AID or its
predecessors. See Derkash; Nationalism in South America: Adios to U.S.
Investors?, May 1971 (Occasional Studies No. 5, Division of Research,
College of Business Administration, University of Denver).
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properties of ITT in Brazil.24 The 1964 revision of the Amendment dealt with adjudication in U.S. courts in cases of alleged
injustices done to U.S. investors in foreign countries. Known
also as the "Sabbatino Amendment," it provided that:
No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the
merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a
case in which a claim of title or another right is asserted by any
party ... by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law, including the principles of compensation. 25
Supporters of these measures claimed that they would protect
U.S. property owners from arbitrary expropriation and thereby encourage more private investment in less developed countries. Secondly, they argued that it would not be wise to
provide aid to countries which violated the rights of U.S.
citizens.

26

One can easily question the authority of the United States
in the application of the 1964 Amendment. Rather than a
strengthening of international law this Amendment appears as
an attempt by the U.S. Congress to create international law.
It is quite doubtful that this attitude will foster an increasingly
orderly world based upon a strong system of international law
since it serves to divide the countries concerned rather than
create a consensus on the solutions to problems. It is also rather
naive of the supporters of this policy to imagine that they
have the power to make and enforce legal decisions in another
country. In the event that U.S. courts ruled in favor of an
expropriated U.S. investor in another country, how could the
U.S. effect a settlement?
The Hickenlooper Amenmdent has been criticized by both
the State Department 27 and U.S. businessmen with interests in
Latin America. 28 They maintain that the Amendment is selfdefeating since it polarizes and hardens the positions of the
parties concerned and makes unlikely a settlement which is
favorable to U.S. interests. In an atmosphere in which most
24 Shortly after the Amendment was passed, a settlement between Brazil
and ITT was reached. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXPROPRIATION OF
AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWEN-

Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963).
22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1964) as quoted in Derkash, supra note 23.
26 This attitude implies that aid is a form of reward for behavior agreeable
to the U.S.
27 EXPROPRIATION, supra note 24, at 27.
28 Hearing on the Alliance for Progress Before the Subcomm. on InterAmerican Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 389-90 (1969).
TIrrH CENTURY, Comm. Print No. 20-821
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Latin American countries are attempting to build national
pride, most people and politicians are sensitive to outside
pressures. The U.S. threat to discontinue aid to enforce compensation for expropriated properties is likely to solidify local
support against compensation. Attempts to force compensation
are likely to create a situation which, from the point of view
of the political decision maker in the expropriating country,
compensation is viewed as politically impossible. The deadline
proposed by the Amendment creates a tense negotiating atmosphere and gives the impression of a presupposition by the
United States that other governments will not honor their
obligations according to international law. Rather than impose
sanctions within the stated six months, it would be better to
leave the issue unresolved. As long as the issue remains unresolved there is at least a possibility of a mutually acceptable
solution.
An indication that the Hickenlooper Amendment is not
deeded and is probably detrimental to U.S. interests can be
seen in recent cases of expropriation in Latin America. In Argentina, rights to petroleum exploitation have been in and out
29
of the hands of private foreign investors. Foreigners were invited to exploit oil reserves during the last few months of the
Peron" regime only to have their contracts revoked during the
post-Peron era. Foreign firms, invited back by President Frondizi, beginning in 1958, found their contracts annulled and
properties expropriated in 1963 by the Illia government. By
1965, the latter realized that the Argentine YPF (Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales), the publicly owned petroleum company,
was unable to supply the country with enough petroleum products and so again foreign investors were invited to exploit that
resource. The important thing about this series of expropriations of, and invitations to, foreign investors is that in none
of the cases were agreements reached on compensation. Compensation for the 1963 expropriations was still being negotiated
when the firms were invited back. Rather than losing, the
firms concerned may have gained; because in each case when
they were invited back they were able to secure contracts much
more favorable to themselves. Had the Hickenlooper Amendment been invoked the matter would have been settled after
six months, with the companies receiving only partial compensation-or in some cases nothing. In none of these cases did
29 Gardner, The Y.P.F., Spring

1969 (a paper prepared for Economics 587

at the University of Colorado).
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the "investment climate" seem to be damaged, since each time
they were invited back foreign investors were willing to bid
for new explorations contracts.
United States reaction to the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) by Peru in 1968 involved
the use of the Hickenlooper Amendment as a threat-an empty
threat it turned out since compensation was not forthcoming
and aid has not been officially discontinued (but substantially
reduced). This crisis was a result of a long dispute between
the IPC and Peru, with claims and counter-claims asserted in
both directions. During the latter years of the Belaunde administration negotiations broke down repeatedly. Pressure for
settling in favor of the IPC was exerted by the U.S. by reducing aid to Peru to a mere fraction of what it had been before
the dispute. The main point at issue seemed to be the way in
which profits would be split. The fact that an agreement was
not reached and that the aid reductions of about $150 million
during a four year period far exceeded the profits to be gained
by Peru had they reached a settlement favoring themselves,
indicates that control over the Peruvian petroleum industry
was of greater importance to the Peruvian government than
mere monetary reward. Eventually President Belaunde reached
an agreement with the IPC which was proven politically unacceptable by his overthrow in late 1968, and the almost immediate expropriation of the IPC by his successor, General
Velasco.
Negotiations between the Velasco government and the
United States quickly polarized. The U.S. took up the IPC claim
without question and wielded the threat of suspending aid.
General Velasco assumed the only politically acceptable role indeed the one which brought him to power-demanding that
the IPC pay its back debts to Peru and telling the United States,
in almost so many words, that they may keep their aid. Due
to this intransigence on both sides, the IPC has been banished
from Peru and any hope for compensation for property seized
has vanished. In the end the Hickenlooper Amendment was
not applied since Latin American sympathies were strongly
on the side of Peru, elevating General Velasco to near hero
status. Suspension of aid would simply make the United States
°
appear more of a bully in the eyes of most Latin Americans.
30

For an excellent account of the IPC story and the events leading to its
expropriation by General Velasco, see Goodwin, Letter from Peru,
NEW YORKER, May 17, 1969.
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What did the use of the Hickenlooper Amendment as a
threat accomplish? It did not protect the IPC properties, and
may have helped in creating an atmosphere in which compensation was impossible. It did not improve the investment
climate for U.S. investors, but does not seem to have damaged
Peru as a host to international corporations of other nationalities. British Petroleum has recently been granted an exploration contract to develop oil in the Amazonian territories and
a British-Canadian partnership 31 has been contracted to exploit
the potentially large Cerro Verde copper deposits. Seven companies, mostly European were competing for contracts to pro2
duce diesel engines and seven more to manufacture tractors.8
Other U.S. political interests have suffered, since in response
to the U.S. attitude General Velasco has become increasingly
allied with the Soviet Union. Also, the realization by other countries that the Hickenlooper Amendment was really a bluff could
have been the final straw leading to further expropriations by
Peru, as well as similar moves by Chile, Colombia, Ecuador
and Bolivia.
U.S. INVESTMENT GUARANTEE

PROGRAM

The U.S. Investment Guarantee Program (IGP) began in
1948 as an inducement to U.S. businessmen to invest in Europe.
Initial coverage of currency conversion risks was expanded to
include protection against confiscatory expropriation (1950.) and
risk of loss from war and insurrection (1956). The list of countries in which investments could be secured gradually expanded
so as to place greater emphasis upon investments in less developed countries. These latter have become the primary area
33
covered since 1959.
In principle the concept of investment guarantees for new
investments in less developed countries seems sound. Conflict
between expropriated companies and host countries stemming
from disagreement over "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation may be avoided. What is compensation to a government may not be considered compensation by a private business
firm. Subrogation by the U.S. government may allow compensation in a form which is in the national interest but which
could never have been acceptable to the private claimant. The
Partnership composed of British Smelter Construction and Wright Engineering of Vancouver.
32 LATIN AMERICA, Oct. 15, 1971, and Nov. 19, 1971.
3. For greater detail on coverages and qualifications for coverage, see Glick
& Tozier, Government Guarantees for Your Investmer',_ Abroad, MERCERS AND AcQUISITIONS, Fall 1965 and Winter 1966.
31
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U.S. government may be willing to accept such things as long
term obligations, payment in "soft" currencies or other intangibles not directly related to the expropriation dispute. In
the IPC case, the United States might have been willing to accept a resolution of the long standing dispute over commercial
fishing rights in waters off the Peruvian coast as a quid pro quo
for claims arising out of the expropriation. Thus greater flexibility could be acquired in the handling of compensation prob34
lems.
In practice, U.S. investment guarantees have proven to be
a potential source of tension and political influence. The IGP
only covers investments in countries which have signed bilateral investment guarantee agreements with the United States,
under the auspices of AID. There is evidence to indicate that
where countries were reluctant to sign such agreements, pressure
was exerted on them to cooperate 3 5 In testimony before the U.S.
Congress' Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, when asked
whether there has been a strong coercive element in the investment guarantee program, Joseph A. Silberstein"0 responded:
"I know there was a coercive element for a period of time
that if by such and such a date a country had not entered into
an investment guarantee agreement, we would have to termi37
nate aid."
In fact, it exists as a presumption in the legislation that there
should be such agreements, leaving to the President the question
of continuing aid.3 8 One official interpretation states. that where
host countries are "unwilling or unable" to put an end to the
"domestic risks of expropriation," government guarantees should
3 9
be employed to ease the uncertainties of private investors
"Unwillingness" and "inability" to end expropriation risk are
two entirely different matters. The latter implies that attempts
are being made unsuccessfully, while the former implies a
definite choice to include expropriation as a potential means
to control foreign investors. In effect, this attitude advocates
stimulation of U.S. investment even in the countries which
do not want U.S. investors and which would find the presence
Groves, Expropriation in Latin America: Some Observations, 23 INTERAMERICAN ECON. AFFAIRS 60 (1969).
35 Wionczek, supra note 9, at 14.
36 Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State.
3
7Hearings, supra note 28, at 13.
38 Id.
34

39 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMrTTEE, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIPS, PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA,

ECONOMIC

J.C. Doc. No. 59-

071, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966).

196

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

of such investors in conflict with their national interests. Such
a policy can only add to the tensions between already existing
U.S. investors and their host countries, increasing the probability
that expropriation will be used as a tool for bringing about
economic institutional arrangements acceptable to the host
country.
With the above in mind it is not difficult to see why the
IGP has been another source of resentment among Latin Americans. They see it as simply one more instrument with which
the United States can extend its influence in their countries,
even when those countries are trying to resist such extension.
They are angered by reference to the IGP as part of the ". .. residual responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect its investors abroad and the degree of pressure which we can exer'4
cise, with or without legal means, including the AID program. "
It is difficult to see the IGP as simply another form of aid in
41
view of such evidence as to the program's political content.
Proposals for multilateral investment insurance, directed
through some international agency, seem far preferable to the
IGP. In this manner political objectives of parties concerned
would be moderated by force of international agreement. Also,
both host country and capital exporting country would share
in the insurance burden. Countries which did not want to
attract foreign capital would simply choose not to participate.
Participation by a potential host country would be a clear sign
to investors that that country wanted foreign investors and
was taking steps to attract them. Since payment for claims
would be borne in part by all signatories, irresponsible acts
by one host country would clearly be felt by other hosts,
thereby providing stimulus for each host country to exert their
influence on other hosts to minimize claims. This is just the
opposite of the present situation where, if anything, an expropriating host is supported by other host countries. These proposals would help minimize the development of the attitude
that neither the host nor the company will suffer, since the
42
U.S. government would pay the claim.
4" Ambassador Milton Barall, Head, Caribbean Study Group, Dept. of State,
AID. Statement in Hearings, supra note 28, at 235.
41 There is some indication, political factors aside, that the IGP is not
needed. Since the beginning of the program in 1948, there have been
so few claims paid, four as of 1969, as to leave these events actuarily
insignificant. That U.S. private investment in Mexico is greater than
in any other Latin American country, and that investment guarantees
are not available there, thrcwS further doubt on the need for the IGP.
oecial features of multilateral investment in42 For some details on the
surance proposals, see Martin, Multilateral Investment -Insurance, 8
HARV. INT'L

L.J. 280 (1967).
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CONCLUSIONS

The case for private investment in Latin America or any
developing region is indeed uneasy. Potentially, advantages can
accrue to countries hosting foreign private investors in the form
of improved technology, increased productive capacity, greater
employment and short run balance of payments improvement.
The presence of such investment, however, can have an unfavorable impact upon local enetrpreneurs, long run balance
of payments and upon the ability of the host country to control
its own economic destiny. Which forces predominate is unclear.
No generalization can be made that private foreign investment
is "good" or "bad" for the host country since each investmenthost combination will differ in its overall economic properties.
United States policy toward private investment in Latin
America has been based upon the assumption that it is always
to the hosts' advantage to have more foreign private investment
than less. Policies based upon this unrealistic assumption have
not and cannot be successful in improving the so called "investment climate" in Latin America nor in protecting U.S.
investors from expropriation. The government of the United
States should neither promote nor discourage private investment
flowing from the U.S. to Latin America. Investment decisions
should be made solely by the firms concerned, taking into
account the economic soundness of the venture, the laws of the
host country and its reputation for keeping its promises. The
U.S. government should neither insure investment nor participate in any private insurance plan.
What might be called a "market" solution to the private
investment problem should be sought in that an environment
lacking distortions caused by unrealistic policies either on the
part of investing or host countries is most preferable. Sound
foreign investment practices will occur in the future only
through arrangements mutually satisfactory to host governments and investors. Countries convinced that foreign private
investment will benefit them will soon discover the measures
necessary to attract the attention of investors. Hosts, convinced
that on balance they are being harmed by the investments of
foreigners, will be free to follow policies which exclude them.
Under the current system, these latter are often forced to host
investors which they consider contrary to their national interests, and are at the same time chastened for their sometimes
harsh acts against these investors. Such harshness can only be
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expected in these cases and could have been avoided in the
first place had the unwilling host been free to exclude the
objectionable investor. By experience countries will learn that if
there are benefits to be gained from private foreign investment,
certain activities (e.g. expropriation) will severely limit their
ability to enjoy those benefits. On the other hand, if such investment places an uncompensated cost upon the host, it will
simply be excluded.
Investing firms will be under constraints similar to host
countries. They will soon learn which modes of behavior are
compatible with their own interests and those of the host.
Should those modes be violated in ways injurious to the latter,
settlement in host country courts is clearly necessary. Firms
will quickly discover where they are welcome and where they
are not. Investment decisions could, therefore, be made with a
clearer assessment of the "investment climate" than is now
possible.
One might ask whether the adoption of such a policy of
non-interference by the United States would mean a rash of expropriations of property now owned by U.S. interests in Latin
America. Surely there will be expropriation in some cases where
the investments are particularly disliked by their Latin American hosts. But is this not what is taking place anyway in Peru,
Chile, Bolivia, etc.? Expropriations will not increase significantly
because each country would realize that a policy of wholesale
expropriation would be a clear sign to foreigners that they are
not wanted. Host countries would not generally want to give
such an impression since most of them realize that under some
circumstances private foreign investors can be of benefit to them.
They would not want to jeopardize their option of attracting
certain kinds of investors by creating the general impression
that they are against all private foreign investment. Only those
investments clearly contrary to national interests are likely to
be expropriated, 4" and only those countries which do not want
any private foreign investment are likely to pursue general
expropriation policies. In this latter case the overall investment
climate would be improved since investors would know precisely where and under what circumstances they were welcome.

trauma and international conflict associated with expropriation could be avoided through the use of an international divestment

.,:,Much of the

mechanism as suggested by Albert 0. Hirschman. How to Divest, supra

note 8.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE GROWTH OF

STATE TRADING
CLIVE M. SCHMITOFF*
FRANK WOOLDRIDGE*

*

It is well known that the principle of sovereign immunity
finds no support in classical international law.1 It is not referred
to by Grotius, is deprecated by Bynokershoek, and Vatte 2 is
only prepared to admit it with regard to the person of the sovereign. The historical origin of the doctrine is bound up with
the personal immunity of heads of state, and it was with regard
to this that the distinction between acts juri imperii and jure
gestionis first attained prominence in Germany in the eighteenth
3
century.
The evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is thus
comparatively recent and it was not until the nineteenth century that the doctrine could have been said to be established in
a majority of states. 4 In the Anglo-Saxon countries the growth
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been influenced by
the immunity of the local sovereign. In the United States, a
further influence appears to have been the Constitution. 5 The
classic formulation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
set forth by Marshall, C.J. in the case of The Schooner Exchange
0
The most relevant paragraph of his judgment apv. M'Faddon.
pears to be as follows:
*Clive M. Schmitthoff, LL.M., LL.D. (London), Dr. jur. (Berlin), Barrister, Visiting Professor of International Business Law at the City
University and at the University of Kent at Canterbury, Hon. Professor
of Law at the Ruhr-Universitat Bochum. ( 1972 Clive M. Schmitthoff.
* Frank Wooldridge, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. (Law), Lecturer in Law at the
University of Kent at Canterbury.
1 See Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BAIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 223 (1951).
2
Vatel, however, recognized the principle of independence, sovereignty
and equality of states. IIE. VATTEL, LE Daorr DES GENS (1758). It seems
Marshall, C.J. derived the doctrine from the writings of Vattel. Id. at
ch. III, § 36, and ch. VIII, §§ 78, 79, 81.
3 For the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see E. GMUR,
GERIcHTSHARKEIT UBER FREMDEN STAATEN (1948).
4 S. SUCHARITKUL STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING AcTIvrIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1959).

5 See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
6 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being capable of conferring
extra-territorial powers, would not seem to contemplate foreign
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade
the dignity of the nation, by placing himself or its sovereign
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in
the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent
sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved
by implication and will be extended to him.7
It seems that the Courts of most countries, apart from
Holland and Scandinavia, recognized the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the nineteenth century. By that time, it had become
a generally accepted principle of international customary law,
and is the basis for the doctrine in Hackworth's Digest of International Law.8 While some would argue that the doctrine
of absolute immunity still prevails in international law," it may
be doubted that all states applied it to commercial transactions,
even in the nineteenth century." That was the era in which
state trading functions were generally minimal, and in which
the principle of laissez-faire was generally in vogue. It lasted
until the coming of the economic depression in the last quarter
of the century."
Although the volume of state trading increased in the twentieth century, 12 this increase has not always been reflected in
judicial decisions by a modification of the doctrine of absolute
state immunity. The problem of state trading has sometimes
been dealt with by treaties. In a 1948 treaty between the
United States and Italy, 13 both states agreed not to raise the
issue of sovereign immunity with respect to any "enterprise
of either High Contracting Party which is publicly owned and
controlled, and engages in commercial manufacturing, processing, supplying or other business activities within the territories
7In another part of his judgment, Marshall, C.J. expressed the opinion
that the above principles do not apply to state trading. One may
usefully compare the above doctrine of Marshall, C.J. with that of
Lord Atkin in The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, in which the learned Law
Lord expressed the opinion that to implead a foreign sovereign would
be to act contrary to a rule of international law.
8 G. HACKWORTH, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1963).
9 See Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts,

14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101-124 (1933).
10 See Gutteriez v. Elmelit, [1886] FoRo ITAL. I 913.
11 As is well known, the doctrines of the Fabians and of the Oxford

Hegelians then suggested a larger role for the State.

12This increase may be direct, or through a state controlled corporation,

as with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries.
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of the other High Contracting Party." There has also been a
shift in the position of national courts concerning the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in regard to increased state trading. It
seems that only the United Kingdom, India,' 4 the Soviet Union
and some Eastern European countries now favor the absolute
rule of sovereign immunity."" The writings of publicists, as
well as the practice of states, have led many to concur with
Professor O'Connell I G that there is no international law regarding sovereign immunity, or, that if there is, it only covers a
narrow field.
The Three Theories Regarding Sovereign Immunity
1. The Absolute Theory
According to this theory, the plea of immunity is available
in all cases in which the person or property of a foreign sovereign is impleaded in the courts of another sovereign. The fact
that it is the sovereign's person or property gives rise to this
immunity notwithstanding the nature of the act of the foreign
sovereign. As will be noted later, British courts adopt this view
although it is open to the House of Lords to adopt a different one.
2.

The Theory of Limited Immunity

This theory provides that the foreign sovereign may arrest
suit or prevent execution only where the activity involved is
that of the government. Immunity thus covers acts jure imperii,
but not jure gestionis. Some would argue that the former are
distinguished from the latter as a result of their objects, while
others would argue, following Weiss, that the juridical nature of the transaction is decisive,'1 7 and that if the transaction
18
could be entered into by an individual, it is one jure gestionis.
13 See Schmitthoff, The Claim of Sovereign Immunity in the Law of
International Trade, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 452-53 (1958).

14 See Dulerai and Co. v. Pokerdas Mengraj, 39 ALL INDIA RPTR. 335

(1952); In re Commissioner for Workers' Compensation, 38 ALL INDIA

RPTR. 880 (1951).

15 The U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of absolute immunity
in the case of Republic cf Mexico v. Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30 (1945),
before the issue of the Tate Letter by the State Department in 1952.
16D. O'Connell, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 918 (1965); see also I. BROWNLIE,

PRINCIPLES

SORENSEN,
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MANUAL

PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL

OF PUBLIC

LAW

282 (1966) and M.
426 (1963).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

17 Compdtetence ou I'incomp6tence d I' egard des~tats 6trangers, Hague
Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours, (1923). The distinc-

tion between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis finds apparent
expression in the provisions of the CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA
AND THE CONTINGUOUS

ZONE,

1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205;

CONVENTION

ON

THE HIGH SEAS, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 825.
18 The Austrian Supreme Court case of Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, I.L.R., 1950, Case No. 41, treats the distinction between acts
jure imperii and jure gestionis as one accepted by international law.
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The distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis0
is difficult to make especially if the first argument is adopted.
There is, according to the U.S. Supreme Court case of The
Pesaro, "no international usage which regards the maintenance
and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time
of peace as any less a public purpose than the maintenance and
'20
training of a natural force.
3. The Theory Which Denies the Existence of Sovereign Immunity
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht argued that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no sound basis in international law. 21 He
contends that absolute immunity has largely been abandoned in
state practice because criteria for so limiting immunity are not
uniform and have become unworkable. He suggests that foreign
States should be submitted to the jurisdiction in the same way,
and to the same extent, as is the sovereign. 22 He qualifies this
statement with four specific rules which he thinks should be
universally adopted; (a) that executive acts of the foreign sovereign in his own territory should enjoy immunity; (b) that
legislative acts should likewise enjoy immunity; (c) that governmental contracts should be treated according to the private
international law rule of the lex fori, which may provide that
there is no jurisdiction; and, (d) that traditional diplomatic
immunities in regard to warships and other foreign property
should be preserved.
23
In his judgment in Rahimtoola v. Nazim of Hyderabad,
Lord Denning agreed in principle with Lauterpacht's exceptions.
He said:
If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative
or international transactions of a foreign government, or the
policy of its executive, the court should grant immunity if
asked to do so, because it does offend the dignity of a foreign
sovereign to have the merits of such a dispute canvassed in
the domestic courts of another country; but if the dispute concerns, for instance, the commercial transactions of a foreign
government (whether carried out by its own departments or
agencies or by setting up separate legal entities), and it arises
Which distinction has not applied in English Law. But see the cases
cited by Mann, Law Governing State Contracts, 21 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
(1944).
20 277 F. 473 (1921).
21 Lauterpacht, supra note 1, at 226-36. See also Schmitthoff, supra, note
13, at 452.
22As O'Connell correctly points out, supra note 16, at 919, this would be
capable of being interpreted as, where the sovereign of the forum
submits himself to the jurisdiction only in matters Jure gestionis the
problem of distinguishing these from acts juri imperii is not avoided.
23 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884.
"9
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properly within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts, there
24
is no ground for granting immunity.

It is difficult to support the doctrine of absolute immunity
under modern conditions. It is doubtful whether the dignity of
the sovereign State is a suitable basis for the doctrine, since
the courts of most States now adhere to the doctrine of limited
immunity. Article 11 of the Draft Convention Respecting the
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States prepared
by the Harvard Law School in 1932 suggested the adoption 'of
this doctrine. As was stated in an earlier article,25 the test which
provides a workable distinction between acts jure imperii and
jure gestionis turns on the nature of the transaction. The third
theory of Judge Lauterpacht would seem to lead to a similar
conclusion, given that the distinction between public and private
26
acts depends upon the nature of the transaction.
One must surely agree with Sucharitkul that ". . . the only
hopeful approach to the problem of jurisdictional immunities
of States in regard to trading activities appears to be to assimilate as far as possible the position of foreign State traders to
that of private merchants or ordinary foreigners and foreign
corporations. ' 27 He also believes that there is room for modification of the doctrine outside the sphere of trading activities,
and a need for a broad definition of the concept of "trading
activities. ' 28 The doctrine of sovereign immunity should be
abolished in this area in relation to process, attachment, and
execution.
The Treatment of the Plea of Sovereign Immunity in Commercial
Transactions by National Courts
It is not finally settled in the United Kingdom whether a
foreign sovereign, acting directly or through the medium of
a state trading corporation, can claim immunity. The question
25
however,
has not yet arisen directly in the House of Lords,
-24 See id. at 913.
25 Schmitthoff, supra note 13, at 456.
2G Note that, as Judge Lauterpacht points out, it may be argued that
some contracts can only be made by a state, i.e., the purchase of
provisicns for the services.
27 S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 313-14.
28 Note that the activities exercised by the New Brunswick Corporation
as described by the judges in Mellenger v. New Brunswick Corporation, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 604 were perhaps not trading, but for the promotion of the industrial development of the province. The decision,
nevertheless, appears to be unsatisfactory.
29 It seems clear that English law has net committed itself to the position of granting immunity to state trading vessels, and in view of
the general development in favour of restrictive immunity, it seems
unlikely that it will. The opinions of Lord Maugham, Thankerton and
Macmillan in The Cristina,[1938] A.C. 485 were in favour of limited irn-
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Lord Denning expressed that he was in favor of the denial of
°
the principle of immunity in Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad
as mentioned above. It may be that if the question were now
to arise in the House of Lords, their Lordships might decide
in favor of the limited principle of immunity, or even in favor
of the denial of the principle altogether with exceptions as
already enumerated. There is nothing, it would seem, in international customary law which need dissuade them from so
doing. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has decided in favor
of absolute immunity 1 Its decisions relevant to state trading
corporations will be considered in the next section of this article.
It is clearly open to parliament to legislate on the question of
sovereign immunity, and restricting it, at least as far as trading
transactions are concerned, would not be contrary to international law.
In the United States, one must distinguish between the
judicial and the administrative views of sovereign immunity in
commercial transactions. The "Tate Letter"3 2 was the culmination of a policy which had been pursued by the State Department for many years. In this statement a survey of the practice
regarding immunity in various countries was made, and it concluded that only English and Soviet law recognized the doctrine
of absolute immunity. Other countries tended toward the restrictive rule which distinguishes acta gestionis from acta
imperii. The letter indicated the intention of the Department
of State to follow the restrictive view of soverign immunity.
In concluding certain commercial treaties 33 with other countries,
the United States has expressly provided that state owned or
controlled enterprises of these countries shall not be entitled to
sovereign immunity when engaged in business activities in the
territory of the other.
State Department certification has much directive impor-

munity, as was the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in The Ramava,
[1941] 75 IR. L.T.R. 153 and the Canadian decision of Flota Maritma
Browning de Cuba S.A. v. SS. Canadian Conquerer, [1962] 30 D.L.R. 2d
172 (Can.). See D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 943.
30 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884, 913.
31 The Parlement Belge, (1880), 5 P.D. 197; The Porto Alexandre, (1920),
23 P.D. 30, Krajina v. Tas Agency [1949] 2 ALL E.R. 274; Baccus S.R.L.
v. Servicio Nacional Del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438; Mellenger v. New
Brunswick Development Corp., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 604.
32 26 DEPT. STATE BULL 984 (1952).
33

See Schmitthoff, supra note 13, at 452-53.
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tance in the U.S. courts 4 In The Republic of Mexico v. Hoffmann,3. 5 the State Department refrained from certifying that it
recognized Mexican ownership, without possession of a ship, as
a ground of immunity. The Supreme Court held that the vessel
was not immune from jurisdiction, because the vessel was not
in possession of the Mexican government. In his concurring
opinion, Frankfurter stated that the concept of possession was
a tenuous one for the purpose of distinguishing between vessels which are entitled to immunity and those which are not,
and that the decision of the court constituted the overruling
of earlier decisions. In National City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China,30 the Supreme Court's deferral to the Tate
Letter may be described as the basis of the decision. The State
Department seems to now recognize sovereign immunity on a
case by case basis.
Despite the doubts of Hamson, 37 France also adheres to the
restrictive theory distinguishing actes de commerce or actes de
gestion prive6s and actes de puissance publique. In Roumania -v.
Pascalet,38 the Commercial Tribunal of Marseilles decided that
the purchase of goods for resale to nationals was an acte de
commerce for which immunity would not be granted. Also, in
Chaliapinev. Representation Commerciale de I'U.R.S.S. et socidt6
Brenner,39 the Soviet Union was not granted immunity in a
suit for breach of copyright in the publication and sale of books.
These cases concerning state trading instrumentalities show the
40
general reluctance of French courts to grant immunity.
At the beginning of this century, German courts firmly
supported the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. In 1921,
chis concept was applied to the Ice King Case, 41 in which the
court disclaimed jurisdiction in a shipping case involving a for34 Note that in Chemical Natural Resources v. Republic of Venezuela,
(1966), 42 I.L.R. 119, a case heard in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, prohibiticn was granted requiring the lower court judges to
accept the State Department's suggestion of sovereign immunity, which
was said to be binding on a U.S. court even though it related to a
foreign government's commercial transactions.
35 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
36National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
37 See Hamson, Immunity of foreign states: the practice of the French
courts, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 293 (1950). See also Lauterpacht's criticism of the article, supra note 1, at 262-63 n.9.
38 Roumania v. Pascalet, A.D. 1923-4, Case No. 68.
39Chaliapine v. Representation Commerciale de l'U.R.S.S. et soci~t6
Brenner, Dallos P~riodique 1934-2/139.
401t
seems that French judges, unlike their British counterparts, are
willing to impose and apply their own views of governmental acts,
and are predisposed to deny immunity in cases invclving the Soviet
Union, which has made a state monopoly of its foreign trade.
41 Gustaf Selling v. United States Shipping Board, (1922), 103 R.G.Z. 274.
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eign sovereign. However, German courts have recently shown a
tendency to adopt the restrictive theory.42 In contrast, Italian
courts have denied immunity since before the turn of the century. This denial of immunity has been based upon a doctrine
of implied waiver. Italian law seems to have developed the most
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity and, since it is
easy to imply a waiver of jurisdictions, 43 the courts take a
liberal view as to what constitutes acta gestionis.44 The Italian
45
Supreme Court, in the case of State de Rumania v. Trutta,
applied the "nature of the transaction" test to a contract for
the supply of leather to a foreign army. It thus decided that
immunity would not be granted since the purpose of the transaction could not alter the private nature of the act of entering
into a contract. Belgian and Swiss courts also adhere to the
46
doctrine of restrictive immunity.
A growing number of states also admit the execution of
judgments upon state assets which do not serve public purposes.
Swiss law permits execution subject to authorization from the
Federal Council; and in the Socobel case,41 a Belgian court subjected Greek assets in Belgian banks to execution. The French
decisions regarding executions are in conflict; but in the United
States, execution has been allowed against a foreign State's
property.
Sovereign Immunity and State Trading Corporations
It is necessary to refer to three English Court of Appeal
decisions 48 before discussing the legal position in the United
States, France, Germany, and Italy. The decisions, in at least
the second of these cases and perhaps the third, are unfortunate.
SUcHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 222-25.
Compare the English case of Baccus S.R.L. v. Servico Nacionale del
Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438 C.A. and Kahan v. Federation of Pakistan
[1951] 2 K.B. 1003.
In the case Hungarian Papal Institute v. Hungarian Institute (Academy) in Rome, (1960) 40 I.L.R., 59, the Italian Court of Cassation
decided that the Hungarian Academy was exempt from the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, as it was an organ of the Hungarian State,
performing cultural activities of a public kind according to an international agreement. This body was not engaging in trading activities.

42 S.
43

44

45 State de Rumania v. Trutta, [1926] FoRo

ITAL.

I. 584.

46Austria recognizes the doctrine of limited sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
the Supreme Court case (Collision with foreign government-owned

motor car (Austria) case), Feb. 10, 1961, 40 I.L.R. 73.
47 Socobel v. Greek State, 32 I.L.R. 187, 1951, Case No. 2.
48 See Schmitthoff, supra note 13, at 463-67; see also Wedderburn, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations, INr'L & COMP. L.Q.
290 (1957). The cases are Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949] 2 ALL E.R.
274; Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438,
and Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corporation, [1971] 1
WJL.R. 604.
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In Krajina v. Tass Agency, the plaintiff alleged he had been
libeled in the Tass Agency, a newspaper published and registered
under the U.K. Registration of Business Names Act of 1916.
Suit was initiated for damages in the English courts. The defendant entered a conditional appearance and applied to the
court to have the suit set aside on the ground that it was a
department of the Soviet State and, therefore, immune from
suit. They produced a certificate from the Soviet Ambassador
stating that Tass "constitutes a department of the Soviet State,
' 49
The
i.e., the U.S.S.R., exercising the rights of a legal entity.
writ was set aside by Birkett, J., and his order was affirmed
by the Court of Appeal. Cohen, L.J. and Tucker, L.J. added
that the agency has the status of a governmental department
and that even if it could have been proved that Tass was incorporated as a legal entity, it would not have been deprived
of sovereign immunity. Singleton, L.J., in a brief but interesting
opinion, stated that if it had been possible to show that Tass
Agency was incorporated as a separate legal entity, the position might have been different. An important factor in the case
may have been that the activities engaged in by the Tass
Agency are of a propagandist and political nature having little
commercial purpose.
The Baccus case was a more unfortunate decision. It concerned a Spanish corporation, the Servicio Nacional del Trigo.
On one hand, the corporation was held to be a separate legal
entity, and on the other, it was held to be a department of the
Spanish government and acting in conformity with the instructions of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture. Servicio entered
into two C.I.F. contracts for the sale of 26,000 tons of rye to a
private Italian company. The contracts provided that "any divergence which may arise . . .both parties submit to the jurisdiction of the technical courts of London." Dispute did arise, and
the plaintiffs issued a writ out of the jurisdiction claiming
damages for breach of contract. Servicio entered an unconditional appearance and the plaintiff buyers filed their statement
of claim. One year after its apparent submission to the jurisdiction, Servicio pleaded immunity on the ground that it was a
department of the Spanish government. It filed an affidavit to
that effect, stating that the earlier procedural steps had been
taken by a Spanish official who purported to act for Servicio,

49

Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949] 2 ALL E.R. 274, 284.
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but who did not have authority.50 The Court of Appeal upheld
this belated plea of sovereign immunity by a vote of two to
one. Singleton, L.J., dissenting, elaborated the rationale which
51
he had already outlined in the Tass Agency case. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not decide that when
a separate legal entity is set up by a state for trading purposes,
that entity should not enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity.
It is arguable, as Professor Wedderburn has contended, that
despite the Baccus case, where the evidence may perhaps have
been special, 52 it is still possible for an English court to decide
that a foreign state trading corporation is sufficiently independent to not be an agent of the State, and, therefore, not
subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is no longer
allowable for the Court of Appeal to state that mere incorporation and having a commercial function suffices to grant this
degree of independence.
It would seem, then, that the Mellenger case was rightly
53
decided if the test of commercial functions is adopted, but
wrongly decided if the wide principle of Judge Lauterpacht's
denying sovereign immunity is adopted. In this case two industrial consultants, who intended to bring action against the
New Brunswick Development Corporation, applied for leave to
issue a writ and to serve notice of it on the corporation outside the jurisdiction. They alleged that a two hundred thousand
pound commission was owed to them for effecting a business
introduction leading to the establishment of a chipboard plant in
New Brunswick. The Canadian corporation entered a conditional appearance opposing the application stating that the
convenient forum for the trial was New Brunswick. Kilmer
Brown, J., granted the plaintiff's request and gave the corporation leave to appeal from his order. It should be noted that the
corporation was established under the New Brunswick Act of
50It does, in fact, seem Senor Cavero, a senior civil servant who had
instructed that unconditional appearance be entered, did not know
the effect of entering an appearance. See Parker, L.J., speech in
Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio National del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438, 473.
51 The learned Judge, like Cohen, L.J. in Krajina's Case, referred to a

number of American cases, in particular Ulen and Co. v. Polish Na-

52

tional Economic Bank, infra.
See Lord Denning's explanation of the decision on this ground in
Mellenger [1971] 1 W.L.R. 610. It seems that, although according to
the affidavit of Snr. Jose Colas, the corporation was subject to the
control and supervision of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, the
corporation was able to effectively exercise the functions of an autonomous body. Perhaps the Master of the Rolls sought to limit the
effect of the case drastically in his obiter dictum distinguishing it

on its facts. He also stated he was not sure it could be upheld.

53 These functions were adopted by Lord Denning.
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1959, which states, "There is hereby constituted on behalf of
Her Majesty in right of New Brunswick a body corporate under
the name of the New Brunswick Development Corporation. .. ."
It is clear that this corporation is closely connected with
the government. The Minister of Industry is an ex-officio director, and the other directors are appointed by the Lieutenant
Governor. The corporation has no issued capital, and no stocks
or shares. Its principal power under Section 3(1) (a) of the Act
is to "assert, promote, encourage and advance the industrial
development, prospects and economic welfare of the province,"
and, although the corporation has the power, with the consent
of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, to carry on any business
of an industrial, commercial or agricultural nature, it has never
exercised that power.
It was arguable that the contract entered into was not a
trading one, because it did not involve buying or selling, but
it did involve the introduction of Airscrew Weyrac in New
Brunswick instead of in Sweden or Finland. Also, it was apparent that the New Brunswick corporation was closely identified with the New Brunswick government, and that it had
never pursued ordinary trade or commerce. On these grounds,
Lord Denning, M.R., and Salmon, L.J., with Phillimore, L.J.
concurring, decided that the corporation was entitled to sovereign immunity. The reason for the decision was that the
New Brunswick Development Corporation was not carrying on
5 4
any commercial transactions.
Arguably, however, the purchase of information is a commercial transaction, and certainly an ordinary contract was in
question. In Rahimtoola's case,5 5 Lord Denning used the example of the commercial transactions of a foreign state as an
instance of when sovereign immunity should not be granted.
The Mellenger case was not concerned with the legislation of
international transactions by a government, and with due respect it seems that Lord Denning did not follow the logical conclusions which he might have derived from his judgment in
Rahimtoola's case. Had Judge Lauterpacht's view of sovereign
immunity been adopted, or the method of Judge Weiss for distinguishing between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis, the

54 See Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corp., [1971], 1 W.L.R.
55

609.

Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884-913.
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case would have been decided differently. In the opinion of the
writers it should have been. 56
In the United States a distinction has been drawn between
government departments and corporations. U.S. courts have
been consistent in their denial of immunity to private corporations. In 1824, Marshall, C.J. 57 said that a government divests
itself of its sovereign character when it becomes a partner in
a trading corporation, and so far as trading transactions, takes
on the character of a private citizen.58
Ulen and Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (National
Economy Bank)5 9 was concerned with a foreign bank in which
the majority of the shares were owned by the Polish government, with control therein vested in the Minister of Finance.
Net profits were reserved for the State Treasury and municipalities which held shares. The Supreme Court denied immunity, and
the distinct legal personality of the corporation was given effect.
The principle of the Ulen case has been generally followed in
the United States. There have been instances, though, in which
U.S. courts have granted sovereign immunity to state trading
corporations. In one because the court found the primary purpose of the corporation to be that of supplying oil to the British
Navy. 60 In this case it will be noted that the court used the
"objects" test as the basis for its decision. As far as state trading
corporations are concerned, the principle generally applied by
U.S. courts is clearly more in accordance with justice and contemporary economic reality than that applied in the United
61
Kingdom.
In France, Germany and Italy it seems that state trading
agencies are not now entitled to immunity from jurisdiction
although there was fluctuation in France early in this century
on sovereign immunity. Soviet state trading agencies have not
enjoyed immunity in the French courts. 62 In Italy, courts have
56 For a recent case on sovereign immunity, see Swiss-Israel Bank v.
Salta Times, April 14th, 1972, at 14, col. 8. In this case McKenna J.
declined to set aside a writ against an Argentine bank which was not
a department of state, but an independent corporation carrying on a
banking business free of government control; by Article 2 the Organic

Law of the Provincial Bank of Salta, it was stated to be autarchic.

Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
See S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 120-23.
See In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 291 (1952).
60 24 N.Y.S. 2d 201 (1940).
57
58
59

61

For recent cases concerning state trading corporations in which sovereign
immunity was not granted by the courts, see Pan American Tankships
Corp. v. Republic of Viet Nam, 296 F. Supp. 361 (D.C.N.Y. 1969);
Amkor Corp. vi Bank of Korea 298 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

62

See the cases cited in Lauterpacht's article, supra note 1, at 260-61.
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consistently denied sovereign immunity to state foreign agencies engaging in trading activities,'63 and it seems that the German courts now take a similar position.
The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the Concept of the
Abuse of Rights
As mentioned previously, the House of Lords and the legislature both have the power to modify the application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity without violating the accepted
principles of international customary law. 4 Some claims of
sovereign immunity constitute an abuse of rights or liberties.
The "right" to plead sovereign immunity in the forum of a
territorial state is a liberty 6 5 granted by a state to the foreign
state or state trading agency. Although it does not seem to have
been contended previously, 0 under certain circumstances the
plea of sovereign immunity might be considered to be abusive
by international law. Fitzmaurice has pointed out that the
exercise of a liberty by a state may be abusive.0 7 This was also
pointed out by the International Court of Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case.0 8 There the majority opinion held that
although Norway, by reason of territorial title and acquiescence
by other states, or as a result of the unique character of her
coast, might delimit her territorial waters by long straight base
lines, they must follow the general direction of the coast. And,
though Norway had some freedom in fixing them, the choice of
the base lines could not show manifest abuse. 9
Where a state has agreed to arbitration, or to accepting the
jurisdiction of the courts,70 and then pleads sovereign immunity,
63 S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 141; see also Floridi v. Soveportrfilm,

Nov. 15, 1951, Annali X(1954), p. 115.
64 It would be desirable to regulate the whole matter by an international
convention, but difficult to achieve.
65 It is analytically a liberty, as international law does not prevent it from
being granted, and dces not define its extent.
66 No mention appears in such important texts which are concerned with,
or mention, the concept of abuse of rights as the Hague Lectures of
Politics (H.R., 1925, vol. I Pp. 5, 77-109); STOWELL'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1931); FITZMAURICE's HAGUE LECIUREs OF 1957 (H.R. 1957, vol. 2, pp.
5-54); ALVAREZ, DROIT INTERNATIONAL NOUVEAU (1958); and H. LAuTERPACHT, FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, Ch. 14.
67 Fitzmaurice, supra, note 9 at 53.
68 See Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116.
9 Id. at 412. One of the most interesting judgments in the I.C.J. concerning the abuse of rights is by Judge Alvarez. See also Second Admission Case, [1950] I.C.J. 15.
70 In Kohan v. Pakistan Federation [1951] 2 K.B. 1003, this was held not

to constitute a submission to the jurisdiction. The requirements for
submission to the jurisdiction are very strict in English law.
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the principle of abuse of rights should be applicable.7 1 It seems
a fortiori, in circumstances analogous with those in Duff Development Co. v. Kalantan Government 7 2 that the action of the
foreign state which had resulted in an injury to a national of
the territorial state could be treated as an abuse of rights. One
might envisage other circumstances in which the plea of sovereign immunity could be treated as abusive.
It might be that a territorial state accepting the principle
of absolute immunity in state trading, and a foreign sovereign
pleading sovereign immunity, accepts the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, although this is by no means
certain. The state may have accepted the jurisdiction subject
to many reservations 7 3 including the doubtfully effective automatic reservation, adopted by the United States in the Connally
amendment. It will, however, be remembered that the Optional
Clause of the Statute of the International Court provides for jurisdiction in legal disputes concerning questions of international
law. These questions may certainly involve the determination of
whether a state has comitted an abuse of rights and injured a
foreign national. The novelty of the claim would, of course,
be no bar to its consideration by the International Court, but
few states have accepted its jurisdiction, and they have made
many reservations thereto.
Abuse of Rights and Public Opinion
As the preceding observations have shown, the International Court of Justice h,,s approached the issue of whether a
state, by pleading sovereign immunity in a matter of international trade is committing an abuse of sovereign power. However, it is also necessary to devise a procedure applicable to the
frequent cases in which the International Court has no jurisdiction.
Here we are on terra nova. However, this should not deter
us. A fair and just procedure should be adopted in the interest
of creating a healthy climate for investment by countries with
It is thought that the concept of abuse of rights in international law
has a wider connotation than it has according to the German Civil Code,
intention to harm, (See RGZ
Art. 226, where there must be a deliberate
69/380; RGZ 138/373; J.W. 1936, p.330 8 ) and no other object. Some
cases in French company law have circumscribed the doctrine in a
like way.
72 [1924] A.C. 797. In that case there was an arbitration clause in a contract
with a foreign sovereign, and an award was made in pursuance thereof.
The foreign sovereign unsuccessfully applied to have the award set aside,
and upon this application being refused, the Kelantan government successfully pleaded sovereign immunity, which they had not raised earlier.
73 See Waldock, [1955-56] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. 244.
71
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industrial know-how which are prepared to transfer their technological knowledge to developing countries. It is thought that,
where a state tries to avoid its contractual obligations by abusing the plea of sovereign immunity, a procedure consisting of
two stages should be adopted.
The first stage would be an authoritative ascertainment
that an abuse of the plea of immunity has occurred. The complaining private corporation or state 74 should address itself to
an international jurist of undoubted world reputation. It must
be pointed out that, although the proposed procedure would be
an ex parte one, the state which wishes to plead sovereign
immunity would be allowed to appear during the hearing of
the case to request the rejection of the application upon certain
defined grounds. There would seem to be nothing to prevent a
member or ex-member of the International Law Commission
from assuming such a function. The position of present members
of the International Court of Justice might be more doubtful;
the express provisions of Art. 17 of the Statute of the Court
would not appear to prevent the assumption of such a role by
a member of the Court, and neither would the rules pursuant
to the article in 1949. 7 5 When, however, a decision of a member
of the I.C.J. may be the subject of an appeal to the Court, the
judge must, according to the 1949 rules, decline jurisdiction.
These rules apply only if a state accepts the jurisdiction of the
I.C.J.
In addition to members or ex-members of the International
Law Commission and the International Court, there are eminent
jurists of world repute in the field of public international law
prepared to accept jurisdiction. It would obviously be better,
in cases of the kind envisaged to nominate a "neutral" jurist,
one who is not a national of either state concerned in the dispute. The giving of an opinion by a jurist in circumstances such
as these is clearly not a violation of the fundamental principle
of international law contained in Art. 2(7) of the Charter of
the United Nations, namely, the prohibition of intervention in
matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction. The
presence of an abuse of an international right, such as the plea
of immunity, removes the matter from domestic jurisdiction.
-14 The competence of the state is made clear by the Mavrommatis Conces-

sions Case, [1924] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 2, at 12. It is now argued correctly
by many that international corporations have likewise some degree of
capacity in public international law.

75

For these rules, see [1953-54) Y.B.I.C.J. 96.
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Also, the giving of such an opinion can scarcely be construed
as "intervention."
In the second stage, when the international jurist has come
to the conclusion that the defaulting state has committed an
act of abuse in its plea of immunity, the question of the consequences of these findings arises. Obviously a coercion of the
defaulting state or interference with its internal sovereignty is
not involved. The findings of the jurist would be passed on to
the world at large, and world-wide publicity would be given
them thus making it known that a prima facie case of abuse
of the plea of immunity has been established against the defaulting state. The findings should also be communicated to international financial circles, such as the World Bank and its
related institutions. It will then be left to these financial instituions to decide whether to continue providing financial support
to the defaulting state.
In this connection, reference should be made to the statement of President Nixon of January 19, 1972, in which he reaffirmed the long-standing policy of the United States in these
matters. President Nixon pointed out that countries which expropriate often fail to attain their own investment goals. He
stated that under international law the United States has a
right to expect that takings of American private property will
be non-discriminatory, for a public purpose, and that prompt;
adequate and effective compensation will be paid. He stated
that, in face of expropriations which are contrary to international law, the United States would withhold its support for
loans to the countries concerned in multilateral investment
77
banks.7 6 In 1972, the U.S. Congress enacted three statutes
requiring U.S. representatives in the World Bank and related
agencies to vote against loans where property owned by U.S.
citizens or U.S. controlled business associations has been nationalized, expropriated or seized, or where contracts or agreements with U.S. citizens or U.S. controlled business associations
have been repudiated or nullified, or where discriminatory
taxes, restrictive maintenance, operational conditions, or other
measures are imposed which have the effect of nationalization,
expropriation, or otherwise seizing ownership or control of
property so owned, and where no determination is made by
the President that an arrangement for prompt, adequate and
76 An exception was made in this statement for humanitarian assistance.
For an estimate of the likely success of Mr. Nixon's policy, see Financial Times, Jan. 20, 1972, at 5, col. 2.
77 Public Laws 92-245, 92-246, and 92-247 of March 10, 1972.
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effective compensation has been made; or where the parties
have submitted the matter to arbitration under the rules of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes;18 or
where negotiations are taking place in good faith with the object
of providing prompt, adequate and effective compensation in
accordance with the applicable principles of international law."0
It is clear that, by reason of the weighted voting system in the
World Bank and the International Development Association, a
bloc of developed states could prevent a loan to a developing
country which expropriated the property of a national of one
of the developed states.
As President Nixon pointed out in his statement, the Department of State has set up a special office for the purpose
of following expropriation cases.8 0 The emphasis made by the
President in his statement on the usefulness of arbitration in
the settlement of investment disputes is of great interest. Mr.
Nixon also stated that the U.S. government would cooperate
with the international financial institutions to achieve a mutually beneficial atmosphere for investment. Such cooperation
would include the encouragement of less developed states which
have not adhered to the 1966 Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes to do so, and it would also include the
use of measures such as the legislation already mentioned. In
this context, it is noteworthy that the Bank and the International Development Association have a long-standing policy
of not lending to countries which have expropriated foreign
investments and which have failed to evidence progress toward
satisfactory settlement of the matter.8 '
Once it is recognized that the Nixon Statement of 1972
is founded on the general principle of international law that
an abuse of the right of sovereignty in international trade,
although not leading to sanctions, should be taken note of by
international public opinion, a solution of a problem which has
long impeded the development of a healthy climate for international business and investment is in sight. As was pointed
out at the beginning of this article, the old concept of unrestricted sovereignty has no room in the international trade relations of the modern world. In international trade relations,
See 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 524 (1965).
The OECD has formulated principles with regard to expropriation.
0 See 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT 117 (1968).

78
79
8

81 Note in this context the British opposition to a loan to Tanzania in the

IDA, which took place because of a Tanzanian expropriation without
compensation; see Financial Times, Jan. 31, 1972, at 5, col. 7.

216

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

states should be treated in the same manner as ordinary businessmen, and a state that tries to avoid its ordinary commercial
obligations by pleading immunity should be regarded in public
opinion the same as a businesman who tries to avoid the rules
of fair business practices.

THE IRAQI NATIONALIZATION OF THE
IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF EXPROPRIATION
RALPH B. LAKE
DAVID R. REITSEMA*

On June 1, 1972, Iraq announced the nationalization' of the
assets of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Syria simultaneously nationalized the pipeline company linking Iraq with the
Mediterranean. In view of the prediction that the number of
expropriations will drastically increase within the next ten
years,2 the challenge which this phenomenon presents to traditional international legal concepts is obvious.
A brief history of IPC's involvement in Iraq will serve to
illustrate the difficulties encountered in applying traditional
law. British and Russian interests in the Middle East conflicted throughout the nineteenth century, as they do now.
Both used military, economic and political pressure in the attempt to obtain a dominant position there. 3 Following the discovery of commercial quantities of oil at the beginning of this
century, British businessmen and government officials realized
the true potential value of the area. When the company which
held the Persian concession ran into financial difficulties, the
British government bought a controlling interest in what became the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. While the immediate
purpose was to secure a source of oil, the long term effect
was a continuing British presence in the Middle East.
The British government's role in Iraq was substantially
more difficult. In 1914 the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC)
was formed with the Anglo-Persian Company having a 50%6
The authors are senior students at the University of Denver College of Law.
' Attempts to distinguish the terms expropriation, nationalization and
others have become intellectual and impractical exercises when discussing the taking of property. A more meaningful term may be
"wealth deprivation." See Weston, International Law and the Deprivation of Foreign Wealth: A Framework for Future Inquiry, 54 VA.
L. REV. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Weston].
2 THE NATION, June 19, 1972, at 778; FORBES, March 15, 1970, at 28.
3 See G. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL (1970) [hereinafter cited as STOCK*

ING].
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interest. In 1918 the British government gained an additional
25% control in TPC by expropriating a German partner's interest.4 The Sykes-Picot arrangement of 1916, which was ostensibly a device to secure support for the Allied cause, also
guaranteed French, British and Russian spheres of influence. 5
This agreement strengthened the conditions which enabled the
British to obtain the concession agreement from Iraq for TPC.
The British position was further strengthened by the San Remo
Agreement of 1920 which gave the French a 25% interest in
British oil lands in return for its building an oil transportation
system through Syria. These arrangements were facilitated by
the mandate system instituted at the end of the war by the
League of Nations. TPC obtained its concession in 1925 prior to
the autonomy the British were forced to grant the Iraqis.
The U.S. government had observed the partition of the
Arab world. In 1920 it began to apply pressure on the British
to allow American companies to participate in the exploitation
of Arab oil. The State Department emphasized that the "Open
Door Policy," which was one of the stipulations of the mandate system, required the power administering the mandate
to preserve the resources until the area was granted freedom."
The American oil companies simultaneously negotiated the degree of participation they were to be granted. This resulted in
two American companies obtaining a combined interest of
7
23.75% in TPC.
Major economic developments following World War II
led to the present Middle East oil situation. The first of these
was an initial 50-50 profit sharing arrangement which represented the beginning of the attempt by the Arab nations to
regain control of oil resources. The second development was a
rising international competition for oil rights beginning in
the 1950's. Until this occurred, the holders of the concessions
had virtually complete control of the means of distribution of
Id. at 44.
5 G. CRAIG, EUROPE SINCE 1815 551 (1966).
6 "The American State Department ... insisted on the obligation of the
British government to apply meticulously the principle of the open
door and nondiscrimination in a mandate that it assumed." II FOR. REL.
83 (1921) in STOCKING, supra note 3, at 68.
7 In 1929 TPC changed its name to Iraq Petroleum Company. The present
owners and the amounts are:
23.75% Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (36%
government
owned)
23.75% British Petroleum (48% government owned)
23.75% Royal Dutch Shell
23.75% Standard of New Jersey and Mobil (50-50)
5.00% C. S. Gulbankian Foundation
4
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the oil. The third development, which is a current one, is the
demand by the producing countries for a 51% ownership of
the operations in their countries. 8
The immediate cause of Iraq's recent expropriation was
the threat of IPC to cut production by nearly 50% unless Iraq
agreed to a 35% decrease in the price of petroleum from the
Northern fields. IPC faced a higher cost in marketing the oil
due to an increased cost of distributing it from ports in the
Mediterranean.
For the past ten years the Sabbatino case has fascinated
American international lawyers to such an extent that little has
been done to develop a meaningful perspective by which to
consider the increasing practice of capital importing countries
to eliminate foreign investments. IPC and Iraq are engaged in
negotiations in an attempt to settle their differences. IPC has
indicated that in the event that these negotiations fail to solve
the problem, it will resort to the use of legal remedies. The
nationalization of IPC, therefore, provides a convenient vehicle
with which to examine not only the traditional rules of international law with respect to expropriation, but also the effects
of modern attitudes upon those rules.
Nationalism, resentment against past colonial injustices and
unfulfilled economic aspirations have produced open hostility
toward foreign investment in many developing countries. This
situation has not only created bleak prospects for their own
economies, 9 but has caused discontent with the previously
accepted law of expropriation.
A rule of law has been defined as an enforceable "concrete particularization of an ideal." 10 It is the assumption of
the authors that the international law of expropriation should
particularize the ideal of order and predictability in international economic relations. The Iraqi nationalization indicates that
the traditional rules have failed to perform this function.
In analyzing the approach to international law taken by
post World War I lawyers, who formulated much of the traditional law of expropriation, Richard Falk has written that
"they relied for a new system of world order upon agreed
legal rules, but they failed to develop an adequate appreciation
8Benedict, New Oil Pacts Have Some Leeway, Wall Street Journal,

Aug. 31, 1972, at 6, col. 4.
')This fact was recognized by the International Court of Justice in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, [1952] I.C.J. 93, 162.
10H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 19 (1967).
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of the social and political difficulties of making these rules
into effective behavioral norms."" The rules which they developed, however, were enforceable by the combined power
of the developed nations.
The international law of expropriation was essentially the
municipal law which Western nations used to govern the taking of property in their own countries. Thus, traditional legal
concepts of expropriation reflected Western notions of individual rights and the sanctity of private property. International law conceded the right of a sovereign to exercise control of property within its boundaries,' 2 and the rules surround expropriation were designed to protect the rights of
the expropriated owner. Expropriating sovereigns had to take
property for a public purpose and could not discriminate against
foreigners. The expropriated owner had to be given compensation for his loss. Since the public purpose and discrimination
requirements fit easily into traditional concepts of sovereignty,
they were generally left in the province of the expropriator.
The basic question in an international framework was the
3
matter of compensation.'
Little was done to develop a system of rules which would
govern investors entering foreign countries or provide a workable method by which countries could eliminate undesired
foreign investments. More importantly, the law did nothing
to account for future social and political changes. The unrealistic position which this placed a developing country ultimately
created the present uncertain situation concerning the law of
expropriation.
11 Falk, New Approaches to the Study of International Law, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 477, 478 (1967).
Indicative of this are the views expressed
in the legal periodicals. For an example dealing with expropriation that social and economic issues "only confuse the issue for the lawyer,"
see Drucker, Edmund Burke's View on Expropriation. 228 THE LAW
TIMES 86, 87 (1959), cited with approval by Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 586 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Domke].
12 D. P.

O'CONNELL,

INTERNATIONAL LAW 851

(1965).

The current Soviet

view is that the state has ultimate ownership of all property as an
aspect of sovereignty. This view was also that of feudal England and
of Austin, who wrote that "it may be said for the sake of brevity and
because established language furnishes us with better expression,
that the Sovereign or State has a right to all things within its territory, or is absolutely the proprietor or dominus thereof." II J.
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 221 (1878). The Soviet view of
paying no compensation, then, might be called "super traditional"
when compared with contemporary Western legal thought.
13 Traditional international law has steadfastly rejected the removal of
the compensation issue from the jurisdiction of internatonal tribunals
and from the rules of international law. 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 916 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN].
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The narrow conceptual basis of the law has only recently
become totally apparent. Although the Soviet Bloc countries
have traditionally denied the need to pay compensation, there
are presently many capital importing countries which echo
the same view, but for other reasons. As mentioned earlier, law
is an enforceable particularization of an ideal. Through the
1950's, Western economic, diplomatic and military power was
such that it was able to enforce traditional legal norms in
expropriation cases. 4 Traditional law was designed to deal
with situations which no longer are very important. Microeconomic situations, such as the recovery of a ship or its cargo,
have been replaced with situations in which corporations often
have greater wealth and power than the countries in which
they invest. This creates varying degrees of pressure on the host
country - something which may or may not be tolerated by
its leaders. New markets for the products of developing
countries, increased demand within old markets and the beginnings of cooperation between capital importing countries
have eroded the ability of the developed countries to enforce
the rules which they created. The dilemma of the oil companies
in the Middle East illustrates this development. There, companies are confronted-with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 15 and an ever increasing world wide
demand for petroleum.
6
may
The "classical" international law of expropriation
be analyzed by reference to specific current and historical
instances in which it was evoked. It is important to notice
that the official U.S. position has remained constant for a least
a half century, 7 and to a great extent so has that of the ex14Rubin, in Nationalization and Compensation- A Comparative Law
Approach, 17 U. CHI. L. R. 458 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Rubin],
notes this with the folowing examples of induced compensation from

Eastern European countries (which do not accept the view that corn-

15

"

pensation is necessary): Russia paid no compensation as it was too
powerful and there was no inducement; Yugoslavia paid the U.S. $15
million fcllowing WWII because the U.S. held $47 million of Yugoslav gold; Czechoslovakia paid Britain Yl0 million following WVWII
because Britain agreed to allow a £5 million annual trade deficit.
Western companies have agreed to the equity participation by Persian
Gulf countries, and are under pressure to grant such participation to
all OPEC members. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
B.A. WORTLEY. EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1959)

[hereinafter cited as WORTLEY].
17 See generally, WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 1020 et seq. For example,

in reference to Mexico's exprcpriaiion of American property, Secretary cf State Hull s'ated that ". . . it ha3 been stated [by the U.S.
governmentl that the right to expropriate property is coupled with
. . . the obligation to make adequate. effective and prompt compensation." Id. at 1020. In explaining U.S. refusal to affirm the agrarian
reform resolution adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference
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propriating countries.' 8 What is unique now are the increasingly
vocal and hostile arguments of the expropriating countries in
support of their actions, the frequency of expropriation incidents
and the success expropriating governments have enjoyed in
not compensating the owners.
Expropriation has always been accepted as a legal function
of a sovereign entity.' However, the application of restrictions
on this sovereign right has been the subject of continuing debate. Traditionally, expropriation was legal if the following
conditions were met: 1) compensation was paid to the owner
for the propery taken, 2) the property was taken for a public
purpose, and 3) there was no discrimination between foreign
and local interests. The difficulty with applying any of these
conditions is well illustrated by the current controversy between Iraq and IPC.
Traditional law required that compensation be given before
the taking occurred, unless there were special emergency circumstances. The current view is that compensation may be
given post facto, and that it must comply with the three requirements of being prompt, adequate and effective. The fact
that Western capital exporting countries still assert this view
in the face of opposition from the Soviet Bloc and capital importing countries is seen in the British government's reaction
to the nationalization by Iraq on June 1. A government spokesman complained that Great Britain found the nationalization
unacceptable because "no provision [had] been made for prompt,
2
adequate and effective compensation.1
Problems arise in the application of this phrase to specific
incidents. The promptness of compensation demanded by this
view is a rare occurrence. 2' The difficulty in being prompt
may be occasioned not only by insufficient resources but by
other problems including the basic problem of determining
the value of property. For example, the claim of IPC for compensation equal to the market value of the property taken is
at Caracas (1954), the State Department explained that "it could not
support the resolution because it was based largely on the narrow concept of land distribution and implied confiscation . . . [t]here are few
human desires stronger than that to posess a little spot of earth which
they can call their own." Id. at 1061.
18 See Nusbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd.
and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950); comments
concerning IPC expropriation by Dr. Pachachi, President of OPEC,
N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 55, col. 4.
19 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 12.
20 Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1972, at 6, col. 3, referring to Iraqi Law
69 of 1972, Art. 3.
21
Domke, supra note 11, at 604.
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greater than Iraq's annual budget for 1972.22 This situation is
further complicated by the insistence of IPC that future profits
be considered part of the loss it sustained. 23 Payment of compensation in a case such as this is so complicated that it would
be extremely difficult to comply with the prompt, adequate and
effective requirements of the law.
The requirement that the taking be for a public purpose
is so vague that it eludes any accurate definition. This requirement originiated in municipal law, and it
*

.

. may have had a reasonably definite meaning in interna-

tional law when the municipal systems of the states that led

in the development of international law were based on private ownership of the means of production. However, in view

of the increasingly broad area of activity in neary all states,
the concept of public purpose or public use seems increasingly

vague and of doubtful usefulness in the future.24

Public purpose includes some notion of special occasion. A taking
for national defense is perhaps the most obvious special occasion,
but another instance is pure economic necessity.25 It must be
something beyond a mere desire to deprive the foreign owners
of property. It has been termed "an exceptional procedure for
special need,' 26 and "the very pith of the so-called rule of
public utility. ''27 The statement of the Iraqi delegation to the
U.N. contained an appeal to this rule, stating that "the grave
economic implications of such a drastic reduction in revenues
are too obvious to require any elaboration.'28 The dependence
of Iraq on oil revenue seems to cause the expropriation to fall
within the special occasion category, 29 as IPC contributed 80%
30
of Iraq's foreign exchange.
Expropriation for the purpose of punishment of political
acts is not recognized as being for a public purpose. While a
state may take the property of aliens without compensation
for a criminal act, the offense must be one "generally recognized as such in public international law, or a crime accepted
22
23
24

See infra notes 51, 52.
N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 55, col. 4.
RESTATEMENT

STATES,

(SECOND)

"Responsibilities

OF

FOREIGN

comment a at 554 (1965).
25

D.P.

RELATIONS

of States for

O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW

LAW

OF

THE

Injuries to Aliens"

UNITED

§185(a),

853-54 (1965).

supra note 16, at 25.
27Weston, supra note 1, at 1088.
28 Statement, Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, June,
26

WORTLEY,

1972, at 1.
29For example, Iraq's total income from oil in 1968 was £ 203 million,
or almost 80% of its total foreign exchange income. STOCKING, supra

30.
Times, June 10, 1972, at 37, col. 3.

note 3, at 463, and infra note
30N.Y.
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as such by the confiscating state and the state of the person
punished . . . . "31 There is a tone of righteous indignation in
the scant Iraqi material available concerning their taking of
IPC, and it seems that some notion of criminality, or at least
wrongdoing, was present in the decision to expropriate. The
press release of the Iraqi delegation refers to the concession
agreement as being "unjust" and proclaims that "Iraq .

.

. shall

not be deterred or intimidated by the pressures and the maneuvers of the companies. '32 A telegram sent to the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (the governing body of the country)
by the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) supported that attitude, stating that the "imperalist oil companies . . . backed

by imperalist forces attempt to subjugate our victorious revolution and its gigantic profits. '33 However, even if one characterized the 1925 concession as imposed under colonial conditions, as the Iraqis do, 34 it seems impossible to rationally
press criminal accusations against IPC on a legal basis. IPC's
actions were not criminal within Iraq, nor were they in relation
to international law.
Discrimination against foreigners defeats the argument of
public purpose, and even those authorities which advocate that
any public purpose is sufficient to justify expropriation require
that it be non-discriminatory. 35 In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v
S.U.P.O.R. Co., an Italian court noted the non-discrimination
requirement. It found that Iran's taking of the company was
non-discriminatory, since its primary purpose was the economic
welfare of the country rather than a mere confiscatory action.3 6
The production cutback by IPC and the resulting loss of revenue by Iraq is similar to Iran's case in that Iraq is completely
dependent on oil for its governmental revenue. 3 In addition,
3 1

supra note 16, at 40. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized
this even though it did not address itself to substantive issues of international law. "There is authority ... for the view that a taking is
improper . . . if it is not for a public purpose." Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398. "The Cuban expropriations provide
a classic example of taking, the purposes of which were admittedly
punitive." Id. at 429.
32 Statement: Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, June,
1972, at 3.
33 INOC Weekly News, May 29, 1972, at 2.
34 Iraq and OPEC position stated in N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 67,
col. 2.
35 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 120.
36 [1955] I.L.R. 23, 39, 40; cited in WHrrHmAN, supra note 13, at 1056-57.
37 Production was cut by IPC in the northern fields by 50% in an apparent attempt to force Iraq to reduce the prices by 35%, N.Y. Times,
June 6, 1972, at 55, cols. 5, 6; normal production was 1.1 million barrels per day, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1972, at 37, col. 2.
WoRTLEY,
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there were no local oil producing interests other than the government operated INOC, so the expropriation could not be
called discriminatory in the sense of favoring local interests
at the expense of foreign interests.
Discrimination against one group of foreigners in favor of
another group also defeats the argument of public purpose.
While the expropriation decree simply stated that "the operation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd. . . . shall be nationalized, 3 8s the French partner was simultaneously given an
option to negotiate separately with the government. This option
was given by the Iraqi government because of the French sup3
port of the Arab position in the Middle East conflict. 9 It must
be concluded that with respect to discrimination, the action
taken by Iraq is in violation of traditional law.
It has been recognized that a party which has been granted
a concession has not only property rights, which may be
expropriated as a function of sovereignty, but also rights arising under a contract.4 A concession places a higher duty upon
countries which grant it, because the premature termination
of a concession allows the party holding it to receive damages
equal to the "benefit of the bargain," as well as compensation
for the property value. Arbitrariness is the primary consideration in determining whether a concession was wrongfully terminated. 41 If Iraq's action is determined to be arbitrary, the
fact that Iraq terminated the concession decades before it was
due to expire indicates that Iraq may have to pay an astronomical sum as compensation.
The area of contractual rights and obligations has many
ramifications which will be very briefly covered here. One
issue is that a contract must be freely negotiated. The concession granted to IPC is notable in that Iraq was under a "Treaty
of Friendship" with Great Britain. This treaty was a substitute
for and had the same effect as the mandate situation. One may
thus question whether the concession grant was truly a sovereign act.42 It is further to be noted that concession agreements
38 Iraq. Law No. 69 (1972),

Art. 1. 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 846 (1972).

.9N.Y. Times, June 2, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
40

41
42

Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, (1961).
Id. at 570.
"The King and his cabinet ratified the new concession on March 14,
1925, one week before King Fai.al promulgated Iraa's organic law
and approximately seven month- before the Iraqi Parliament ratified
the treaty defining Irao's obligations under the mandate orinciple; in
short before an autonomous Iraq government had anything to say
about it." STOCKING, supra note 3, at 52.
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must be honored by successor governments if "every act nec43
essary for vesting them in the holder has been performed.
It has been said that one of the necessary acts is that the
granting be "discretionary" on the part of the party granting
it.14 It is obvious, then, that the existence of contractual obligations is an issue which will be raised by both parties: Iraq
on the basis of unfairness, IPC on the basis of contract obligations.
Two options appear possible from this application of traditional law to Iraq's actions. The first is to simply apply international law with the resulting determination that Iraq
has broken the law by discriminating between groups of foreigners. The companies which suffered the expropriation have
the right to recover the loss, much as in the case of Iran's
taking of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's property. The
difficulty with this option is that both sides are able to present
rational arguments in support of their position. As was seen
in the case of Iran, courts of other countries are forced to
accept one or the other position. The resulting solution will be
unpredictable and will possibly be unsatisfactory to both parties. 45 This approach has resulted in uncertainty and distrust
between the companies and host countries.
The alternative option is an admission that the traditional
rules of international law are no longer viable and that a
reshaping of the law is imperative to provide a meaningful
framework to stabilize world economic relationships. Richard
Falk has made a similar proposal for dealing with the general
problem of the relation of law to world affairs: [T]he objective
is to develop attitudes and habits that encourage international

43 1. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

162 (8th ed. H.

LAUTERPACHT)

(1956).
44Huang, Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 AM.J. INT'L L.

277 (1957). See also Carlston, International Role of Concession Agreements, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 618 (1959).
45Iran's Nationalization Law provided for 25% of receipts to be set
aside for the purpose of paying the company for the taking. WHITEThis "intent" to pay defeated the comMAN, supra note 8, at 1170.
pany's subsequent claim that the taking was confiscatory. AngloIranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, [1953] I.L.R. 305,
310-11 (Tokyo D.C., 9th C.D., Japan). Exactly the opposite result was
reached by a less partial court in Aden which held the expressed
intent too vague by itself. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. Jaffrate
and Others (The Rose Mary), [1953] I.L.R. 316, 321-22 (Supreme
Court, Aden). An Italian court held that any intent expressed by an
expropriating country was sufficient to meet international rules:
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. S.U.O.R. Co. (The Miriella), [1955]
I.L.R. 19, 22-3 (Court of Venice, Italy).
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law to become increasingly a system of world order rather than
'4
to serve as a style of argument in international relations. ,
As an illustration of factors influencing current international economic relationships, two socio-legal issues will be
raised. These are the nationalistic movements within the host
countries, and the lack of political accountability on the part
of the companies. These two issues will serve as indications of
the direction in which the law will move if it is to regain
a meaningful validity.
Nationalism is one of the most important causes of the
controversy between the companies which support the traditional law and the developing countries. Perhaps the most
striking aspect of the expropriations by these countries is the
hostile attitude of their leaders toward the presence of foreign
capital.47 A professional observer of the industry described his
reaction to the 1960 Second Arab Petroleum Congress by stating that "I was unprepared for the hostility, bitterness and
suspicions manifested by Congress spokesmen for the host
,,41 Indeed, in matters of such financial importance
countries ....
one would expect a more economically oriented position. It
is interesting to note that the result of expropriation is often
financial disaster to the country. Mexico's expropriation of the
oil industry led to tax revenues being replaced by government
subsidies; Iran's expropriation put the country in a state of
financial chaos; and Chile's recent taking of its copper industry
has had a result similar to Iran's.
Nationalism has led to social and cultural changes of such
major proportions that challenges to the economic status quo
are inevitable. The concept of state sovereignty, the original
basis for the ideal of a state being permitted to take property
for a public purpose, is now being invoked by Iraq to support
its expropriation. 49 OPEC described Iraq's action as "a lawful
'
act of sovereignty by Iraq to safeguard its legitimate interests."
Thus, we find the state of the law to be a mere style of argu46Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International LawGaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 242 (1964).
47See Rubin, supra note 14, at 458; Iraq's President Bakr, in his expropriaticn decree stated that "We have decided to go on the of-

fensive against the oil monopolies," N.Y. Times, June 2, 1972, at 7,
col. 1; Syria's President Assad described the pipeline seizure as "in
conformity with our policy for economic liberation," N.Y. Times,
June 3 1972, at 37, col. 2.
48 STOCKING, supra note 3, at vii.
49 Statement, Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, June,

1972, at 3.
5o Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1972, at 11, col. 2.
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ment rather than a system which provides investors and host
countries alike with order and stability in their international
economic affairs.
The weakness of traditional international law with respect
to nationalism is paralleled by its lack of legal provisions dealing with the political accountability of international companies.
It must be emphasized that in many cases a company possesses
greater wealth and power than the host country. For example,
the total government revenue of Iraq in 1969, $291 million,51
can be compared with the gross incomes of the two American
partners of IPC, $4 billion.5 2 The loss of revenue from IPC has
forced Iraq to cut its 1972 budget by 40% and potentially much
more.5 ' Also, Iraq's prospect of disposing of a sizeable quantity
of the expropriated oil seems unlikely.5 4
Not only do the companies possess great wealth, but also
they are supported by the economic and political power of the
developed nations. The power which this combination produces
may be seen in the rivalry between Russia and Great Britain
over the control of Iran. The Russians were principally interested in territorial gains, while Britain desired economic supremacy of the whole Middle East for its commercial interestsY'
The effect of this was that "only the commercial and political
rivalry of Great Britain seemed then, as does now that of the
United States, to bar the way to the complete absorption of
Iran into the Russian orbit. ' '5 ' This government-industry partnership remains in effect although supplemented by a U.S.
presence. It has been stated that "the C.I.A. generally receives
credit for the coup that restored the Shah to power. ''5 7 Clearly
51 EUROPA

PUBLICATIONS

LIMITED,

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

AND

NORTH

AFRICA

286 (18th ed. 1971).
52 MOODY'S

INVESTOR

SERVICE,

MOODY'S

INDUSTRIAL

MANUAL,

3119, 2700

(1972).
. Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
54

Italy has agreed to buy 40,000 barrels per day. Wall Street Journal,
June 20, 1972, at 12, col. 1. However, Japan announced that it would
not buy any pending a settlement of the claims. Wall Street Journal,
June 22, 1972, at 29, col. 3. Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, the
French partner of IPC, has stated a similar position. Wall Street
Journal, June 20, 1972, at 12. col. 2. Nor is Russia, which is a selfsufficient oil producer and already a recipient of significant quantities of foreign oil, likely to absorb any of the surplus. Industry spokesmen stated that Iraq's chances of disposing of the oil are almost none.
Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
XII CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 491 (1910), cited in H. MORGENTHAU,
(4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 57
MORGENTHAU].

supra note 55.
& T. Ross, THE INVISIBLE
supra note 3, at 156.

.

MORGENTHAU,

57
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WISE
STOCKING,

GOVERNMENT

110-14 (1964),
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the resulting restoration of the Shah led to a continuing U.S.
economic presence in Iran. There is little to indicate that this
siutation is changing, and it may be unrealistic to suppose that
any law is capable of dealing with it.
Considering the foregoing discussion of the nationalism of
capital importing countries and the great power of the international companies, one is impressed with the difficulty of
achieving order in economic affairs. An examination of recent
expropriations, beginning with the case of Iran and culminating
in Iraq's action, illustrates the increasing difficulty of applying
traditional international law. International law was invoked in
the 1951 Iranian expropriation. Iran's expropriation decree made
a specific provision that 25% of future oil revenues would be
set aside to pay compensation.5 s This was held by some courts
to be sufficient to meet legal requirements.5 9 International law
was enforceable as evidenced by the numerous legal actions
instituted by the company. The threat of legal action as well
as the availability of alternative sources of petroleum prevented
Iranian sale of sizeable quantities of the oil. The international
petroleum cartel, in order to protect its interests and to discourage future expropriations, was able to dissuade potential
purchasers of Iranian oil from buying it. The resulting loss of
revenue caused the fall of the government and an acknowl60
edgement of Iran's obligation to the company.
The Chilean expropriation of 1970 may be viewed as an
interim step between the takings of Iran and Iraq. Chile went
through the motions of complying with international law, and
acknowledged an obligation to pay compensation. It then made
a mockery of the law by first changing its Constitution to
permit the expropriation,"1 and then demadning that the companies compensate Chile for "excess profits" earned during
62
the period of agreement.
When reviewing the Iraqi situation the initial positions of
both parties seem based more on notions of fairness and equity
than law. Although Iraq has stated that it will pay compensation, no procedure for doing so has been provided, as it was in
58

See supra note 45.

59 Id.
60

Iran's oil income dropped from £7 million in 1951 to zero in 1952.
STOCKING,

supra note 3, at 463.

61 Proposed Constitutional Amendment Concerning National Resources
and Their Nationalization, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1067 (1971).
Resolution on Compensation (1971), 10
62 The Comptroller General's
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1240

(1971).
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Iran's decree. Also, the Iraqi decree never mentioned the word
"law." The position of IPC has been to vigorously assert the
traditional rules of law, but the realities of the situation suggest that this is only a bargaining tool. It appears, in conclusion, that both sides plan to settle the matter at the negotiating table with few other considerations than the realities
of power.
While it is not the purpose of this article to predict what
the law of expropriation will be in the future, it seems safe to
predict that traditional international law must be adjusted to
allow it to become an enforceable particularization of the ideal
of economic order. The Iraqi situation shows that there has
been a significant change in the bases of political and economic power. The application of traditional international law
and a concurrent failure to recognize these political and economic changes will only serve to frustrate the realization of
this ideal.

REGULATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL

COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS: AN EXAMPLE OF THE
ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE TRANSNATIONAL

LEGAL PROCESS
JAMES A.

R. NAFZIGER*

The massive looting, scarring, destruction, and international
smuggling of the artistic and archaeological heritage of national
patrimonies has received, as it has deserved, widespread public
concern and commentary.' The plunder of national art treasures
has been called quite aptly the "murder of man's history. '2
Individuals, professional groups, governments, intergovernment3
al organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGO's)
have all recently come to the rescue. Their efforts have led to
the emergence of a transnational regulatory regime which, as
will be seen, is both directed toward and supported by a gradual
substitution among relevant global actors of the value of enlightenment for that of wealth.
The emerging regime of control is highly pluralistic; it
includes multilateral conventions, bilateral treaties, domestic
antiquity and export-import laws, private bilateral agreements,
enforcement by the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol), voluntary self-regulation by museums, domestic and
Administrative Director, American Society of International Law; and
Lecturer, Catholic University of America School cf Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the cooperation and assistance of Hugues de
Varine-Bohan, Director, and Bonnie Burnham, Project Coordinator,
International Council of Museums and especially Ann Zelle, Executive
Secretary of the U.S. Naticnal Committee of ICOM.
1 Coggins, Illicit Traffic in Pre-Columbian Antiques, 29 ART JOURNAL 94
(1969); Coggins, The Maya Scandal: How Thieves Strip Sites of Past
Cultures, 1 SlvNmSONIAN 8 (1970); Evans, Archaeology and Diplomacy
in Latin America, FOREIGN SERVICE J 35 (1968); Gaskill, They Smuggle
History, Illus. London News, June 14, 1969, at 26; Hamblin, The BillionDollar Illegal Art Traffic-How It Works and How to Stop It, 3 SMrrHSONIAN 16 (1972); Williams, Destruction in the Name of Art, HARV.
TODAY 3 (1972); Zelle, Acquisitions: Saving Whose Heritage? 49 MuSEUM NEWS 19 (1971); Christian Science Monitor (six part series), July
12, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 13, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 14, 1971, at 9, col.
1; July 15, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 16, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 17, 1971, at
9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1970, at 5, col. 3; June 4, 1972, at 3, col.
5; Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, March
10, 1970, at A12, col. 7; April 4, 1970, at Bl, col. 1.
2 Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1970, at 1, cal. 1.
3 That is, "any international organization which is not established by
inter-governmental agreement . . ."U.N. ECOSOC Res. 288(X), (1970).
*
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international NGO programs and controls, and, to a perhaps
diminishing extent, the market itself. Although there has been
useful commentary on some aspects of this regime, little of it
pertains to the role of such NGO's as the International Council
of Museums (ICOM).
As a potential leader in the process of regulating both
local acquisitions and transfers of art and artifacts, ICOM is
interesting first in respect of its specific functions of control.
Moreover, and more generally, as an organization showing signs
of transformation from a static, conference orientation to a
dynamic instrumentality of social action, ICOM is interesting in
respect of the emerging role of non-governmental organizations
in the transnational legal process. This study will explore both
of these dimensions of ICOM's institutional role. It represents
one effort in what has been described as the "tremendous job"
of investigating the practices of international organizations,
in applying their basic norms and law. Such investigation can
serve as a foundation for the sort of comparative analysis and
general theory which improves the capacity of international
organizations to engage in responsive and effective decisionmaking.
Most countries have their own legal controls over international traffic in art treasures.5 It is clear, nevertheless, that
by themselves, domestic governmental controls, based upon
criminal and antiquity laws, civil suits, policing of sites, border
controls, taxation, duties, tariffs, and the like are insufficient.6
It has been noted, for example, that domestically the "problem
cannot be dealt with through the existing channels of criminal
law since the very concept of a cultural heritage transcends
Sohn, The Growth of the Science of International Organization,in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 K. Deutsch and S. Hoffman ed.
1968.
5 Two unpublished summaries of municipal controls are, Protection of
Art Treasures and Antiquities in Various European Countries (Library
of Congress, Law Library, European Law Division, July (1969), and
4

J.

ON

NAFZIGER, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
MUNICIPAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF

NATIONAL ART TREASURES.

6 Among the vicissitudes of the numerous municipal controls are lax

domestic law enforcement; an overemphasis on reactive export,
rather than import, controls; the weakness of the corresponding market mechanism; reliance upon control systems of guards and inspectors that are often prohibitively expensive for the art-rich developing countries; the ancillary susceptibility of poorly paid guards and
inspectors to bribes; the susceptibility of other agents of law enforcement, including judges, to bribes (known as "mordida" in the Spanishspeaking countries); the lure of hard currency from foreign purchasers
in preference to indigenous currency sometimes available from the
government

or local purchasers;

topographic and logistic

obstacles,

particularly in the remote, cften treasure-laden, areas of developing
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traditional notions of ownership and title."' 7 It seems imperative
that non-governmental controls be developed.
Several professional and learned associations have led in
the expression of domestic non-governmental concern within the
United States -most notably the American Society of International Law, the College Art Association of America, the Archaeological Institute of America, and the Society of American Archaeology.8 But the efforts of these organizations have been hancountries; an iron law of inflation that sets prices on the international
antiquities market beyond government control; draconian, sometimes
completely proscriptive, export controls and embargoes that counterprcductively drive up the market and invite disobedience; the difficulty
of controlling the movement of items intended for re-export in such
6ntrepots as Switzerland and Lebenon; and the impossibility of sealing
off borders and intercepting diplomatic pouches, which may contain
contraband in cultural property (see, e.g. Evans, supra note 1). In view
of such deficiencies in the municipal regime cf control, it is not surprising that the laws are found to be honored more in their breach than
in their observance. See, with respect to muniepial controls in Latin
America, Evans, id. On the efficacy of holding out the "carrot" of more
liberal loan policies, and financial aid, as an alternative to the "stick"
of rigid controls, see Hamblin, supra note 1, at 25.
Proposals for more efficacious domestic regimes of control have included, inter alia, the encouragement of higher insurance rates for the
storage of art objects, so as to prompt their release on loan or exchange;
the elimination of long-term capital gains tax treatment of cultural
property; a restriction on tax exemptions for charitable contributions
of objets d'art to those of unimpeachable provenance; provisions (such
as those in effect in Japan and Great Britain) for a public or governmental option, at the declared valuation for a sale, to purchase treasured objects intendcd for export; a tariff on the export of certain
classes of cultural property; a sales tax on all foreign sales; a general
sales tax with forgiveness or rebate in the case of a domestic sale; a
revocation of the tax-exempt status of museums that accept illegally exported or otherwise obtained items; and museum subsidies.
A special panel of the American Society of International Law prepared two resclutions that, if implemented, promise some hope of more
effective U.S. controls over the flow of illegally exported objects into
this country. One of these resolutions recommended emergency congressional authorization to the President, to prohibit the import into
the U.S. of designated cultural property that formed part of another
country's heritage; and another called for prompt measures to protect
pre-Columbian monumental and architectural sculpture and murals exported contrary to the laws of the countries of origin. The resolutions
were transmitted to the Secretary of State, and were subsequently
supported by the American Institute of Archaeology. The Secretary of
State proposed measures which became H.R. 9463 in order to accomplish the purpose of the latter resolution. H.R. 9463 was reported out
from the Committee on Ways and Means, Feb. 7, 1972, Report No.
92-824.
7 Gordon, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L L. J. 537, 541 (1971).
S The respcnses of the first two of these organizations are summarized
in Zelle, supra note 1, at 22. The College Art Association adopted a resolution at its 1972 meeting that expressed concern about the failure of
the U.S. government to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. Letter from Edward N. Wilson, Secretary,
College Art Association of America, to the author, July 10, 1972. The
Association cf the Bar of the City of New York held a program on the
subject, March 9, 1970. The Society of American Archaeology held a
symposium on "Looting the Past: An International Scandal" on December 29, 1971, during the annual meeting in Philadelphia of the American
Association for the Advancement cf Science. Aside from these domestic
responses, several international NGO's have helped kindle public awareness of the underlying problem. These NGO's include the International
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dicapped by their relative isolation from the critical constituency
of large volume collectors. By far the leading U.S. non-governmental organization with such a critical constituency is the
American Association of Museums (AAM). Its response, however, has been very limited, although its Special Policy Committee has issued a mild statement of concernY On the credit
side it should be noted that the Association of Art Museum
Directors is in the process of preparing a proposed acquisition
policy.10
Because the AAM appears disinclined to establish an effective code of self-control measures, 1 the International Council
of Museums has been increasingly expected to be a prime mover
in establishing effective non-governmental controls.
Before turning to ICOM, it will be useful to establish a
theoretical framework of inquiry and to identify the nature
of the available framework of control, in order more clearly
Congress of Americanists and The Union of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences, the latter of which adopted a resolution at its 1971
annual meeting that called for stricter international control of trade in
artistic and archaelogical material, N.Y. Times, Sept 18, 1971, at C5
col. 1.
The role of the American Association of Museums regarding transnational movement of international art treasures
has been and will continue to be one of cooperation and encouragement of effective, national procedures whereby the integrity of the object and its educational value are respected and
utilized together with full respect of the laws and regulations of
the country of origin.
As a non-governmental organization, the AMM is not in
a position to regulate its members or any national government
on these matters; it is in a position to stimulate and encourage
positive steps of professional and educational cooperation and
protection of the object and respect for the nation of origin
[emphasis added]. Letter from Kyran M. McGrath, AAM Director, to the author, May 26, 1972.
The AAM's Special Policy Committee urged the organization's
members "to abstain from purchasing and accepting donations of antiquities exported from their countries of origin in contravention to
the terms of the UNESCO draft convention." A major loophole is that
"this abstention is to apply only to antiquities from a country which has
adopted the farsighted policy of making duplicate material available
through legal channels, or has installed a procedure for granting export
licenses to material which has been approved by a board of review."
In an accompanying Report, the AAM Special Policy Committee surprisingly emphasizes, not the vulnerability of the "have" countries, but
of the U.S., which the Report suggests, is experiencing a "cultural drain."
Generally, the AAM gives the UNESCO Convention only "conditional
support" subject to the submission of "modifications." Report of the
AAM Special Policy Committee, 49 Museum News, May, 1971, at 22.
10 Letters from C. C. Cunningham, Director of the Art Institute of Chicago
to the author, May 30, 1972 and from Mitchell A. Wilder, Director of
the Amos Carter Museum of Western Art and President of the Associaton, to the author, July 3, 1972, and Aug. 8, 1972.
I' As, for example, recommended by P. Bator, Memorandum Submitted by
the Reporter to the Panel of the American Society of International Law
[on] the International Movement of National Art Treasures 67 (October
10, 1969, unpublished), summarized in HARvARn IAw REcoRD, Feb. 5,
1970, at 7, col. 1.
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to orient and appraise the ongoing activities of ICOM as a
non-governmental paradigm of transnational regulation.
THE

THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK:

ORGANIZATIONAL

NESTING

The design of effective transnational regulation is enhanced
by a clear identification not only of the target problems and
available decision-making agencies, but also of the relevant
values. When these are clarified, a functional response may be
formulated that takes account of the strengths and weaknesses
of the available organizational machinery. The emerging institutional network may well include a variety of related governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental mechanisms
whose relationships with each other are important.
Whether the emerging pattern of interorganizational relations is formally prescribed or operationally descriptive, and
however strong its internal linkages, 12 it will have an organizational ecology whose complexity demands both systematic and
systemic inquiry. Both empirically and normatively, the central
question is: how do (or would) the several regulatory structures interact most optimally? The complexity and dynamism
of the organizational system will correspond to the varying
styles of the component organizations.' 3 These styles may be
conveniently categorized as traditional, charismatic, classical
bureaucratic, human relations, system and network. 14 The preferred, dynamic style for a global system of interacting organizations is that of an autocoordinated, organic network that at
different points and times may be centralized or decentralized.
Without elevating form over function, it may be productive
to idealize the network as a "nesting" of organizations. Thus
seen, the typical problems of "linkage" and interaction among
the component organizations become less ones of conflict among
them than ones concerning the multi-dimensional "fit" at a
given point in time between different, organically related organizations oriented toward similar or identical goals. Presumably,
there will be a correlation between the closeness of fit among
the structures and the system's functional effectiveness. Component organizational structures may, and presumably should,
be flexible over time. Yet even if the nesting is seen to be
adjustable, this conceptualization will help in perceiving functional interstices, in attributing to the total institutional struc12Aldrich, Relations Between Organizations: A Critical Review of the
Literature, 24 INTERNATIONAL AsSOCIATIONs 26 (1972).

13 See Judge, The World Network of Organizations: A Symbol for the
1970's, 24 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 18 (1972).

14 Id., at 20.
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ture some degree of predictability and stability, and in suggesting ways in which the component structures may shape
each other. For these reasons and as a technique of appraisal,
the "closeness of fit" between ICOM and other functionally
related structures of transnational control is indicative. Generally, with qualifications to be noted, each of the following
control structures may be seen as nesting within those of the
previous, more comprehensive structures.
THE AVAILABLE FRAMEWORK:

AN INVENTORY OF CONTROL STRUCTURES

1. Multilateral Agreements. Multilateral agreements to protect cultural property have their origins in several attempts
to isolate such property from the ravages of war and to prevent
the sort of devastating pillage premised on the traditional recognition that to the victor belongs the spoils. The first multilateral convention that offered peacetime international protection to cultural property was the European Convention on the
Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, signed in 1969 by
member states of the Council of Europe.1 5 Its emphasis is on
joint conservation, education and information programs, the
preparation of public and private inventories, regional cooperation and vigilance, the creation of archaeological zones for
excavation by qualified scientists alone, and limited rules
governing acquisitions by institutions under sovereign control.
No sanctions are provided by the convention.
The most comprehensive multilateral agreement on the
movement of cultural property is the UNESCO Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which
went into force in April, 197 2.11; As its travaux preparatoires
15 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage,
May 6, 1969, Europ. T.S. No. 66, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 736 (1969). It
should be noted that there were earlier International Conventions, such
as the Hague Convention of 1907, several League of Nations treaties, and
the UNESCO-sponsored Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, that have offered some degree of
protection to cultural property in time of war.
16 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
General Conference at its 16th Session, Paris, Nov. 14, 1970, 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1971). The Convention, which was adopted by a
vote of 77 to 1, with 8 abstentions, entered into force three months after
ratification by three signatories. As of August 1972, five countries Bulgaria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ecuador, and Nigeriahad ratified the Convention. On August 3, 1972, the U.S. Senate advised
and consented to ratification of the convention.
Two related draft conventions have been prepared by UNESCO.
A Draft Convention Concerning the Protection of Monuments, Groups
of Buildings and Sites of Universal Value was adopted by UNESCO at
its sixteenth session. SHC/MD/18, Paris, Feb. 21, 1972 (translated from
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make clear, it is not the first global agreement affecting the
international movement of cultural property. 1 7 It is, however,
the first global convention whose entire purpose is to protect
cultural property from non-military threats. Briefly, the convention, which is entirely prospective, binds its parties to
cooperate in establishing national registers of important cultural property, in facilitating the scientific and technical work
of collection agencies, in supervising archaeological field work,
in publicizing stolen or missing property, and in certifying
legally exportable items. Parties to the convention are obligated to bar the import, and upon request, take steps to recover
and return cultural property stolen from museums and the
like; and to bar the importation of uncertified items by domestic museums and institutions, "consistent with national
legislation." Bonafide purchasers of illegally imported items
with valid title to them are protected by a requirement that
the country of origin must pay compensation in order to regain
possession of them. The UNESCO Convention is of particular
interest to this study because of explicit references in it to
its relationship with other functionally related control structures,
including municipal laws (passim), bilateral agreements (Articles 9 and 15) ethical codes (Article 5) and non-governmental
programs (Articles 5 and 17) .18
the French). A Draft Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and Draft Recommendation Concerning
the Protection at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage,
were prepared by a Special Committee of Government Experts at a
meeting on April 22, 1972, and were submitted to the UNESCO General
Conference for approval and adoption at its meeting in October, 1972.
17 C/18, Paris, June 15, 1972.
17 Agreements cited note 15 supra: also, several provisions in the Treaties
of Vienna of 1815 and 1966 and the post-Versailles treaties are of particular pertinence. See Means of prohibiting and perventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property, Preliminary
Reoort prepared in compliance with Article 10.1 of the Rules of Procedure concerning Recommendations to Member States and International Conventions covered by the terms of Article IV, paragraph 4, of
the UNESCO Constitution, SHC/MD/3, Paris, August 8, 1969 (translated
from the French), at 2, 3, 9, 11 [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Report].
See generally B. HOLLANDER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ART 56 (1959),
passim.
18 The fundamental regulatory role of the UNESCO Convention was emphasized by Bonnie Burnham, Project Coordinator of ICOM, in a letter to
the author, July 17, 1972. She wrote:
It is my feeling that a working accord, beginning with the
ratification of the UNESCO Convention must be the basis for
future limiting of illicit import and export cf cultural property.
A central office dealing with this technical implementation of
the resolution of the UNESCO Convention would not necessarily
be a function of ICOM, but would be linked to it, perhaps as
an "international specialized body" and linked, as well, to
UNESCO, Interpcl, the Rome Centre for Conservation, and
other international bodies concerned. . . . In summary, a harmonisation and coordination of the activities of the participating 'nested' organizations, an encouragement of their potential
development.
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2. Bilateral Agreements. One weakness of the UNESCO Convention is its incapacity directly to control the importation by
private institutions and individual collectors of items purchased
in good faith which were not stolen, but rather were exported
contrary to the laws of the country of origin. 9 This is a particularly pronounced weakness in respect of importation through
"transit" countries such as Switzerland. The Convention does
not require one party to it to enforce the laws of another,
except in the instance of stolen property and, consistent with
national legislation, whenever a museum receives property that
has been certified by a country other than that of the museum
as belonging to its national patrimony. Another weakness of
the Convention resides in the generality, even vagueness, of
' 20 °
the term "cultural property.
These two vicissitudes of the UNESCO Convention can
be overcome on a specific, ad hoc basis by means of supplementary, bilateral agreements, which are explicitly encouraged
by Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention 2 1 and which find their
precedent in several nineteenth and early twentieth century
international agreements that governed archaeological expeditions conducted by foreign nationals. There is a close relationship between the UNESCO Convention and supplementary, bilateral agreements. Indeed, the cutting teeth in the draft
UNESCO Convention were pulled largely as a result of U.S.
diplomatic efforts to subsitute the concept of bilateral agreements for a blanket requirement in the draft Convention that
19 Article 7 (a) provides simply that "The States Parties to this Convention undertake: To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions within
their territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another
State Party which has been illegally exported after entry into force
of this Convention, in the States concerned. Whenever possible, to
inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such
cultural property illegally removed from that State after the entry into
force of this Ccnvention in both States" [emphasis added].
20 "For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'cultural property' means
property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the following
categories: [eleven categories follow]." The travaux preparatoires of
the Convention indicate that the phraseology of this definition caused
continuing controversy.
21 "Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may
call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to
this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and imports
and international commerce in the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures
to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural
heritage of the requesting State."
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would have obligated its parties to enforce the export laws of
other parties.22 Thus, a U.S.-Mexican treaty, 23 in force since
March, 1971, not only pledges both parties to bar illegal imports, but also obligates them to take judicial action under
municipal stolen property laws to effect the recovery and return
of pre-Columbian objects, Spanish colonial artifacts and religious art, and pre-1920 documents taken from official archives.
Although the treaty is intended primarily to protect the Mexican patrimony, it quid pro quo establishes that serious professional field work by U.S. archaeologists in Mexico will be
welcome. The bi-national feeling of trust that the treaty engenders serves not only to encourage a mutually beneficial
exchange of cultural items, but to assure that the scientific
community will have continuing access to the field.2 4 Moreover,
the U.S.-Mexico agreement will serve as the nucleus of a
contemplated western hemispheric convention sponsored by
the OAS, and eventually perhaps, of an expanded global regime.
3. Non-governmental Controls. In order of comprehensiveness
and long-term nesting within the overall control structure the
three NGO regulatory structures are: international NGO's;
domestic NGO's; and private characteristically bilateral, arrangements between museums. The order of presenting these
three regulatory structures has been reversed in this study in
order to accommodate a clear presentation of the role of ICOM
in response to the deficiencies of other control structures. The
order of presentation adopted by this article should not, however, blur the perception of ICOM as at least potentially the
most comprehensive NGO structure.
a. Private Agreements. It is widely accepted that spiraling
market for artifacts and objets d'art can be markedly wound
down by encouraging short- and long-term loans and exchanges,
and by the sharing of cultural information among collecting
See, e.g., the comments of the State Department's chief representative
to the UNESCO Conference, quoted in the Washington Post, April 4,
1970, at B7, col. 8.
23Treaty of Co-operation with the United Mexican States Providing for
the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, [1970].
24 The risk that illegal activity may lead threatened countries to bar foreign archaeological expeditions provides a strcng incentive for collector
interests to favor transnational controls. The recent refusal of a U.S.
museum either to explore the pedigree of a valuable collection of
ancient go!d, or to cooperate in its return to the probable country of
origin, Turkey. has led to retaliation by that country against all archaeological expeditions, even the most impeccably legitimate of them. Washington Post, March 10, 1970, at A12, col. 7. Archaeologists are, of course,
cften restricted in their field work on the basis of other national
policies, such as that of military security.
22
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interests and institutions. Although the UNESCO Convention
and the U.S.-Mexican Treaty explicitly second such programs,
they are handicapped by the sheer complexity and expense of
being effective. Of considerable efficacy in supplementing intergovernmental agreements are private agreements, such as that
signed in 1968 between the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New
York and the National Institute of Anthropology and History in
Mexico City. This agreement has, for example, stimulated a flow
of previously stockpiled pre-Columbian objects northward, and
ancient Mediterranean objects southward..2 5 To be sure, the
development of such private agreements is demonstrably incremental, and may be handicapped by a lack of cooperation
within a country between a disinterested, "have" institution
and an import-seeking, "have-not" institution. Nevertheless,
private agreements may serve a useful role in easing the market and in creating mutual trust both among leading collectors
of importing countries, and between them and officials and
institutions within the exporting countries.
b. Domestic Non-governmental Regulation. Private intermuseum agreements are commonly regarded as a luxury of affluent musums. Those less well-endowed institutions with less to
offer foreign lenders may feel left out. One alternative to bilateral private agreements are multilatral ones within a single country that enable small museums with limited resources of time
and money to receive the benefits of bilateral agreements. In return, all museums, large and small, that are parties to the
agreement may be required to adopt restrictive acquisition
policies and other self-controls.
In the context of the current crisis, the case for organized,
joint self-control of what has been described as the "voracious"
acquisition policies of U.S. museums has been well stated:
In order to avoid governmental regulations, museums must
act to police themselves. Museums must adopt policies which will
provide complete, honest, and potentially public pedigrees for all
[M]useums would clearly find it easier to
their acquisitions ....
resist the temptation of buying beautiful objects which they know
to have been stolen, if they were to adopt a code of ethics which
20
would regulate their relationships with art dealers.

So far, neither effel.tive voluntary agreements nor an effec25 Zelle, supra note 1, at 25. The importance of a comprehensive, global
regime of control, of self-regulation by private interests was noted in
the official statement of the U.S. Department of State presented to the
Senate in its hearing on the UNESCO Convention. Hearings on S. Exec.
Rep. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d SeSs. 11 (1972).
26 Coggins, The Maya Scandal, supra note 1, at 16.
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tive ethical code among them, have been forthcoming.2 7 Several
inhibitions may be responsible. Among them are mutual suspicion among domestic museums; the bugbear or perhaps
excuse that an agreement among museums would violate antitrust laws; 28 the notion that restrictions on museums may serve
only to deflect the market to individual collections; the "Elgin
syndrome" - that is, the attitude that the object would have
been lost had it not been for a collector's or art dealer's purchase and protection of it (thereby sanitizing the intermediary
dealer); the reluctance to alienate any source of gifts; and the
uniquely U.S. attitude that all museums should be encyclopedic, eclectic, and therefore vast in scope. Inhibitions such
as these continue to hamstring the domestic organizations whose
leadership is necessary for an effective domestic NGO response
to the underlying problems.
The most significant offsetting perception to these inhibitions, which have served to block the development of joint
measures, is that a laissez-faire philosophy of acquisition may
lead the art and archaeological "have" countries to bar all
serious field activity conducted by museum interests, even
cooperative ones, from the "have-not" countries, especially
29
the United States.
The strongest joint action taken by U.S. collecting interests
so far was a resolution adopted in 1971 by the Society of American Archaeology. 30 In lieu of organized, domestic NGO controls,
27 In a letter, dated September 19, 1969 to L. Arthur Minnich, Executive
Secretary of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Kyran M.
McGrath, Director of the American Association of Museums, wrote that
although the AAM was prepared "to assist in any means possible to
develop a meaningful program to prevent the profitable traffic in
objects, especially pre-Columbian, either stolen or smuggled," nevertheless it opposed the "overkill" posed by the suggested imposition of disciplinary sanctions by governments on instituticns which acquired
illegally imported cultural property. There is no mention of selfregulation as an alternative to the imposition of government sanctions.
28 E.g., The American Institute of Architects was recently charged by the
U.S. government for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The action charged that AIA's practice, under its ethical code, of banning competitive bidding among its members was a restraint against
interstate trade. The suit asserted that as a result of the practice, price
competition in the sale of architectural services has been eliminated
and customers have been deprived of the benefits of free competition.
The action would, of course, be legally distinguishable from a "trade"
agreement to protect archaeological treasures insofar as the activity controlled in the latter instance would be contrary to both public policy
and, in various instances, international agreement. N.Y. Times, May
18, 1972, at 15, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1972, at 5, col. 1;
Washington Post, May 18, 1972, at A3, col. 5.
29 Supra note 24, and N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
no Resolution of the Society of American Archeology, Zelle, ed., Newsletter of the United States National Committee/International Council
of Museums [hereinafter cited as U.S.-ICOM Newsletter], Aug. 1971, at 2,
col. 1.
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several museums have unilaterally adopted strict acquisition
policies that proscribe the acceptance by them of items of
suspect provenance.3 1 Explicit encouragment of such unilateral
action may lead in time to a domestic climate more tolerant of
proposals for jointly organized codes and controls.
c. InternationalNon-government Regulation. In view of the
failure of a domestic NGO regime to emerge in the world's
greatest art-consuming country as a means of self-controlling
what is unquestionably a transnational problem, recourse to
the authority of international NGO's, such as ICOM, seems
essential.3 2 In moving from domestic to international NGO's,
not only do the pressure groups expand geographically and
quantitatively, but public-private linkages come into play,
which, aside from those between the U.S. government and the
Smithsonian Institution and the National Gallery of Art respectively, are generally alien to the laissez-faire tradition of
museum acquisition in the United States. An advantage of international regulation by NGO's is that as NGO's assume regulatory authority the effective sources of pressure are no longer
limited to competing private institutions; rather, national museums with governmental support may come to exert pressure through diplomatic channels, with considerable foreign
policy implications.
See the acquisition policies of the University of Pennsylvania Museum,
adopted April 1, 1970, ICOM, Ethics of Acquisition 7 (undated); the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, announced May 3, 1971, U.S.-ICOM Newsletter, supra note 30; Harvard University, adopted June 21, 1971,
ICOM, Ethics of Acquisition 8 (undated). The University of Pennsylvania Museum rejects all items that are unaccompanied by a "pedigree,"
including legal export papers and a description of provenance. The
Metropolitan Museum's system of control involves the dispatch of a
description (accompanied by a photo) of all offered items to all countries
in which the item could have its origin. Foreign officials are given 45
days to inform the museum that the work is or is not important enough
to its patrimony to proscribe its export. Harvard's policy puts the burden on each museum officer responsible for acquisitions in his department to do his utmost to ensure that artifacts and works of art which
are being acquired by Harvard either by outright purchase or by gift
have left the country of origin with approval of its government and
have entered the United States properly, so that Harvard can claim a
valid title to the object. Otherwise, rejections of the items and steps
to return it to the country of origin are required. This embargo on
illicit materials also includes, "if appropriate," materials received on
loan for exhibition. Williams, supra note 1. It should be noted finally,
that other domestic museums have co-operated in returning legally
exported items to their countries of origin. Coggins, Maya Scandal,
supra note 1.
32 The U.S. government has officially supported the work of ICOM. See
Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Committee of Governmental Experts to Examine the Draft Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property 41 (1970), submitted to the Secretary
of State, July 27, 1970 (reproduced in the 1970 DEPT. OF STATE, BULL.
22). UNESCO has also supported the development of acquisition codes
as a useful element of transnational control.
31
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The role generally of international NGO's in the transnational legal process has been described as one of limited
legal authority. NGO's are regarded, indeed usually designed
to serve as pressure groups, shapers of public opinion, advocators of preferred policies, and as channels of transnational
communication and exchange. In sum, "they can be effective in
providing information and applying pressure in the pursuit of
their goals. If nothing else, non-governmental organizations provide a mechanism through which private interests in various
states can cooperate to bring pressure on their respective governments and on the relevant international institutions. ' 3 3 Moreover, NGO's may help relieve overloaded international governmental organizations of demands on them. From even a
conventional, modest viewpoint, then, the role of NGO's may
at least be called "para-legal."
It is rudimentary, therefore, that ICOM as an NGO offers
technical assistance to both intergovernmental organizations
and to domestic authorities, as, for example, through its special
relationship with Interpol to facilitate the return of clandestinely exported property. 34 But more important than this limited
role is the possibility that the policies and norms of ICOM,
combined with supporting programs, can be marshalled into a
body of effective legal constraints and facilities. The establishment of authoritative standards by NGO's, particularly scientifictechnical ones, is an example of the legally operational role of
such organizations. Similarly, ICOM's role may be transformed
from a para-legal into a quasi-legal or legal one.
There are, to be sure, several other international NGO's
operating within this sphere; as recognized by UNESCO these
include the International Association of Art, the International
Council of Monuments and Sites, the International Council for
(1966). For an
excellent discussion cf the decline of governments in the West and the

33 W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105

concomitant rise of transnational relationships based on non-governmental organizations, see Hughes, Whose Century? 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 476

(1972). Note too, this comment: "that traditional legal theory denies
these entities [NGO's] a specific and formal law creating or law applying role, cannot detract from the bustling reality." W. HOLDER & G.
BRENNAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 293 (1972). See also, S.
BASTID, 2 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: LE DROIT DES ORGANISATIONS
INTERNATIONALES 317 (1970); J. LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 82-84 (1963); Skjelsbaek, The Growth
of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century, 25 INT'L ORG. 420 (1971); Szalai, The Future of International
Organizations, 5 INT'L ASSN'S 267 (1972); L. White, INTERNATIONAL
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 10 (1951).
34Article 17(3) of the UNESCO Convention specifically provides that

UNESCO may call on the cooperation of competent NGO's in this
respect.
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Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, the International Committee
on the History of Art, and the International Centre for the
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.3 3 Of all the relevant international NGO's, however, ICOM
seems to exhibit the greatest potential as an effective transnational mechanism of control.
THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS

ICOM, established in 1946 with its headquarters in Paris,
is composed of about 3,000 institutions and dues-paying representatives of recognized institutions in 100 countries, and of
national committees in seventy-four.3 6 Financed by members'
dues, foundation grants, and UNESCO support, it is a consulta3s
37
and ECOSOC.
tive organization of both UNESCO
The component bodies of ICOM include a General Assembly,
which consists of all members of ICOM and which meets every
three years as ICOM's "Sovereign Body"; a 26-member Executive Council that is elected by the General Assembly to prepare
and implement programs and budgets; a Board that acts between sessions of the Executive Council; a Secretariat in Paris;
the National Committees; several "International Specialized
Bodies"; an Advisory Committee that meets every year and is
composed of the chairmen of the national committees and the
international specialized bodies (the chairman of the Advisory
Committee is an ex officio member of the Executive Council);
39
and, finally, the UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center.
The expressed aims of ICOM are to stress the essential
35 The first three of these organizations, together with ICOM, participated
as observers in the UNESCO meetings. Report of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts to Examine the Draft Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property [hereinafter Report of the
Special Committee], 9 INT'L. LEGAL MAT. 1038 (1970). The latter two,
together with ICOM and the International Council of Monuments and
Sites, were acknowledged as competent sources of technical assistance
by UNESCO in the preliminary report on the Convention. Preliminary
Report, supra note 17, at 13. A sixth NGO, the International Federation of Library Associations, had been recognized by UNESCO and had
participated as an observer in the UNESCO meetings, but was recently
suspended by UNESCO. 24 INT'L ASSN'S 216 (1972).
36 Interview with Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director ICOM, in Washington, D.C., June 14, 1972. Other data in this summary, unless otherwise
indicated to the contrary, are taken from 1970-71 Y.B. IN'L ORG'S (13th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Yearbook].
37 The Union of International Associations lists ICOM as an "A" category
consultative organization of "proven competence in an important field of
UNESCO's work." Yearbook, supra note 36, at 1020.
38 ICOM is listed as a third-category consultative organization to ECOSOC,
that is, one that "can make occasional and u_ eful contributions to the
work of the Council." Id.
39 The International Council of Museums, I.C.O.M. STATUTES § V, Art. 13
(1969).
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unity of purpose behind the museum concept; to further cooperation between museums and members of the museum community in different countries; to protect and promote museums'
interests and to widen their influence, and to emphasize the
importance of their role in community life and in the promotion
of knowledge and understanding among peoples. 40 ICOM's current statement of aims diverges from an earlier statement which
emphasized cooperation with "international, educational, scientific, and cultural organizations" toward not simply the "promond understanding among peoples", as
tion" of "knowledge
expressed in the current statement, but also the "preservation,
advancement, and diffusion of museums. ' 41 If such statements
are to be taken as serious articulations of shared norms, the
policy framework today for ICOM action in regulating the flow
of cultural property would seem to have been restricted. Nevertheless, ICOM has more ambitiously and significantly articulated
its current place in the transnational system of control as follows:
It should be noted in the first place that the praiseworthy
efforts of UNESCO towards the establishment of international
legal regulations serve only to reduce the problems involved in
the field of international exchanges. The law has never restrained
any but those who choose to respect it or whom it can reach. It
is therefore to be feared that each of the governments participat-

ing in this project might seek only to project its own interests
and that the terms of the law could not put a stop to illegal
manipulations, fraud and smuggling. The criticism is not meant

in any way whatever to underestimate the extent of UNESCO's
efforts but to stress the fact that unless the museums meet their
own responsibilities such efforts cannot be fully effective.
In spite of all the cleverness of which fraudulent dealers
might be capable, the problem remains simple. The fraudulent

dealer is only a go-between who is himself either ignorant of the
law, knows how to avoid it or profits from its absence, and he
might therefore also elude the proposed regulations. However,

the boycott solution remains. .

.

. It is vital for museums to

cooperate and to coordinate their efforts. Their mission can only
be fully accomplished within a framework of cooperation be-

tween the museums of the entire world-

a cooperation which

will be capable of surmounting personal, local and national
42
interests.

A decade of ICOM concern about the rampant traffic in art
and archaeological treasures led to an April, 1970 meeting of
ten experts to design a set of ethical rules for guiding museum
acquisitions. 43 Their meeting took place just prior to the meetId., § III, Art. 5.
41 1961-62 Y.B. INT'L ORG'S 1341 (9th ed. 1963).
42 ICOM News, Sept. 1969, at 49.
43 A short summary of their deliberations may be found in ICOM, Ethics
40

of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 5.
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ing of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts to examine the draft UNESCO Convention, to which meeting ICOM
sent observers. After ICOM had drafted a set of twenty rules,
it emphasized at the UNESCO meeting two points: that an
effective regime of control must govern traffic through the
so-called transit countries and entrep6ts, and that "the legal
measures to be taken [by UNESCO] could be effective only
if they were backed up by a moral code for museum workers."
ICOM reported on its newly drafted ethical rules, and commented upon the importance of the transnational market in cultural property and the utility of export certificates. 44 At its own
1970 meeting, the ICOM experts recommended, and its General
Assembly later adopted, a resolution that museums develop
explicit, scientific programs of acquisition; that they acquire
and exchange items purposefully, selectively, and cooperatively;
that they never acquire items without full documentation; and
that they not acquire objects solely for their commercial value.
The resolution also urged cooperation among museums in field
work and expeditions, and the sharing of documentation between an expedition and the country in which the expedition
was conducted. Finally, ICOM adopted a statement that "[a] s
a matter of principle, a museum or other collecting institution
or individual should act in good faith to make all reasonable
efforts to avoid acquiring, directly or indirectly, any object
which it has reason to believe, either from inadequate documentation or other available evidence, has been illegally removed from its country of origin. '45 The ICOM resolution was
officially characterized as "a first step in establishing a professional ethical code regarding acquisition"; it was to comprise
a set of "ethical rules", to which member museums might voluntarily adhere "in working out their own policies. ' 46 Although
in general, ICOM rules are given authority as a "practical
application of the . . . Statutes",47 it is doubtful that the new
ethical rules are considered to be "rules" in this technical
sense.
The ICOM Secretariat prepared a form for completion by
all museums wishing to formalize their adherance to the rules.48
44 See Report of the Special Committee, supra note 35, at 1039.
45 U.S.-ICOM Newsletter, supra note 30, May 1970 at 1.
46 Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 5.
47 I.C.O.M. STATUTES, § XVI, Art. 46 ("Rules").
48As a first step in establishing a professional ethical code

regarding
acquisition, the staff of the .......... .......
................ museum accepts the
ICOM recommendations as a minimum standard for the collection of
objects, thereby agreeing to assist other countries in safeguarding and
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It also undertook the preparation of a summary of domestic
antiquity laws, scheduled for completion in 1973, to which will
be appended the addresses of local Interpol agencies and a
"first list" of museums voluntarily adhering to the rules. 49
Programmatic support for the resolution is being or will
soon be provided by several ICOM services. 50 These are in
increasingly close association with Interpol in the dissemination
of information taken from a "stolen objects" list and in the
developing of a system to verify the legality of exports; a
periodic bulletin; the UNESCO-ICOM Museum Documentation
Center,5 1 which inter alia microfilms domestic antiquity laws for
ready reference and analysis; an "inter-exchange" service to
inform museums of the availability on loan of surplus items and
to facilitate the exchange of these; 2 the organization of regional
meetings to discuss mutual legal and law enforcement problems;
and the dissemination, principally through ICOM News, of information about progressive or model museum acquisition policies.
It is clear that the ICOM "ethical rules", even as institutionally supported, represent only a beginning. Beyond the establishment of a more binding ethical code- the logical next
step- what can be done? To answer this question, a clear
identification of the values at stake will be productive. One
study of the problem lists eleven such values: greater accessibility to art, and visibility of it; the preservation of the national
enriching their cultural heritage, and to give preferential treatment in
all professional activities to other museums adhering to the code.
Date
Signature of responsible officer
Signing of the agreement is valid upon receipt of this form along with
a description of the museum's programme and acquisition policy, and a
description of acquisitions and services requested by the museum to
ICOM Secretariat, UNESCO House. 1 rue Miollis, Paris 15e.
49 Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 5.
50 See generally, Zelle, ICOM Ethics of Acquisition: A Report to the Profession, 50 Museum News, April, 1972, at 31.
51 The UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center is the outgrowth of a library
established in 1947, by the Museum and Monument Division of UNESCO
for its own research and documentation. In 1948, it became a part of
ICOM. It is administered by a small staff and is now the largest library
of its kind. Its activities are governed by Article 39 of the I.C.O.M.
STATUTES.

[i]ts functions shall be (a) to conserve and classify printed and
manuscript documents and illustrations of museological interest
received from UNESCO, ICOM or other sources, and to make
such documents available to members of UNESCO and ICOM
and, whenever practicable, to all other qualified experts; (b)
to assist the Secretariat of ICOM with any part of its work of a
documentary or bibliographical nature.
02 See U.S.-ICOM Newsletter, supra note 30, May 1970, at 3, col. 2, for a

description of an exemplary exchange of cultural property.
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patrimony; the exporting country's interest in export; the use
of art as a good ambassador; the importing country's interest
in imports; the enrichment of the national patrimony; the general interest in the breakdown of parochialism; the preservation
of differences and the division of labor; the preservation of individual works of art; the preservation of archaeological evidence;
the preservation of sets and collections; the preservation of
values derived from particular locations; and values served by
cooperation in enforcing the existing law. 53
Of these values, all of which are germane to ICOM's activities, the last four would seem to be particularly so in establishing a global, specifically non-governmental structure of selfcontrol based upon the enlightened self-interests of museums
and the nesting within more comprehensive structures of control. Indeed, these four values, with their emphasis on the context of an item, were specifically identified and merged by
the ICOM Board to form the two salient principles guiding the
design of its ethical rules:
From the scientific point of view, a museum object has
no real cultural value unless its origin, history and context are
known and dccumented with maximum accuracy.
From the moral point of view, an object of doubtful origin
would be dangerous for the good reputation of the acquiring
museum and would consequently present difficulties for future
cooperation between that museum and other similar institu54
tions.

It is true, as one useful study of relevant attitudes and
controls noted, that individual museums have adopted a laissezfaire viewpoint largely because of a self-fulfilling fear of competitive disadvantage. 55 But museums are questioning more and
more whether the "market" is free. The evidence suggests that
it is not; foreign governments may, and do, retaliate against
illegal exports of their national patrimony by simply shutting
off the market to all excavators, collectors, and dealers. Moreover, museums have come to realize that their interests do not
necessarily coincide with those of the individual collector or
antiquarian.
As the science of museology has developed, scholarship has
come to challenge connoisseurship. Museums, and increasingly
their client communities, appreciate that wholeness and historic
context are preferable to quantity and isolated fragments.
Bator, supra note 11, at 7-21. Cf. UNESCO Convention, supra note 16,
(preamble).
54 ICOM News, September 1969, at 49.
55 Zelle, supra note 1, at 20.
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Broadly speaking, this shifting emphasis reflects a substitution
of enlightenment for wealth.
The museum community's increasingly mature emphasis on
contextual, cross-cultural, and holistic education cannot tolerate
the pillage, "thinning", dismemberment, and separation from
geographical and historical context performed by the obliging
huaquero, or grave-robber. Thus, the owl of Minerva begins
to fly only at the sunset of expectations, when the most precious
educational values of cultural objects are forever lost and when
national retaliation, such as that taken by Turkey, restricts or
even cuts off the source of supply. Having perceived the need
for self-controls and having appreciated the coincidence of
their emerging values with those articulated by ICOM, 6 museums may find it constructive to support ICOM controls, which
nest within the larger framework of a more comprehensive,
principally intergovernmental regime of control. One scenario
follows of how the ICOM regulatory mechanism might develop.
ICOM's ethical rules have become identified with the more
education-oriented, less parochial values which are becoming
more widely accepted by museums. As these rules are adopted
57
by the museums, they will serve to mobilize shame not only
through diplomatic channels by nation-states that have been
pressured by domestic museums, but also by museums which
have high standards of acquisition against those with lower
standards. Publicity is a strong disinfectant.
A second step for ICOM in transforming its transnational
role from a para-legal to a legal one, would be to establish
its ethical rules as a code of binding rules, perhaps by incorporating them by reference into the ICOM Statutes. A third
step would be to support the rules with sanctions. According
to the ICOM Statutes, "among the methods" by which it may
carry out its "aims" are:
(a) to establish itself in the largest possible number of countries and to recruit the greatest number of qualified
members,
(b) to set up study groups and working parties, either permanent or temporary,
(c)

to organise and encourage,

i)
ii)
56

57

large international conferences of museum experts,
smaller international meetings of specialists on muse-

eums and kindred subjects,
ICOM has urged museums not only to reject items of doubtful ownership, but to define and publicize "the criteria which give value to an
object." ICOM News, Sept. 1969, at 49.

On the mobilization of shame as an inducement to compliance with the
decisions of international organizations, see generally S. SCHWEBEL, ed.
THE

EFFECTIVENESS

OF INTERNATIONAL

482, 496, 511-12, 516 (1971).
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434-35, 442, 447-56,
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to encourage the international exchange of experts and
students, missions of experts, traveling scholarships in
museology, and international seminars on the improvement
of museum techniques,
to study the problems involved in the international exchange of museum objects,
to organize international exhibitions, to keep a watching
brief on the quality, technical methods and the coordination of international exhibitions in which museums take
part,
to carry out international surveys,
to encourage the exchange of information and publications,
to issue periodical or occasional publications,
to collect documents dealing with museum subjects, and
to make them accessible,
to promote, in addition to missions of museum experts,
the free flow of documents, objects and technical material
relating to museums.5 8

It will be noticed that none of these
the legitimacy of a sanction. To be sure,
utes provides one authoritative sanction:
bership (and presumably its benefits)

"methods" approaches

article 12 of the Statexpulsion from memof "any persons for
not paying their subscriptions or for any other legitimate reason" [emphasis added]. The latter basis for expulsion, though
cryptic, might offer a legitimate basis for the imposition of
sanctions to support ICOM ethical rules, were it not for its
limitation to "persons". Because of this limitation, institutions,
the prime target, seemingly would escape the available sanction
of expulsion from membership. Perhaps the most feasible, strong
sanction would be a voluntary refusal by museums to cooperate
in loans, exchanges and research sharing, with museums that
do not follow minimal ethics of acquisition.
The eleven methods quoted above at least provide some
basis for the exercise of administrative discretion as a minimal
sanction, and also provide a framework for the explicit formulation of sanctions, by means of their explicit incorporation
5 '
Perhaps more akin to a genuine sanction
into the Statutes.is the mandate "to promote, in addition to missions of museum
experts, the free flow of documents, objects and technical material relating to museums." 0 This mandate might serve to facilitate the exercise of administrative discretion in a manner
tantamount to the imposition of sanctions. In any event, the
serve at the very least to generate positive
and informed incentives for transnational cooperation and to
eleven methods

I.C.O.M. STATUTES, § III, Art. 6.
59 Id., § XVII, Art. 47, provides the procedures for the amendment of the
Statutes.
60 Id., § III, Art. 6, (k).
58
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mobilize shame in response to violations of the rules. The only
apparent inhibition to a broader regime of control based on the
methods may be found in the first one listed, though it is not
necessarily the primus inter pares ("to establish itself in the
largest possible number of countries and to recruit the greatest
number of qualified members"). The foregoing considerations
are presented not only to identify available legal or quasi-legal
tools, but also to assist in the drafting, already begun, of a new
set of ICOM Statutes.61
Although the establishment of sanctions under either the
current or revised Statutes may be premature and ICOM's
effectiveness and efficiency might be endangered by a hasty
formulation or attempted exercise of them, 62 nevertheless, their
seed may be found in the ICOM Statutes, and in Rule 20 of
the ICOM ethical rules:
The museums of any country which bind themselves to follow the ethical rules and the practical proposals formulated in
paragraphs 1 to 19 of this document, will agree to offer each
other prefereritial treatment in 3 all professional activities, compatible with the existing laws.G

A set of sanctions might become operational on one of four
bases: the "methods" listed in the ICOM Statutes; an application of Rule 20 of the ethical rules either voluntarily by the
museums or by ICOM enforcement; an amendment of the current ICOM Statutes; or provision for them in the revised
Statutes.
We may discern, then, a multi-stage process by which law,
acting dynamically as both a constraint and a facilitation, may
articulate authoritative procedures and powers, and, combined
with various established methods and programs, provide a
blueprint for helping govern and further the mutual interests
within an entire arena of social action and interaction.
New programmatic inducements to cooperation might well
expedite the development of a code of ethics and, later, a
quasi-legal or legal regime of control. New ICOM programs
might include the establishment of an international committee
to review and harmonize domestic definitions and regulations
related to the term "cultural property"; the establishment of
61 Interview with Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director ICOM, in Washington, D.C., June 14, 1972.

62 For an expression of ICOM's disinclination to do either at this time
("If we did, we wouldn't have any members left"), see Hamblin, supra
note 1, at 23.

63 Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 3.
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a conciliation and mediation panel; the formulation of a legal
committee to draft uniform laws for the registration of sites
and for excavation; the education of museum personnel, particularly in the preparation of object inventories; an expanded
program of technical assistance to UNESCO, pursuant to Article
17 (3) of the UNESCO Convention; the encouragement of intermuseum loans and exchanges of indefinite duration; the identification of various art forms as "endangered species", figuratively within the meaning of that term in U.S. conservation
legislation; the adoption of corresponding transnational controls;
the promotion of visual substitutes, such as rubbings, copies,
and projected materials; and the "establishment of international
committees of experts qualified to give useful advice to States
having difficulty in identifying, collecting and preserving their
''64
cultural property.
The endowment of ICOM's conservation programs with external financing would be of enormous assistance. Such assistance might be put toward the photographing and cataloguing
of art treasures, and the establishment of a readily accessible
means of information retrieval for use by dealers, collectors,
and police authorities alike.65
Conservation programs, if properly funded, may spin off
from feasibility studies, such as the Mayan Reserve Project
launched jointly by the Center for Inter-American Relations
and the American Society of International Law, which has undertaken to examine the efficacy within a particular area of
alternative measures for protection, such as increased guards,
international intelligence work, electronic devices, museums,
and fencing. 6 Finally, and perhaps most important, financial
assistance to ICOM might enable it to provide incentives for
museums to develop unilaterally imposed self-controls. Such
incentives might include the tying of loans, exchanges and other
positive programs to the demonstrated cooperation, enlightened
acquisitions policies, and acceptable conduct of the beneficiary
institutions. Perhaps it is not too hopeful to expect that such
measures would move ICOM well along toward the status
of a non-governmental organization, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, with more than para-legal or
rudimentary legal authority.
64UNESCO suggested this role for ICOM. Preliminary Report, supra
note 17, at 13.
65 The two UNESCO Draft Conventions, supra note 16, provide respectively for an International Fund (Articles 11-13) and a World Heritage
66 Fund (Articles 15-17).
Coggins, The Maya Scandal, supra note 1, at 15.
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CONCLUSION

"Elginism" - the dismemberment of an historical monument, piece by piece, for permanent export - together with
all other uncontrolled handling of national art treasures is
nothing new. But fed by a mounting interest in objets d'art
as speculative investment and by a skyrocketing market in
them,6 the problem has become worse. Keeping in mind the implicated values, it is difficult to dispute the ironic fact "that
the warring interests of nations, museums, collectors and dealers, and their failure to achieve agreement on ethics and civilized tactics, have combined to drive price and demand steadily
upward and to make thieving too enticing to resist." 68
In response, a multidimensional regime of transnational
controls has begun to emerge which, if the component organizations strive to fit themselves together into a single, functional
system with shared goals, may at least gradually come to fulfill
the prescription that "[e]verything must be organized the way
it is for drugs, with everyone cooperating - police, professionals,
museums, governments - to communicate the names of known
culprits, to keep up-to-date international files." 9 It is encouraging that this statement, which explicitly recognizes a multiple
governmental and non-governmental response to the problem,
was made by ICOM, a non-governmental organization that shows
an unfulfilled promise of helping shape the entire regime of
control. ICOM controls cannot, of course, directly stem the
flow of objects of doubtful provenance into the hands of individual collectors, but at least indirectly they can help dry up
a market that presently is bathed in inflationary speculation.
In working within an emerging framework of intergovernmental
structure, ICOM can maintain a closeness of fit with related
institutions that permits it to help shape them, as well as to
conform to them with a clear awareness of their mutual nesting. Thus, ICOM may well emerge as a creative, as well as
responsive, non-governmental organization with more than minimal legal authority in the process of transnational regulation.
67 It is estimated that the average market value of archaeological artifacts
has tripled during the last decade. Gaskill, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
8 Hamblin, supra note 1, at 24.
69 Statement of Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director of ICOM, quoted in
Hamblin, id. at 26. Cf. a statement accompanying the University of
Pennsylvania Museum's acquisitions policy that "[p]robably the only
6

effective way to stop this wholesale destruction of archaeological sites
is to regulate the trade in cultural objects . . . just as most countries

in the world today regulate domestic trade in foodstuffs, drugs, securities,
and other commodities." Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 7.

254

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

THE TANZANIAN PERMANENT COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY-

THE OMBUDSMAN
BmNixAR

FRANK*

INTRODUCTION

In 1966 the United Republic of Tanzania formally created
the Permanent Commission of Enquiry. The Commission was
designed to function as a mechanism by which citizens could
protect themselves from the abuse of governmental power.
National ombudsmen are in office in Sweden, Finland, Denmark,
Norway, New Zealand, Great Britain, Guyana, Mauritius, Northern Ireland and Israel. These all possess features characteristic of classical ombudsman systems:
1. The ombudsman is an independent and non-partisan officer
of the legislature, usually provided for in the constitution, who

supervises the administration.
2.

He deals with specific complaints from the public against

administrative injustice and maladministration.

3. He has the power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but
not to reverse, administrative action.'
If the term ombudsman is restricted to these characteristics
then it is difficult to classify the Tanzanian Permanent Commission as an ombudsman system, Although the Commission
is provided for in the Constitution of Tanzania, and its procedures, powers and privileges are prescribed by Act of Parliament, the Commission possesses a wide variety of unique
attributes. The Commission is appointed by the President and
reports only to the President. Furthermore, Tanzania considers
its Commission to be an' ombudsman at the same time that
it proclaims the Commission to be "an institution which is in
keeping with the traditions, customs and way of life of Tanzanians without too much reliance on the methods imported
'2
from foreign countries."
A solution to this definitional problem may be to use an
appropriate qualifying word such as executive ombudsman, as
suggested by an authority in this field.3 In the United States,
* Member of Pennsylvania Bar; Chairman, American Bar Association
Committee on Ombudsman and Chairman, Federal Bar Association Ombudsman Section, Administrative Law and Procedure Committee.
I THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (2d ed. 1968).
2 Annual Report cf the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, June 1966June 1967, 3 (Dar Es Salaam 1968) [hereinafer cited as 1967 Report].
3 Rowat, The Spread of the Orabudsman Idea, in OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? 7, 35 (S. Anderson ed. 1968).
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officials appointed by governors are functioning in Oregon and
Iowa as ombudsmen. Based on this definition, there would be
no problem in classifying the Permanent Commission of Enquiry as an ombudsman institution although it is not of the
classical or legislative model.
The name is not particularly relevant since the ultimate
question which must be answered is not whether the Commission's characteristics match the classical definition, but
rather, whether the Commission works successfully in handling
the public's complaints against the abuses by party and government officials in the developing, one-party country of Tanzania.
The Tanzanian experiment is significant in that if successful
it may point the way to the only system that will work in the
one-party states of Black Africa to protect the citizen and
fill the gap in the machinery of government and party for the
redress of grievances.
4
Reasons for Creating the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
The ombudsman system can easily be engrafted upon the
political and legal systems of a country. 5 It has been pointed
out that "an ombudsman can be made to fit almost any form
of democratic constitution" and that "very few institutions
have this degree of universality."'6 Given this attribute of the
ombudsman system and the situation of Tanzania, there were
compelling reasons for Tanzanians to adopt the Commission.
The modern state has assumed an enormous number of
functions resulting from social and welfare legislation. Extensive powers and discretion have been given to government
officials as well as to party officials in one-party states. In many
countries, including Tanzania, there is no constitutional provision guaranteeing the individual's rights. This greatly increases the possibility of friction between officials and citizens.
Some type of protection of the individual is required against
executive and administrative mistake and abuse of power, particularly where there is a vast bureaucracy, great illiteracy and
a basicaly rural population as in Tanzania.
In socialistic and developing countries where the government assumes a large proportion of the policy making and
4

See generally, Frank, The Ombudsman and Human Rights, 22 AD. L.
REV. 467, 478-80 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Frank].
5 Seminar on the Effective Realization of Civil and Political Rights at the
National Level, Apr. 25 to May 8, 1967, at Kingston, Jamaica.
6 Wade, The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender, in LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH:

OCCASIONAL

FEREFNCE (NEW DELHI)

PAPERS

FOR THE

3, 6 (1971).

FOURTH

COMMONWEALTH

CON-

TANZANIAN

PERMANENT COMMISSION

The stability of government rule requires that there be general
administrative functions, efficient administration is required.
satisfaction with the exercise of executive power. There must
be controls to see that "public officers are discharging their
duties in the correct manner and are not contributing to the
frustration of official aims." 7 It is in the general and long-range
interests of government that its administration be directly re8
lated to the purpose of its public policy.
Bureaucracy has a key role in a developing country and
there must be adequate administrative support for development
projects to succeed. Such countries must concern themselves
more with the "problems of establishing and maintaining honest
and efficient administration and administrators. 9 Institutions
are needed to "ensure fairness, openness and efficiency in
administration.' 10 Furthermore, one of the unique features of
the ombudsman system which is of interest to one-party states
is that of "providing a feedback from the people at the bottom
of the administrative hierarchy to the politicians at the top."'1
Although it is a principle in Tanzania that the judiciary
should be independent, the Tanzanian courts were not apparently effective in controlling administration. They are crowded,
overworked, slow, bogged down by technicalities and formalities, and overly expensive.12 Court procedures are not readily
understood by an illiterate populace. Rules of justice are subject to displacement by legislative grants of discretionary powers.1 3 Adverse judgments can be overruled by legislative actions.1 4 There are only a few instances of judicial review of
administrative action, and the government is not liable for
damages arising out of torts. There is also a feeling on the
part of some persons that it is best not to cause a confrontation
in court. Despite an increasing use of the criminal courts for
prosecutions involving abuse of power and similar crimes, Tanzania has "inherited much law which is archaic in the context
7Ghai, Ombudsmen and Others, E. Are. J. 1 (mimeo. reprint, 1969) [here-

inafter cited as Ghai].
8Id.
OId., at 8.
10 Id.
11 Rowat, The Ombudsman in Developing Countries, INDIAN
REV. 28, 30 Oct.-Dec. 1968.

ALM.

& MAN.

An Account of the Origin, Practice and Procedure of the
Permanent Commission of Enquiry in Tanzania, The Standard (Dar
Es Salaam) May 15, 1968, at 4 [hereinafter cited as The Standard].

12Man'enya,

13

Ghai, supra note 8, at 3.
and Ghai, Constitutional Innovation and Political Stability
in Tanzania: A Preliminary Assessment, 4 J. MoD. AFR. STuD. 479, 488

14McAuslan

(1966) [hereinafter cited as McAuslan].
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of its new policies" and the Commission is needed "to highlight
anomalies and injustices in the legal system, and hopefully lead
to reform." 15
The National Assembly does not appear to be effective in
the redress of citizen complaints. The Assembly sits for only
about 55 days each year and few of the issues considered involve
individual cases.' 6 In addition, the Assembly plays a subordinate
role to the National Executive Committee of the Tanganyika
African National Union Party (TANU) and as such becomes
subject to the dictates of party politics. In a one-party state
the executive of government and party finds little difficulty in
having the Parliament pass legislation, and in defending itself
against complaints of all kinds. Since one person could act in
different capacities both in the party and the govrnment, the
one-party state system increases the powers wielded and responsibilities of such persons. Unless that power is checked there
is a great likelihood for abuses by such officials.17
Administrative or semi-administrative machinery within the
government and party for reviewing decisions lacks impartiality. In 1970, a Tanzania newspaper stated
Even where there is provided for machinery within the structure
for the individual to appeal or fight for his rights as a worker or
is liberties as a citizen, this machinery may be infected by delay,
indifference, incompetence, or downright inertia. And finally the
appellate machinery and procedures may be quite costly both
financially and in terms of the individual's continued enjoyment
is
of his rights within the locality or sphere of employment.

Thus, a review of existing government and nongovernmental
machinery showed inadequacies for redressing grievances. In
the word of Chief Mang'enya, ".

.

. the traditional means of pro-

tecting the individual's rights against purely administrative
decisions have been outmoded, and in some cases, these means
are quite ineffective.'" 19 The odds were heavily weighted against
the individual and there was "clearly an important need to
establish additional controls on the exercise of administrative
powers. '20 In addition to the need to provide greater security
15
16

Ghai, supra note 8, at 7.
Bayne, Tanzania's Ombudsman: The Permanent Commission of Enquiry,
in LAW

AND THE COMMONWEALTH:

OCCASIONAL PAPERS FOR THE FOURTH

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE (NEW DELHI) 37, 51-2 [hereinafter cited as
Bayne].
17 Kimicha, The Ombudsman and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry,
Econ. Comm'n for Africa, Conference of African Jurists on African Legal
Process and the Individual, Addis Ababa, HR/WP.6 at 2, cited in U.N
Doc. E/CN.14/521. (Apr. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Kimicha].
18 The Nationalist (Dar Es Salaam) July 15, 1970, at 4.
19 The Standard, supra note 12.
20 Ghai, supra note 8, at 3.
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for the citizens, a watchguard was needed to oversee the activities of public administration. For these reasons Tanzania took
the steps to establish the Permanent Commission of Enquiry.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE PERMANENT COMMISSION

OF ENQUIRY FUNCTIONS
Consideration must be given at this point to the Tanzanian
environment in which the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
was dsigned to operate since the success of the Commission depended upon the social, economic, geographic, demographic and
political characteristics of Tanzania.2 ' These characteristics mark
Tanzania as being quite different from the other countries
which have ombudsman institutions.
Tanzania's population is over 13 million, and its geographic
area is 364,943 square miles. More than 120 distinct tribal groups
as well as "[H]amitic people and several minority groups like
Indians, Arabs, Comorians, [and] Europeans ' 22 are said to
inhabit the mainland. Religious groups are varied- Christian,
Muslim, Hindu- but indigenous groups are in the majority. The
population of the mainland is almost 99% African.
Tanzania has made strides in education, but its secondary
school and higher education enrollment is comparatively small.
Ten percent of the mainland population is literate.23 The two
main languages are Swahili (official) and English.
In the words of President Nyerere, "Tanzania is a backward
and poor country, most of whose people live in the rural areas.
Our economy depends upon agriculture ....-24 In 1970 the national income per capita was $60. Communications are poor;
there are four daily newspapers with a circulation of 5 per
1,000 people.
Tanganyika became independent on December 9, 1961, and
a republic within the Commonwealth of Nations the following
year. In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar entered into the union
known as the United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania is a oneparty state. In mainland Tanzania the single party is TANU
21 Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman, in OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT? 37, 45-9 (S. Anderson ed. 1968); Caiden, Ombudsmen for
Under-Developed Countries?, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ISRAEL AND
ABROAD 100-04 (E. Samuel ed. 1968); Cheng, The Ombudsman System
in Evolution: Can It Be Adapted to Commonwealth Developing Countries?, 1967 (mimec. essay, Carlton Univ.).

22 The Standard, supra note 12.
23

BIENEN, TANZANIAN

PARTY

TRANSFORMATION

AND

ECONOMIC

DEVELOP-

MENT 468 (1970).

24 Address by President Julius Nyerere, Aug. 29, 1970, in 9 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 107, 112 (May, 1971).

260

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 2

and in Zanzibar, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The President,
Julius K. Nyerere, is both Head of State and Head of Government and in fact, as wll as in law, has considerable power.2 5
He is also President of TANU. The National Conference and the
National Executive Committee of TANU are the bodies primarily
responsible for the formulation of government policy.2 6 Chief
Mang'enya has stated that "the Policy of the Party is the only
policy in the country and is therefore the only policy of the
Government. '' 27 The National Assembly is "primarily concerned
with the more detailed task of giving effect to Government
policy through appropriate legislative measures and exercising.
vigilant control over all aspects of Government expenditures. 81
Thus, it plays a role somewhat different from that of the legislature in a Western system.2 9 Comment has already been made
that the National Assembly plays a subordinate role to the
TANU National Executive Committee.
Local government is divided into regions, and regions are
divided into districts. Dual offices in local party and government
are normal. Thus Regional and District Commissioners are also
secretaries of TANU in their respective jurisdictions.
It was announced in 1961 that Tanzania was to be a socialist country. The Swahili word Ujamaa, which means familyhood, defines the Tanzanian socialist policies. In building socialism and in attempting to increase agricultural production Tanzania has combined rural development, state farms and cooperatives with self-help, Ujamaa villages. 30 The Arusha Declaration of 1967 and subsequent policy statements set forth
guidelines for socialistic developments which emphasize selfreliance in both domestic and foreign policy. By 1971 the government had nationalized most industries, banks, a large part
of commerce and trade, and all rental property valued at more
than $14,000.
Reference has already been made to the inexperience of
the civil service. "Africanization' was faced very early in the
civil service when Tanganyika became independent, because in
an independent country certain posts must be manned by "na25

26
27

Bayne, supra note 16, at 37.
Id.
MANG'ENYA,

THE

PERMANENT

COMMISSION

OF

ENQUIRY

(OMBUDSMAN)

4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MANG'ENYA].
28 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Demo-

cratic One Party State 16 (Dar Es Salaam 1968)
Report].
29
Bayne, supra note 16, at 38.
30 New York Times, Jan. 31, 1972, at 67, cols. 1-3.
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tionals", and as national policies emerged they required na31
tionals to implement them.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

-

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

On January 14, 1963, President Nyerere made public the
decision of the National Executive of TANU that Tanganyika
should be a democratic one-party state de jure and his authorization to appoint a Presidential Commission to consider the
necessary changes in the Constitution of Tanganyika and the
Constitution of TANU. The report of th Presidential Commission
was issued on March 22, 1965.32
It has been stated that the Presidential Commission had in
mind the ombudsman institution.3 3 Between the time the Presidential Commission was appointed in January of 1964, and the
time it made its report in March of 1965, national ombudsmen
were in office in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and in
one Commonwealth country, New Zealand. The subject of the
ombudsman had been discussed at regional seminars sponsored
by the United Nations Division of Human Rights on the general
topic of judicial and other remedies against the abuse of administrative authority in Ceylon (1959), Buenos Aires (1959), and
Stockholm (1962). The International Commission of Jurists had
discussed the ombudsman at several congresses and conferences
at New Delhi (1959), Rio de Janeiro (1962), and Bangkok (1965).
Tom Sargant, Secretary of Justice, British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, had visited Tanzania in 1964
and provoked discussions about the ombudsman. He discussed
the "possibilities of introducing the ombudsman system in African countries, especially in those where, de facto or de jure,
a one-party system is in operation. ''34 It would seem reasonable
to conclude that the ombudsman concept was in the minds of
some members of the Presidential Commission when it first met.
The Presidential Commission considered the rights of the
individual in the one-party state and deemed it important to
provide adequate safeguards for the individual. It reached the
conclusion that "an attempt to protect individual freedom by
a bill of rights would in the circumstances of Tanganyika today
35
be neither prudent nor effective.
31
MANG'ENYA, supra note
32

Report, supra note 28.

27.

supra note 27.
34 Sargant, Correspondence,8 J. ArR. L. 195-97 (1964).

33 MANG'ENYA,

3

5Report, supranote 28, para. 104.
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The Presidential Commission recognized that many government and party officials exercised wide discretionary powers,
and that their decisions can have "most serious consequences
for the individual. '36 The Presidential Commission was aware
'37
It
of "public concern about the danger of abuse of power.
therefore. had given careful thought to the possibility of providing some safeguard for the ordinary citizen which would
not have the effect of limiting the actions of government and
party and hinder the task of nation building. The Presidential
Commission felt that the Disciplinary Commission of TANU,
which had been established to deal with allegations of misconduct by TANU officials, was not sufficient since abuse of power
was not confined to party officials and "officials of government
at all levels of the administration may also abuse the powers
that have been entrusted to them. ' 38 It pointed out that to be
really effective "such a committee requires to be established
by laws and to enjoy certain powers and protection." 39
Based on its study of Tanzania's situation, the Commission
recommended the establishment of a Permanent Commission of
Enquiry. The National Assembly accepted this recommendation
and the Interim Constitution of 1965 provided for the basic
40
framework of the Commission.
THE

PERMANENT COMMISSION OF ENQUIRYITS MEMBERSHIP AND STAFF

With the exceptions that a member of the Permanent
Commission cannot be a Minister or Junior Minister or hold
any office prescribed by Act of Parliament or any office in
TANU, there are no required qualifications. 41 The Act prohibits
holding other offices such as Speaker of the National Assembly,
judge, judicial officer, civil servant, member of a local government authority and any office in service of such authority,
member of the Electoral Commission, member of a scheduled
organization and any office in service of such scheduled or36

Report, supra note 28, para. 106.

3T Id.
38

Report, supra note 28, para. 107.

39 Id.

The Interim Constitution [hereinafter cited as Constitution] provided
that, subject to its provisions, the powers, immunities and procedure of
the Commission shall be prescribed and regulated by Act of Parliament
(§ 67-9). The National Assembly passed The Permanent Commission
of Enquiry Act on February 22, 1966, and it was enacted on March
7, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Act]. The Act was amended in 1968
[hereinafter cited as Act No. 2], and in the same year, Section 68 of the
Constitution was amended [hereinafter cited as Act No. 36]. No reference is made in the Constitution or the Act to the term ombudsman.
41 Constitution, § 68(2).
40
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ganization. 42 There is no prohibition against being a member of
43
the National Assembly.
The Interim Constitution provided for a membership consisting of a chairman and two other members, rejecting the
proposal of the Presidential Commission for six members. 44
Following the recommendation of the Presidential Commission,
the Interim Constitution requires appointment by the President
of Tanzania. This should be compared to other countries where
appointment is made by Parliament (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway), by the Governor General on recommendation of the House of Representatives (New Zealand), by the
Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition (Guyana and Mauritius), by the Crown on recommendation of the
Government (Great Britain), appointment by the Governor
(Northern Ireland), and appointment by the President upon
recommendation of the Knesset House Committee (Israel).
Every Commissioner is required to take an oath of allegianre
and an oath for the due administration of his office administered
by the President.

45

The Presidential Commission recommended a two-year term
of office. The Interim Constitution provides for a two-year
term except that one of the original members of the Commission other than the Chairman was required to vacate his office
at the end of the first year. 4 , No reappointment was possible
under the original Interim Constitutional provision except after
a lapse of two years. 47 However, the Interim Constituiton was
amended to provide reappointment for a further term of two
years, with no further reappointment possible except after a
42 Act, § 4(1).
43 The Act was amended in 1968 to provide for continuity in service for
any prior appointive office vacated upon appointment to the Conunission, if a person is reappointed to the office upon ceasing to be a Commissioner (Act No. 2).
44 Constitution, § 68(1). The first Chairman of the Commission was Chief
Erasto A.M. Mang'enya, who earlier had been Deputy Speaker of the
National Assembly and Representative to the united Nations and who
continued to serve as a member cf the National Assembly. Serving with

him was Sheikh Mohamed Ramiyah and Samson K. Gabba. Subsequently, Kikwete M. Kikwete replaced Mr. Gabba when his term expired. The present members of the Commission are Justice M.P.K.
Kimicha, Mr. W.N. Bizuru and Sheikh Abdallah I. Chaurembo. Mr.
Herbert Katua, the Secretary to the Commission, was appointed in Janu-

ary, 1966.
45 The form of the oath is attached as a Second Schedule to the Act [Act,
§ 7(1)).
4 Constitution, § 68(4).
47 Id., § 68(3).
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lapse of two years. 48 The original term of two years is unusually
short and not in accordance with the normal ombudsman pattern of four years of service with reappointment possible, or
even service during good behavior until age 65 (as in the case
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). A short term goes
contrary to the independence of the office, although, ". . . a
critic may lose verve and flexibility if too long involved in the
49
same work.
The President has the right to remove a member of the
Commission for misbehavior or for a disability which prevents
discharge of his official functions. 50 In a one-party state other
factors militating against a long term and in favor of a short
term are present. Although it may be recognized that two
years is rather inadequate to acquire the experience required
for the proper functioning of the office, there may be apprehension on the part of civil servants and government and party
officials if longer terms are involved. Commission members
with long tenure "may come to be regarded and may begin to
'
regard themselves as potential leaders of a political opposition."51
The compensation of ombudsmen is generally at a high
level to indicate the importance of the position. This appears
to be true also in Tanzania. The annual salary of the chairman
is three thousand pounds and the salary of the other members,
two thousand pounds. 52 These sums are charged on the Con53
solidated Fund.
Staff appointments, promotions, dismissals, suspension from
work, and leave are governed by the laws relating to the civil
service. Salaries and allowances as well as all the other expenditures of the Permanent Commission are payable out of
monies appropriated by Parliament. 54 Every person appointed
to a Commission office must take and subscribe to an oath of
secrecy administered by a Commissioner.5 5 There are seven administrative officers and two legal officers, all seconded to the
4

8Act No. 36. The terms of Chairman Mang'enya and Sheikh Ramiyah
were extended in 1968 until 1970 when they were replaced by present
members of the Commission. In 1969, the term of K.M. Kikwete was
extended until 1971 when he was replaced by W. N. Bizuru.

49 GELLHORN,
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PROTECTORS
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COUNTRIES 425 (1966).
5

§ 68(5).
supra note 14, at 504.

0CONSTITUTION,

51 McAUSLAN,
52

1970: 20 shillings equal one pound; 7.14 shillings equal one dollar.

53 Act,
54 Act,

§ 23.
§§ 6, 22.

55 Act, § 7(2).
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Commission. Persons in the service of the United Republic may
be seconded to the Commission by the Principal Secretary, Establishments. 56
The Commission cannot pick staff without reference to
Central Establishment, and promotions cannot be made without
prior consent of Central Establishment and Treasury, 5 7 although
elsewhere, ombudsmen generally control the selection of staff.
These restrictions are inconsistent with the independence of the
office.
The Commission, although not empowered to do so by
statute, has drafted regulations for its own purposes. These regulations cover the following main subjects: procedure in receiving complaints, office routine, decision whether there should
be an enquiry, how to conduct an enquiry, reporting to the
President, miscellaneous matters, Commission activities outside
Dar Es Salaam, and hearing of complaints outside Dar Es
Salaam.
Jurisdiction of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
The Interim Constitution provides for the Permanent Commission of Enquiry to "have jurisdiction to enquire into the
conduct of any person to whom this section applies in the exercise of his office or authority, or in abuse thereof."58 The words
"conduct" and "abuse" are not defined in the Interim Constitution or the Act but can be filled in by writings of the former
59
and present chairmen as well as regulations of the Commission.
Chief Mang'enya stated that "conduct" includes acts, decisions
or omissions which relate to administration and that an enquiry
can be made "if an official acted wrongly or acted when he
was not supposed to act, or omitted to do what he was legally
'6 0
bound to do, or if he did not follow standard procedure." The
scope of the jurisdiction of the Commission includes
arbitrary decisions or arrests, omissions, improper use of discretionary powers, decisions made with bad
or decisions that have been influenced by
tions, unnecessary or unexplained delays,
sions, misapplication and misinterpretation
regulations, etc. 61

or malicious motive,
irrelevant consideraobvious wrong deciof laws, by-laws, or

56 Act, § 6.
57 MANG'ENYA,

supra note 27, at 10.

58 Constitution, § 67(1).

supra note 27, at 6; Kirnicha, supra note 17, at 2; Regulations, Permanent Commission of Enquiry 3 [hereinafter cited as Regulations].
MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 5.

59 MANG'ENYA,

60

61 Id.
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The Commission has jurisdiction over persons in the service
of the United Republic, party officeholders, and persons in the
service of Commissions, statutory corporate bodies, public authorities, and public boards, as may be specified by Act of Parliament. 2 The jurisdiction of the Commission covers not only
the party and the government, central and local, but also practically all statutory public bodies and party affiliates in the
country. Thus the Commission can investigate the conduct of
ministers, principal secretaries, regional commissioners, area
commissioners, party officials, directors or governors of the
specified organizations, and, except for their judicial decisions,
3
judges and magistrates. 3
The Interim Constitution specifically provides that the President of the United Republic and the Head of the Executive for
4
Zanzibar are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In addition, the Commision has no jurisdiction over the East
African Community, private companies, missions, churches and
the People's Defense Forces." It should be noted that the Second Vice-President is not excluded from the purview of the
Commission.
The Commission cannot "question or review any decision
of any judge, magistrate, or registrar in the exercise of his
judicial functions or any decisions of a tribunal established by
law for the performance of judicial functions in the exercise
of such functions. 6 With the exception of Sweden and Finland,
the exclusion of the judiciary is customary. However, the Commission does challenge their administrative decisions and does
investigate the conduct of judicial officers in the course of their
duties. Questions of delay by the courts have been taken up
by the Commission." The constitutional provision limiting the
jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to judicial and tribunal decisions is a troublesome one, because the Commission
must distinguish between judicial and non-judicial functions.
But the Commission does use a narrow definition of judicial
functions and thus finds many cases justified.68 Complaints
62 Constitution, § 67 (4). A First Schedule attached to the Act lists some 23
scheduled organizations. The Schedule A is out of date because of
nationalization and post-1966 statutory corporations. It should be noted
that an organization need not be set out in the First Schedule of the
Act but may be specified by any other Act (Act, § 2).
63
MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 5,.

64 Constitution, §67(4).
65

MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 5.
66 Constitution, §67(5).
6
7Ghai,
68

supra note 8, at 4.

Bayne, supra note 16, at 43.
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against the judiciary are frequent. In the 1968-1969 report of the
Commission, it was noted that 189 cases out of 1,434 were complaints against the judiciary.6 The Commission continues to
receive complaints about judicial decisions although the public
has been advised that under the law the Commission has no
jurisdiction.
Zanzibar has its own separate executive, legislature, and
party (ASP) with a wide measure of internal autonomy. The
jurisdiction of the Permanent Commission over Zanzibar is
limited to persons in the service of the United Republic and
to Union matters only.7 0 The executive power in respect to all
matters for Zanzibar other than Union matters is vested in the
Head of the Executive for Zanzibar and excluded from the
71
Commission's jurisdiction.
The Commission is willing to review the detention power of
officials to determine the adequacy of the grounds for the exercise of the powers, but cannot review an exercise of the power
by the President. 72 However, under the Preventive Detention
Act of 1962, a person detained by the President can make representation to an Advisory Committee whose decision is not binding on the President. The Commission can investigate whether
the advice given to the President by the Advisory Committee
73
was correct.
The Commission may exercise its jurisdiction and powers
notwithstanding any written legal provision that an act or
omission shall be final or non-appealable or that no proceeding
or decision shall be challenged, reviewed, quashed or questioned. 74 However, as previously noted, judicial decisions are
final.
PROCEDURE OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION

OF ENQUIRY

The Permanent Commission must make an enquiry when
directed to do so by the President, and, subject to direction by
the President not to investigate in any case where the Commission considers that an allegation of misconduct or abuse of
7 5
office or authority ought to be investigated.
Apart from Presidential direction, complaints may be made
69

Annual Report of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, June 1968June 1969, 12 (Dar Es Salaam 1971) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Report].
70 Act, § 3.
71

supra note 27, at 6; Constitution, § 54(1), § 67 (4).
Bayne, supra note 16, at 41.
73 MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 6.
74 Act, § 8.
MANG'ENYA,

72

75

Constitution, § 67 (2).
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orally or in writing, and without charge. Most of the complaints
received are in writing, in English or Swahili, and no particular
form is prescribed. The Commission will not entertain anonymous complaints and will not act upon letters which have copies
sent to other bodies, or letters which are sent to other bodies
with copies to the Commission.7" The Commission is empowered
to investigate on its own initiative.7 7 However, there have been
no such reported instances. 78 A complainant who cannot move
as a result of serious illness or old age debility may deputize another person to write or see the Commission on his behalf. However, before undertaking any investigation, the Commission must
meet the aggrieved person.79 All letters which are new complaints
are seen by the Chairman, who then issues instructions on the
action to be taken and by whom. Files for each complaint are
then opened and the officer who has been designated to handle
the file is requested to take action as soon as possible without
delay. An acknowledgment form is sent to the complainant.
Each Commissioner is requested to endeavor to read each complaint.80
Ombudsman statutes have generally made provision for
complaints from persons in custody. A complainant in custody
on a charge, or after conviction of any offense, or detained
other than under the Preventive Detention Act should have
access to the Commission either in person or by letter.8 1 If by
letter, as in other countries, a duty is imposed on the person
in charge of the place of detention to forward the letter to the
Commission as soon as possible.
The Commission
in its absolute discretion may refuse to investigate or stop any
enquiry commenced if in the opinion of the Commission:
(a) The subject matter of the complaint is trival; or
(b) The complaint is frivolous, or vexatious or is not made in
good faith; or
(c) The complainant has not adequate personal interest in the
subject matter of the complaint; or
(d) Under the law or existing Administrative practice, there
is an adequate remedy or right of appeal; or
(e) Having regard to all the circumstances of the case any
further investigation is unnecessary, the Commission in
76 Regulations, supra note 59, at 1 (b).
77 MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 7.
78 Bayne, supra note 16, at 46.
79 Regulations, supra note 59, at 1 (c).
80 Id., at 5, 7, 10.
81 Id., at 43.
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its discretion may refuse to investigate the matter further;
or
The Commission may refuse to investigate or stop any
further enquiry if the complainant had had knowledge of
his cause of action for more than 12 months before the
complaint is received by the Commission. This Section
applies to complaints which arose after the establishment

of the Commission. In such cases the Secretary will
inform the complainant accordingly and may state the rea82
sons as and if the Commission so directs.

The requirement of adequate personal interest would seem
to be unduly restrictive since the wrong sought to be corrected
is abuse of power, and a complaint from a good citizen with
no personal interest other than public welfare should be as
important as one from the person injured.
The requirement of exhaustion of other available remedies
is a significant limitation. Although there are many cases where
the Commission invoked this rule of exclusion, the key word
is "adequate" and in practice the Commission has not rigorously
83
applied its general rule.
The June 1968-June 1969 Annual Report states that the
Commission has declined to take up a case, or discontinued an
investigation where, in addition to the factors covered in Regulation 42 above,
(ii)
(v)
(vi)

there is no substance to warrant further investigation;
or ..
if after a preliminary investigation, there is no prima facie
case against an offiical; or
8 4
it is against Government Policy.

The discretion to refuse to take a case against government policy
is understandable in a one-party state.
Before entering upon the enquiry, the Commission must
record the nature and scope of the enquiry it proposes to make,
inform the appropriate authority of its intention to make the
enquiry and furnish such authority with a copy of the record.s 5
The complete record forms part of the proceedings of the enquiry.
If the facts reveal the case to be genuine and warrant an
enquiry by a Commissioner handling a complaint, the matter
will be brought up at a meeting attended by the Commissioners,
the secretary of the Commission, and the legal advisor. Advice
is obtained from the legal advisor as to whether the case comes
Id. at 42.
Bayne, supra note 16, at 45.
84 1969 Report, supra note 69, at 84.
85
Act, § 9 (1).
82
83
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within the purview of the Commission, and whether there are
legal implications likely to involve the Commission. If the determination is made that the complaint is legally out of order, or
if the Commission is of the opinion that an enquiry is not justified, the complainant is so notified. If the complaint is legally
in order and the Commission decides that an investigation
should be made, the Commission then decides where the investigation will be held. Decisions are made by majority vote;
no abstentions are allowed. If only two Commissioners are
8 6
present and split their votes, then an enquiry will be held.
The Commission may hold a preliminary enquiry to determine whether an enquiry should be made, or whether the scope
of any enquiry should be enlarged, by examining a complainant
87
or consulting with the appropriate authority.
The term appropriate authority means the Principal Secretary of a ministry or department including the Chief Justice,
the Speaker, and the Comptroller and Auditor General, the
Secretary General of the party, the mayor or chairman of a
local government authority, the governing body of a scheduled
organization, a minister, a junior minister, and regional commissioner. In any case not within the above group, appropriate
authority means the President.8
In the course of an enquiry the Commission may enlarge
the nature and scope of any enquiry. It must then make a further record to that effect and furnish the appropriate authority
with a copy.8 9 Every enquiry shall be conducted in private 0
The place and time is decided by the Commission, and at least
two Commissioners must be present at the enquiry 1 The Commission may hear or obtain information from such persons and
may carry out such investigations as it thinks fit.9 2 In practice,
witnesses appear one at a time and out of the presence of the
person against whom the complaint has been made. When a
prima facie case is established, the Commission may call upon
the person complained against. 3 It is not necessary for the
Commission to hold any hearing, and no person is entitled as
of right to be heard by the Commission. However, if at any
Regulations, supra note 59, at 13-16.
Act, § 9(5).
88 Id., § 2.
89 Id., § 9(2).
86
87

90 Id., § 10(1).

91 Regulations, supra note 59, at 18-19.
92 Act, § 10(2).
93

MANG'ENYA,

supra note 27, at 7.
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time during the enquiry it appears to the Commission that its
report or recommendation may seriously affect any person, department, or scheduled organization, it must give notification
and an opportunity to be heard.14 Witnesses in such defense
may be called by the affected person, department, or scheduled
organization or by the Commissioners.!' 5 Witnesses or persons
against whom complaints have been made cannot be represented
by counsel 6 In practice, all persons complained against are
7
accorded the opportunity to present a defenseY
The Comission has the power to require the attendance of
8s
witnesses and the production of documents, papers and things
Such persons shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges
as witnesses have in a court of law, including fees, allowances
and expenses. 9 The Commission may issue warrants of apprehension for any person not complying with a summons, using
police officers to execute such warrants. 10 0 No privilege can
be pleaded against disclosure unless the President certifies that
the giving of any information, the answering of any questions
or the production of any documents, paper or thing might
prejudice the security, defense, or international relations of
Tanzania or the investigation or detection of offenses or would
involve the disclosure of Cabinet deliberations.' 0 1 It should be
noted that anything said, and any document, paper, or thing
produced by any person in the course of an enquiry is privileged in the same manner as if the enquiry were a proceeding
in court.' 0 2 Any information supplied to the Commission is inadmissible against any person in any court or other proceeding
other than further Commission proceedings except for certain
designated offenses of the Penal Code. 10 3 No person is liable
for prosecution by reason of giving information or production
of documents, paper or things except for certain designated
04
offenses such as perjury and similar offenses.1
The Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence and
Act, § 10(2).
95 Regulations, supra note 59, at 22.
96 Id., at 22.
97 MANG'ENYA, supra note 27, at 8.
04

9S Act, § 11 (1).

99Id., §§ 13(1), 11(6).
101 Id., § 11 (4).
102 Id., § 14(1).
102

Id., § 19(2).

103

Id., § 13 (2).
Id., § 14 (3).

104
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"a decision is made on a balance of probability"'0 5 as to the
admission of such evidence. The Commission has stated that it
will play the part of an active judge and that it will not confine itself "to witnesses called by either party or evidence
adduced by such party," and that it will call other witnesses
who may assert any evidence in the inquiry.1 6 It may call on
the assistance of experts at any time and request confidential
reports.1 7 The Attorney General is frequently called upon for
legal advice. 0 8 At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioners
by majority vote decide whether adequate grounds have been
laid for making any report or recommendations. If the Commission finds the evidence insufficient, the case is closed unless
the enquiry was commenced on the instructions of the President
in which case the President will be notified accordingly." 9
The Commission has the right at any time to enter upon any
premises occupied by a department or scheduled organization
to inspect the premises and carry out an investigation for the
purposes of an enquiry, but must notify the appropriate authority before doing so. However, the President may by notice
to the Commission preclude such right of inspection and entry
if the President is satisfied that to do so would prejudice the
security, defense or international relations of Tanzania. 10
SAFARIS
One of the most significant aspects of the Commission in
a basically rural country is its travels on two types of official
safaris: (1) to hold public meetings to explain the work of the
Commission, followed by private sessions to receive complaints;
and (2) to hold investigations."'
The Commission each year has toured the country to explain its activities to the people, civil servants, party officials
and scheduled organization employees. 1 2 In the private sessions
which follow, complaints are heard, advice given and simple
cases settled on the spot. All serious cases requiring notification
105 Kimicha, supra note 17, at 3.
106 Regulations, supra note 59, at 36.
107 Id., at 44.
108 Bayne, supra note 16, at 48.

109 Regulations, supra note 59, at 21, 25.
11o Act, § 12.
111 1967 Report, supra ncte 2, at 4; Annual Report of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, July 1967-June 1968, 3 (Dar Es Salaam 1969) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Report]; 1969 Report, supra note 69, at 3; Regulations, supra note 59, at 46-7.
112 In its first year, the Commission visited 14 regions, 53 districts and
addressed 64,065 persons; in the second year, it visited 7 regions, 10

districts and addressed 21,262 persons.
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of the appropriate authority can be decided by at least two
Commissioners, otherwise the case must be referred to Dar Es
Salaam and a full Commission hearing.
The regulations spell out the efforts of the Commission
while on safaris to mark its independence and impariality so
as not to be identified too closely with TANU, government departments or scheduled organizations. For example, travel arrangements should, if possible, avoid accepting the use of motor
vehicles or hospitality from such organizations.
REMEDIES

The Commission is required to report the proceedings of
every enquiry, including its conclusions and recommendations,
to the President. 113 The Commission makes a secret report to
the President if the Commission is of the opinion that the decision, recommendation or omission which was the subject
matter of enquiry (a) appears to be contrary to law; (b) was
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory;
(c) was wrong; or (d) a discretionary power has been exercised for an improper purpose or that a discretionary decision
has been based on irrelevant grounds or irrelevant considera114
tions have been taken into account.
However, the regulations provide that if at any stage of
an enquiry the Commission is of the opinion that a report to
the President is unnecessary because the matter could be
referred to the appropriate authority for further consideration,
or the omission could be rectified, or the decision could be
canceled or varied, or the law on which the decision, recommendation, act or omission was based should be reconsidered,
or any other steps could be taken to remedy the wrong; then
for the time being a report will not be made to the President
unless the appropriate authority does not respond within a
reasonable time with respect to action taken or if the action
taken does not satisfy the Commission. 115 No comment that is
adverse to any person, department or scheduled organization
shall be contained in a report to the President unless an opportunity to be heard has been given. 116
The Act further requires that every report to the President
shall contain a statement of any action taken by any person
whose conduct is under enquiry, or by the department or
113
114
115
116

Constitution, § 67(3).
Regulations, supra note 59, at 30.
Id., at 26.
Act, § 10(2).
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scheduled organization of which such person is a member or
employee, to correct or ameliorate any conduct, procedure, act
or omission adversely commented upon in the report. 117 This
means that the Commission may informally seek to have its
recommendations accepted by the person, department or scheduled organization complained against. When the recommendations are accepted the matter is concluded.
The Regulations provide that the Commission may disclose
in its report such matters as ought to be disclosed in order to
establish grounds for its recommendations and conclusion. But
the report may not disclose matters that might prejudice the
security, defense or international relations of Tanzania, or the
investigation or detection of offenses, or involve the disclosure
of Cabinet deliberations." 8
The report must be signed by the three Commissioners, and
if the Commissioners are not in agreement the report must
contain a statement of any matter which is the subject of disagreement, which statement must be signed by the dissenting
Commissioner." 9 No member dissented during the first 34
months of operation and dissent could occur only rarely, if at
all, because, as Chief Mang'enya stated: "We iron out differences, filter all opinions, crystallize our recommendations, and
then make one report. '120 This is in accord with the traditional
African method of conducting affairs by free discussion until a
consensus is reached.
In addition to the reports to the President at the conclusion of enquiries, an annual report covering the fiscal period
from July 1 to June 30 is required to be prepared for the President to be placed before the National Assembly. Such reports
may not disclose the identity or contain any statement which
21
may point to the identity of persons complained against.
IMMUNITIES

OF

THE

COMMISSION

No enquiry or proceeding of the Commission can be held
bad for error or irregularity of form. Furthermore, except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, no enquiry, proceeding, process or report of the Commission can be challenged, reviewed,
122
quashed or questioned in any court.
Id., § 15(1).
118 Regulations, supra note 59, at 45.
119 Act, § 15(2).
120 Letter from Chief Mang'enya to author, 1969.
121 Act, § 17.
122 Id., § 18.
117
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No proceeding, civil or criminal, lies against the Commissioners, staff members, or police officers serving or executing
the orders and warrants of the Commission. Anything such a person may do, or say, in the course if the exercise, or intended
exercise, of functions under the Act is immune unless it is
shown such action was taken in bad faith. However, the immunities noted here are not applicable in proceedings involving
violations of the Official Secrets Ordinance, certain sections of
the Penal Code in relation to an enquiry, or Section 20 of the
Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act (1966) .123
The Commissioners, staff members or police officers aiding
the Commission cannot be called to give evidence in any proceeding of a judicial nature in regard to anything coming to
their knowledge in the exercise of functions under the Act.
However, the immunity is not applicable in proceedings in12 4
volving violations of laws noted in the preceding paragraph.
Reports of the Commission are privileged in the same manner
125
as records and judgments of court proceedings.
OFFmsEs AGAINST THE COMMISSION

Ample protection is given to the Commission and its proceedings by the Act which makes it an offense to:
1. disobey any order of the Commission for attendance or production without lawful justification or excuse;
2. refuse to be examined or answer questions without lawful
justification or excuse;
3. willfully present any false document;
4. make false statements with intent to deceive the Commission;
5. mislead or attempt to mislead the Commission;
6. publish any false or scandalous libel on the Commission;
7. create or join in any disturbance which interrupts or is likely
to interrupt proceedings;
8. willfully obstruct, hinder or resist the Commission or any
other person acting in the exercise of powers conferred by the
Act, without lawful justification or excuse.126

The Act prohibits any person including the Commission
and its staff from disclosing the contents of documents or information other than in the course of official duty. In addition,
any person who knows of such information disclosed in violation of the prohibition and publishes or communicates it to any
other person, other than for the purpose of prosecution under
123Id., § 19(1), (3).

124 Id.
125
126

Id., § 19 (2).
Id., § 20.
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the Act or in the course of official duty, is committing an offense. However, in both instances, prosecution can only be
commenced with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Power to Point Out Defects in Law
No power is given to the Commission to point out defects
in the law, but the Commission has pointed out that in the
127
course of is work obvious defects in law have been discovered.
Chairman Kimicha stated at the 1971 Addis Ababa Conference that the Commission has "persistently pointed out some
defects in the law and the Civil Service Regulations that have
come to its attention during the course of its work. Consequently, some amendments have been effected where necessary.
Likewise, the Commission has commented against some undesir128
able trends in the administration.'
Attitude of Civil Service, Public Officials,
and Scheduled Organization Employees
The bureaucracy initially resisted the idea of the Permanent
Commission of Enquiry. In the First Annual Report of the
Commission, reference is made to one official planting informers
to report back the activities of the Commission and the identity
of complainants. But it

went on to say that ".

.

. all this

'129
In
is now very rare and with time it will stop entirely.
the Second Annual Report it is noted "that some officials still
entertain some misgivings or misapprehension towards the
Commission.' 130 In addition, complainants have been discriminated against by those against whom complaints have been
made and some officials have failed to reply to letters from
the Commission.13' The trends in opposition to the Commission
"have not continued to any significant extent in later years.
This is no doubt due to the manner in which the Commission
has conducted its work . . ."',132 "In the eyes of more junior levels
of the civil service, the P.C.E. is seen as a defender against the
caprice of their seniors, for the awareness among civil servfnts
that the Commission will assist seems to be highly developed,

1967 Report, supra note 2, at 9.
Kimicha, supra note 17, at 5.
129 1967 Report, supra note 2, at 5.
130 1968 Report, supra note 111, at 3.
131 1967 Report, supra note 2 at 13; 1968 Report, supra note 111, at 10; 1969
Report, supra note 69, at 8.
132 Bayne, supranote 16, at 53.
127
128
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33
and it no doubt serves to boost morale in the civil service.'
Publicity
The work of the Commission has been publicized in Tanzania through the newspapers, radio, through the public meetings held on tours, and talks to educational institutions and
Ujamaa villages. Its activity is not a matter of public disclosure
since investigations and reports to the President are secret.
However, the Annual Reports of the Commission placed before
the National Assembly are covered in great depth by the newspapers.

Commission Assistance Where No Jurisdiction
One of the most interesting aspects of the Commission is its
policy to help even those complainants whose cases are outside
the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission pointed out
in its First Report that rather than reject some complaints outright as not being within its jurisdiction, it decided to help
where possible as a "poor man's lawyer" and advise complain34
ants as to where they should go to seek relief.
Chairman Mang'enya advised in 1969 that every individual
who feels aggrieved should lodge a complaint with the Commission and that even though the Commission was not a panacea
for all ills, "the aggrieved individual will always get either
a piece of advice, a word of comfort, a 'flower' of consolation,
or a rewarding decision."'13 5
Minorities
This writer had elsewhere posed the question as to whether
the ombudsman can help in aiding minorities against discrimination and concluded that the institution had not yet developed
an effective record of protecting minorities." 30 Chief Mang'enya
stated that not many complaints are received from non-Africans
and speculated that one reason for this situation is the suspicion
"that the Commission is going to reveal everything and because
it is working as a 'secret police' as some of them call it, they
are afraid of reprisal from the officials whom they may complain against." Another possibility is that the non-African communities do not like to jeopardize their stay in the country
and do not want to get involved. ' 3 This may be a problem
133
134

135

Id.
1967 Report, supra note 2 at 10.

Mang'enya, Nation's Watchdog, The Standard (Dar Es Salaam) Dec. 5,
1969, at 11.

130 Frank, supra note 4, at 489-90.
137

The Standard (Dar Es Salaam) Dec. 16, 1968, at 14.
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"which only time will dissipate, but it does underline the problem faced by an ombudsman in a multi-racial or multi-communal country."'138
Some Observations With Respect to the
Permanent Commission of Enquiry
The Commission has been in operation for six years and some
observations are in order. The proceedings of the Commission,
the reports to the President, and the actions of the President
on the reports are not disclosed publicly. The activities of the
Commission are revealed only through the annual reports. The
public, therefore, does not have any current information. The
First Annual Report notes "that non-availability of investigated
cases to the public has had the effect of creating the impression
that the Commission has very little to do." 139 This prevents the
government agencies, TANU and the scheduled organizations
from learning of defects which might apply to them and from
taking corrective actions.
The policy of the Commission to help complainants even
when cases are outside the jurisdiction of the Commission indicates a broad and humane approach to its functions. This is
particularly important in a country where most of the population is rural, poor and uneducated.
The Commission performs a valuable service in bringing
itself to the people outside of Dar Es Salaam by going on tours
to the regions, districts and villages to hold public meetings, to
receive complaints and to hold investigations. In the First Annual Report the Commission states that it was on tour for a
total of 215 days during the reporting year.14 0 The Conference
of African jurists on African Legal Process and the Individual
viewed with approval a traveling ombudsman as an effective
institution in the field of the protection of the individual's rights
as evidenced by the Tanzanian experiment with the Permanent
Commission of Enquiry.11
The Commission is subject to effective control by the President and is essentially an instrument of the President. In Tanzania, this may be said to be of advantage to the Comsission
because of the strong role of President Nyerere. But this does
138

Bayne, supra note 16, at 50.

139 1967 Report, supra note 2, at 12.
1

40

141

Id., at 4.
Econ. Comm'n for Africa, Conference of African Jurists on African
Legal Process and the Individual, Report, at 5 U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/521
(1971).
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mark a major difference in the classical legislative ombudsman
and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry. But this difference
has no significance if on balance the Permanent Commission of
Enquiry is an effective instrument in handling complaints. The
record shows that the Commission is not reluctant to deal with
complaints and recommend corrective action aginst Ministers,
Regional Area Commissioners and other officials of the Government, as well as TANU officials. The Commission does review
the actions of those advising the President or exercising powers
delegated from the President.
Conclusion
The Tanzania Commission must be viewed with critical interest. The ultimate question that must be answered is whether
this is the best system for a one-party state to provide the citizen some device to lodge complaints against both state and
party. Obviously, a one-party state will not permit a device to
function which interferes with government policy, but it must
permit machinery to operate which will siphon off resentment
against party and state. The formation of the Commission is
an admission by TANU that it "has not adopted the fallacy
that, because it is the only lawful political party, there cannot
be anything wrong with it or the Government that is formed
14 2
from it.
It is a brave experiment to permit the aggrieved citizen an
inexpensive and informal remedy to complain against abuses
by party and state. The evidence would seem to indicate that
it works.

142

McAuslan, supra note 14, at 505.
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MARXIAN SOCIALIST LAW AND THE
LAW REVIEWS
JoHN N. HAZARD*

Thirty-five years ago a law review considered itself daring
to print an article on Marxian socialist law.' Today, such articles have become routine, not only as leading articles by the
the teachers in the field,2 but also as student notes.3 An entire
issue of the Columbia Law Review was devoted in 1970 to a
review of thirty-five years of research in selected aspects of
Soviet law.4 By no means is writing limited to the law of the
U.S.S.R., for much of it concerns the People's Republic of
China,5 and other Marxian socialist countries, including those
in Africaf Even Cuban law has recently been given a lead
position in an article written by a former campus militant
attracted to scholarship by a course in Marxian socialist law
7
and a research visit to Cuban courtrooms.
What is happening? Is this publication record evidence that
the U. S. law student, the law teacher and even the readers
of the professional journals have swung to the left? Undoubtedly this fact provides some of the explanation, as any spectator of campus demonstrations and of urban lawyers' activities can certify. New criteria of "relevance" are being presented today by lawyers and incipient lawyers discontented
with familiar career patterns, yet, the new law review emphasis is hardly rebellion for rebellion's sake. It seems to
represent something more: a search for provocative ideas by
* Professor of Public Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1 Hazard, Soviet Law: An Introduction, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (1936).
2See WRITINGS

ON

SOVIET

LAW

AND

ON

SOVIET INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(W. Butler ed. 1966).
3 Note, Collective Bargaining in the Soviet Union, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1191
(1949); Comment, Role of State Arbitration Under the New Conditions
of Economic Management in the Soviet Union, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1285
(1968). Some grew into articles as with Markovits, Civil Law in East
Germany- Its Development and Relations to Soviet Legal History and
Ideology, 78 YALE L.J. 1 (1968).
4 70 COLUM. L. REV. No. 2 (1970).
5 See Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China:
An Introduction, 79 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1966); Hsiao, The Role of Economic Contractsin Communist China, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1029 (1965); Lee,
Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60 MICH.
L. REV. 439 (1962); Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute
Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284 (1967).
6 Hazard, Mali's Socialism and the Soviet Legal Model, 77 YALE L.J. 28
(1967).
7 Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1969).
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a generation of editors sensing its inadequacy in the task of
coping with the social problems of our time. These editors are,
in the main, not revolutionaries, but rather are reformers
seeking ideas.
In a sense the writers, editors and readers of the Marxian
socialist materials have taken to heart what Dean Harry
Bigelow of the University of Chicago Law School told his
listeners in the 1930's. He was among the first to remark that
the law school's function was not alone to train legal craftsmen but also to inspire incipient "statesmen" with ideas. In
the 1930's it was still considered a radical departure from goals
established centuries ago by the lecturers of the Inns of Court
in London and later espoused by the law school teachers of
19th century United States. Today, this approach has become
commonplace and finds expression in the annual reports and
after-dinner speeches of Deans.
Bigelow's approach led to a reconsideration of both the
legal techniques and the moral values to be imparted by
teachers. It soon became evident to pioneer thinkers that
Americans would be limiting the options they could offer
others, if they were to search only in the common law world
for their models and inspirations. It was not by accident that
the first chair of comparative law was created at the University
of Chicago under Bigelow's stewardship and filled by Max
Rheinstein. In a very real sense Rheinstein provided a bridge
to the Continent, and opened the eyes of his students to alternatives to the U. S. solutions. He did not limit his teaching
to conduct of a seminar on comparative law, but rather entered
the lists with the old-timers to present common law subjects
with some provocative Romanist alternatives as accompanying
materials. Chicagoans became aware of the rest of the world,
a happening not customary in law schools of preceding decades
where comparative law was considered a cultural subject suitable only to graduate students hoping eventually to emulate
the erudition of a Roscoe Pound. Rheinstein made it an undergraduate experience appropriate to the prospective legislator in
Springfield or the practitioner in LaSalle Street.
The idea of presenting a world outlook spread widely so
that today it is commonplace to provide comparative law
in the standard curriculum for the law undergraduate. More
than 100 teachers have registered themselves in the Directory
of the Association of American Law Schools as teaching com-

1972

FACULTY

COMMENT

parative law. By no means are they only the foreign scholars
who sought refuge in U. S. schools from various European
tyrannies. Many are born and bred U. S. citizens, often with
relatively limited experience abroad. Some have studied in
European schools, and a growing number have taught in
Africa, thanks to the extraordinary programs of the project of
the International Legal Center known as SAILER.
Notable evidence of the practical value of comparative
law is provided by a letter written the author in 1965 by a
young Chicago practitioner after receiving a request for an
evaluation of the course in the light of his practice. He wrote:
The most important thing to learn is that there is another
system. Knowing this, an attorney can begin questioning his own
system with the assurance that it is not the only way to organize
a society. From this, I believe, an attorney can understand the
true meaning of tradition and precedent.
When precedent is against me, I am not afraid to argue that
it is now time that the rule be re-examined in the light of
today's changed circumstances. When precedent is with me, I
am not complacent with the knowledge that I have the support
of tradition. Instead, I try to show that the rule is as valid today
as it ever was.
This letter emphasizes what many have expected to be the case,
that it is the "idea man" with a wide range of experience and
learning who writes the best appellate briefs and drafts the
best memoranda to meet the needs of law practice, and who
is best prepared to respond to the multitude of policy questions
which a contemporary legally trained mind is asked to examine
in today's complex world.
Materials on Marxian socialist law now are a segment of
the comparative law materials being presented in law school
teaching and legal periodicals, from which so much teaching
material is drawn. They are the most recent arrivals, following thirty years of French and German studies, and are now
being seized upon as the most exciting. It is symptomatic of
the growing concern for the value to be found in these materials that the VIII Congress of Comparative Law held in
September 1970 in Europe included upon its agenda many
topics of vital concern to all developed societies." In one case
participants explored the methods for dispute resolution outside of courts and arbitration tribunals. The topic was suggested
by a Harvard Law School professor, and avidly accepted by
the Europeans responsible for the agenda. Their concern was
the same as his, namely to determine whether there is somes The

papers by American participants were published in

LEGAL THOUGHT

IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES

Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1970).
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thing that can be done to reduce the burden upon the courts
and at the same time develop a clearer sense of social consciousness among occupants of crowded, municipally owned apartment
houses where the "cop" and the "court" are anathema, sometimes even psychological stimuli to disorderly conduct.
Quite independently of the Congress' thinking on the topic
a young lawyer for Model Cities has been exploring methods
of controlling disorder in municipal housing around the world
so as to find ideas suitable to improvement of the situation in
New York. His studies have led him to many systems, among
them those of the Marxian socialist countries. The matter of
Marxian socialist law is not, therefore, purely of theoretical
interest. It has become practical, and neither he nor others who
think like him will be surprised to learn that the Harvard professor who proposed the subject for discussion at the VIII
Congress has chosen to write a paper himself on social controls
in the People's Republic of China, expressing in his conclusion
his opinion of their relevancy to other societies.9
Only a few years ago a suggestion that Marxian socialist
controls in public housing might provide models for use in the
United States raised cries of anguish from a class of students.
The arguments were not only that there were grave constitutional problems of due process involved, but there were social
attitudes which could not be abandoned if our way of life were
to survive. One of these was that neighbors must not discipline
neighbors. That was thought to be the task of the state official,
and of him alone.
In 1969 the same suggestions of the utility of tenants'
courts received quite different responses from young men and
women who know the problems of the ghettos, and who abhor
the intervention of police. Contemporary students are still not
sure whether social controls of this nature are desirable under
current social philosophies, or whether Constitutional precepts
will change enough to permit their use, but the germ of an
idea has been presented. The article by the recent law school
graduate on the popular tribunals in Cuba" ° is an example of
such a search. He wanted to know what others are doing as he
entered upon a career with legal aid, seeking to protect the
ghetto dweller from excesses of the law and order system as it
was manifested then in New York.
' As an example, consider the COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL
PROBLEMS and LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW, the journal of the Law and

Society Association.

10 Berman, supra note 7.

FACULTY COMMENT

Yet another aspect of Marxian socialism and its law has
intrigued the law students of the current generation. There
seems to be few in the law schools of the United States who are
not interested in "development." Concern for this problem has
aided SAILER in recruiting young teachers for African law
schools. Still other graduates have found places in government
agencies or private foundations concerned with the problems
of aiding Africans, Latin Americans and Asians to develop their
economies and democratize their political systems. Some are
in business offices where the lawyer has to study not only
problems of trade with developing areas, but the investment
by U. S. business in these areas.
Development goes hand in hand in many countries of the
world with "socialism." The U. S. adviser must understand the
concept in "socialism's" various manifestations if he is to cope
with its proponents in the regions with which he is concerned.
Of necessity, law school courses in law and development, of
which there are increasing numbers, must have materials explaining the hopes and fears of those in power in the developing
countries, including those who look to one or another form of
"socialism" for ideas and possible solutions. To provide these
materials the law reviews are responding by publishing studies
of socialism and law as manifested in a wide variety of countries.
The law review with its eyes on the world cannot but
join the parade, for who can talk intelligently with a businessman or state official in a developing area, if he thinks of socialism only in terms of Stalinism? Even Marxian socialism now
speaks in many tongues and with such variation that a widely
spread group of legal scholars are now engaged in attempting
to determine what those tongues and variations are. Some
scholars talk even of ultimate convergence between East and
West in a pattern like Sweden's. Considering all of this, can
the law review seeking to stand in the adventuresome front
rank omit the subject? The letters of invitation to write such
pieces for law reviews throughout the country suggest that
the matter is on many editors' minds.
Finally, Marxian socialist studies give outlet to editors
seeking to break down the barriers between disciplines. No
author can treat a Marxian socialist legal system without calling
upon materials from economics, sociology, political science and
philosophy. The Marxian socialist family of legal systems is
distinguished by the intertwining of themes from all of these
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fields of study. To treat any aspect of the subject requires a
broad perspective. Some editors have not yet grasped this fact,
as evidenced by one rejection of a Marxian socialist study on
the ground that "it is not law," but many are quite prepared
to take the plunge. Why not, when some law reviews have
been introduced which treat of nothing but social problems in
their broadest aspects, and use various techniques to supplement
research in the books? 10 Law in the current image becomes
clearly a social science, an instrument of social engineering to
be evaluated for its successes and failures in implementing a
social philosophy and meeting contemporary need, often felt
primarily in economic terms. Marxian socialist law is but the
system most evidently engaged in social engineering in implementation of clearly expressed values, and law review articles
on its provisions inevitably treat its many aspects. They give
rise to thought about the U. S. legal system and the need of
seeing it also in social terms.
All of this suggests that the law review in serving today's
readers will want to publish more than the traditional articles
on tax, corporation, constitutional and tort law, important as
these are to the retention of subscribers. Editors find themselves
in something of the same position as the conductors of symphony orchestras. There must be enough Mozart, Beethoven and
Brahms to keep the old timers subscribing, but no concert will
be called a success with the audience as a whole unless it includes Stravinsky, Bartok, Hindemith or Pinkham.
Law reviews have readers with a wide variety of concerns,
as they always have had. They also perform a vital part of
the educational process in the law schools of which they are a
part, and on the continuing effective performance of that function hangs their subsidy from the faculty. To continue to recruit
students they must appeal to inquisitive students, many of
whom are now offered seemingly more exciting work as student practitioners in law offices for the poor. Under such circumstances law reviews must cater to both young and old, and
among the young are those who wish to relate themselves more
closely than has been customary in the past to the community.
Quite naturally, they turn to other systems for ideas, and among
these one of the most stimulating, whether to emulate or combat, is that of Marxian socialism.

